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INTRODUCTION
This sixteenth Survey marks the third year since the scope of the
Survey was expanded formally to include employment discrimination
law as well as labor relations law.' This year, for the first time, the
Survey devotes more coverage to employment discrimination law than
to its more traditional topic of labor relations law. This change reflects
the magnitude of the Supreme Court's work in the former area dur-
ing the Survey year—April 1, 1976 through March 31, 1977. In its
1976 Term, the Supreme Court clarified or changed broad areas of
the law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By compari-
son, the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts, and the National
Labor Relations Board were relatively quiet in the area of labor re-
lations law.
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court rendered labor law
decisions concerning work-preservation strikes as secondary boycotts, 2
choice of law rules for the application of right-to-work laws, 3 and
standards of review under the Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act for restrictions on access to the union ballot. 4 The lower
courts decided several cases interpreting the Supreme Court's Buffalo
Forge decision.° The NLRB altered its position on the effect of labor
union racial discrimination on the certification of a bargaining rep-
resentative. 8
Supreme Court employment discrimination law decisions during
the Survey year include the Court's controversial sex discrimination
decision concerning pregnancy disability 'benefits,' decisions affecting
the rights of both federal and state employees under Title V11, 8 and a
decision defining the Title VII rights of white discriminatees.° In ad-
dition, the lower courts decided various questions of standing to sue
for employment discrimination'° as well as the capacity of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to sue for employment dis-
crimination where a charging party has already brought private suit."
' See Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 13.C.
IND. & COM. L. Rev. 965, 966 (1975).
2 See pp. 1047-62 infra.
3 See pp. 1078-90 infra.
'See pp, 1090-1103 it!fra.
5
 Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
See pp. 1062-77 infra.
'See pp. 1103-17 infra,
See pp. 1118-34 infra.
8
 See pp. 1134-62 infra.
2 See pp. I 182-89 infra.
"See pp. 1163-74 infra.
" See pp. 1174-82 infra.
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1. SECONDARY BOYCOTTS — NLRB RIGHT-TO-CONTROL ANALYSIS OF
WORK-PRESERVATION DISPUTES: Enterprise Association.
Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act)
makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to engage in any strike
or picketing of which an object is to cause a person, among other
things, to cease doing business with or dealing in the products of any
other person.' This provision was fashioned to prohibit a union from
imposing secondary boycotts by using a "neutral," one with whom it
has no dispute, as a vehicle for boycotting another person.' At the
same time, a proviso to section 8(b)(4)(B) excludes from the statute's
coverage otherwise lawful primary activity—strikes and picketing
against an employer with whom the union does have a dispute—even
though such activity may visit economic sanctions upon a neutral. 3
Applying this statutory distinction between the permissible incidental
effects of primary activity and the impermissible objectives of second-
ary activity and the concomitant duty of fashioning meaningful stand-
ards for identifying the secondary boycott have proved especially elu-
sive tasks for both the National Labor Relations Board (Board or
NLRB) and the federal courts.
' 29 U.S.C, § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents— .
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting
commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employ-
ment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise, handle or work
on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any ser-
vices; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in com-
merce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object
thereof is—
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other per-
son, or forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain
with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless
such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That
nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing; ...
A closely related statutory provision, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. V 1975), proscribes
agreements or contracts that would impose a secondary boycott upon neutral employ-
ers. See note 6 infra for the text of section 8(e).
2 The legislative history of the Labor Management Relations Act is illustrative of
this point:
Thus, it would not be lawful for a union to engage in a strike against em-
ployer A for the purpose of forcing that employer to cease doing business
with employer B; nor would it be lawful for a union to boycott employer A
because employer A uses or otherwise deals in the goods of or does busi-
ness with employer B (with whom the union has a dispute).
S. REP. No. 105 on S. 1126 80th, CONG. 1ST. SESS. (1947), reprinted in, 1 NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 428 (1948).
See text of section 8(b)(4) at note 1 supra.
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Particularly troublesome has been the legality of concerted union
activity to enforce work-preservation clauses—union-employer
agreements to preserve work performed by members of the bargain-
ing unit. Although such agreements arise within the context of collec-
tive bargaining relationships, their enforcement necessarily affects not
only those who otherwise would perform the work, but also those in
purchasing positions who would prefer to install materials fabricated
away from the jobsite. 4
 In the leading case of National Woodwork Man-
ufacturers Association v. NLRB, 5
 the Supreme Court held that a union's
economic pressure upon its immediate employer to force the latter's
compliance with a valid work-preservation clause, 6
 does not necessarily
violate section 8(b)(4)(B), despite its effects upon neutral parties.? The
Court established as the proper test for a secondary purpose whether,
in the totality of the circumstances, the agreement and the union's at-
tempts to enforce it were aimed at preserving work traditionally per-
formed by union members or whether the union's actions were "...
calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere."
The NLRB's application of the totality-of-the-circumstances test
enunciated in National Woodwork gave rise to a conflict among the cir-
cuit courts of appeals. 9 Prior to National Woodwork, the Board had
established a right-to-control test in order to determine whether the
objectives of work preservation were secondary." Under this test, the
Board consistently found an immediate employer's lack of the right-
to-control contested work to be a significant, if not determinative, in-
dication that union objectives in enforcing a work-preservation clause
were secondary and hence in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B)." The
For example: a builder, architect, or general contractor who specifies the use of
a prefabricated product.
5 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
° A valid work-preservation clause is one that does not fall within the proscription
of section 8(e) of the NLRA which prohibits "hot cargo" agreements. In relevant part
section 8(e) provides that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using.
selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other
employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract
or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agree-
ment shall he to such extent unenforcible and void ....
29 U.S.C. 158(e) (Supp. V 1975). The test for validity under section 8(e) focuses upon
whether the work subject to an agreement traditionally has been performed by union
members. National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 645-46.
386 U.S. at 644-45. In National Woodwork, the manufacturers of prefabricated
doors that the union had refused to install were the affected parties. Id. at 645.
° Id. at 644-45.
° See text at notes 15-19 infra.
'° 386 U.S. at 616 n.3. The first application of the Board's test occurred in Clif-
ton Deangulo, 121 N.L.R.B. 676, 684-86, 42 L.R.R.M. 1420, 1421-22 (1958).
"See, e.g., International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 137 N.L.R.B. 1178, 1181-82, 50
L.R.R.M. 1333, 1335-36 (1962); Enterprise Ass'n Local 638, 124 N.L.R.B. 521, 526-27,
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Board continued to apply this right-to-control test after National
Woodwork was decided." While the courts of appeals for the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits sustained the Board's adherence to its approach,"
the Third," Eighth' 5 and District of Columbia" Circuits ruled that
the Board's test focused mechanically upon the right-to-control factor
to the exclusion of other circumstances surrounding the enforcement
of a work-preservation clause. Consequently, the latter circuits ruled
that the Board's test conflicted with National Woodwork."
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court resolved this conflict
by upholding the Board's application of its right-to-control test in
NLRB v. Pipefitters Local No. 638 (Enterprise Association)." The Court
established that the existence of a valid work-preservation clause does
not immunize union efforts to enforce the clause from the taint of
secondary boycott." Then, deferring to the Board's expertise, the
Court concluded that the significance which the Board attaches to the
lack of control over disputed work is within its discretion" and does
not contravene the totality-of-the-circumstances test set forth in Na-
tional Woodwork. 2 ' Applying these standards to the Enterprise Association
record, the Court held the Board's determination that the union in
that case had engaged in a secondary boycott was supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record considered as a whole."
In Enterprise Association, Local 638, a pipefitters union, rep-
49 L.R.R.M. 1435, 1436 (1959). In reaching this conclusion, the Board has reasoned
that the union's objectives must be to force some other employer, normally a general
contractor, to grant its members the work assignments, or alternatively, to force its im-
mediate employer to cease doing business with the other party. Id.
"See, e.g., Local 438 United Pipefitters (George Koch Sons, Inc.), 201 N.L.R.B.
59, 63, 82 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1117-18 (1973).
"Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 493,
438, 88 L.R.R.M. 3542, 3545 (9th Cir. 1975); George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490
F.2d 323, 326-27, 84 L.R.R.M. 2957, 2959-60 (4th Cir. 1973). But see Western
Monolithics Concrete Prods. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 522, 525.26, 77 L.R.R.M. 3023, 3025-
26 (9th Cir. 1971) (Ninth Circuit refused to sanction the Board's right-to-control
analysis where it was employed to allow union picketing against a general contractor
which was not the union's immediate employer but controlled the disputed work as-
signment).
" NLRB v. Local 164, Intl Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 388 F.2d 105,
109, 67 L.R.R.M. 2352, 2354-55 (3d Cir. 1968).
" American Boilers Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 556, 561-62, 69 L.R.R.M.
2858, 2861 (8th Cir. 1968).
1 " Local 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 906, 909, 74
L.R.R.M. 2851, 2853 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"Local 636, 430 F.2d at 910-11, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2854; American Boiler, 404 F.2d
at 561, 69 L.R,R,M. at 2861. See Local 164, 388 F.2d at 107.09, 67 L.R.R.M. at 2353-55.
See also, Beacon Castle Square Bldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 188, 192 n.10, 70
L.R.R.M. 2357, 2360 n.10 (1st Cir. 1969) (indicating disapproval of right-to-control test
in dicta).
"429 U.S. 507 (1977).
" Id. at 520-21.
"Id. at 528.
" Id. at 524.
"Id. at 530-31.
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resented steamfitters employed by a plumbing and heating sub-
contractor, Hudik-Ross Co., Inc. (Hudik).23 Local 638 and Hudik
were parties to a collective bargaining agreement which included a
work-preservation clause. Under this clause union members were enti-
tled to perform the internal piping work on heating and air-
conditioning units at the jobsite prior to installing them." Hudik bid
on and was awarded a subcontract with Austin Company (Austin), a
general contractor. Despite the restrictive provisions of Hudik's collec-
tive bargaining agreement, Hudik's contract with Austin specified the
installation of prefabricated climate control units manufactured by
Slant/Fin Corporation (Slant/Fin). 25 When the prefabricated climate
control units arrived at the construction site, upon Local 638's advice
its members refused to install them. In so doing, the employees
claimed that the internal piping work within the units was reserved
for steamfitters by their contract."
The general contractor, Austin, thereupon filed unfair labor
practice charges with the Board alleging that Local 638 had violated
section 8(b)(4)(B) by engaging in a work stoppage and encouraging
Hudik employees to refuse to install the units. 27 Austin contended
that Local 638's actions had impermissible secondary objectives:
namely, to force Hudik to terminate its. subcontract with Austin and to
cause both Austin and Hudik to refrain from purchasing Slant/Fin
products." Local 638 countered that its objective was to preserve the
internal piping work on the climate control units for jobsite comple-
tion by demanding that Hudik comply with its collective bargaining
agreement."
The National Labor Relations Board concluded that Local 638
had violated section 8(b)(4)(B). 3° Although the steamfitters' refusal to
install the Slant/Fin units was based upon a valid work-preservation
agreement between Local 638 and Hudik, the latter did not have the
legal right to control assignment of internal piping work to steamfit-
ters because this right had been contractually relinquished to Austin. 3 '
Accordingly, the Board concluded, the union's pressure on Hudik was
secondary because it was designed to change Austin's purchasing pol-
icy or to cause Hudik to cease doing business with Austin. 32 Thus, the
' 3 1d. at 511.
24 /d. at 512.
25 1cf. at 511-12.
" Id. at 512-13. Local 638's business agent informed both Austin and Hudik that
the steamfitters would not install the units. Id.
" Id. at 513.
" Id.
29 Id.
3° 204 N.L.R.B. 760, 760, 83 L.R.R.M. 1396, 1397 (1973). In so doing the Board
adopted the findings and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge. Id.
31 Id. The only additional evidence of secondary objectives cited by the Board was
that Local 638 first informed Austin of its refusal to handle the climate control units
and that it continued to do so. Id.
32 Id.
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Board ordered Local 638 to stop advising that its members refuse to
install the prefabricated units."
Upon Local 638's petition to review the Board's order, 34 the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en
Banc, rejected the Board's reliance on right-to-control as the dis-
criminant between primary versus secondary union objectives.'"
Rather, a majority of the court concluded that the Board's application
of the right-to-control test was in direct conflict with the totality-of-
the-circumstances test set out in National Woodwork. 3° The court rea-
soned that the Board had applied its right-to-control test to find per
se violations of section 8(b)(4)(B) wherever an immediate employer
did not have the legal right to assign disputed work, thus automati-
cally ascribing to that employer neutral status in the work-preservation
controversy." The majority rejected this automatic inference of neu-
trality." In the court's view, a subcontractor, who contracts for work
inconsistent with a work-preservation clause by which he is bound, in-
itiates the dispute by breaching his collective bargaining agreement."
Thus, the court held that where an immediate employer has re-
linquished his legal right to assign work covered by a valid work-
preservation agreement with the union, and the union does no more
than engage in a work stoppage to protest work violating that agree-
ment, the employer is presumed able to comply with its agreement in
some manner. By corollary the court held that a presumption exists
that the union's strike in response to a violation of a valid work-
preservation clause is lawful primary activity beyond the scope of sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B). 4° Accordingly, the burden falls on the charging party
to adduce other evidence that the union's tactical objectives are
secondary under the standard set forth in National Woodwork.' The
majority therefore remanded the case to the Board for its re-
consideration of factors in addition to Hudik's lack of control which
would show that Local 638's work stoppage had secondary objec-
tives.'"
The Supreme Court entirely rejected the approach adopted by
the court of appeals. While accepting the applicability of the National
Woodwork standard to situations such as in Enterprise Association where
the immediate employer lacks control of the contested work," the
Court held that the Board's conclusion that Local 638 had engaged in
33 Id. at 761, 766, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1397-98.
" 521 F.2d 885, 885, 89 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2769 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en bane). The
hoard also cross-appealed for enforcement of its order. Id.
31' Id. at 904.05, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2782.
3 ' Id. at 905, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2782.
37 Id. at 890-91 & n.9, 89 L.R.R.M. 2771-72 & n.9.
36 Id. at 903, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2781.
Id. at 895, 903-04, 89 L.R.R.M. 2775, 2781-82.
40 Id. at 904, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2782.
Id. at 904-05, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2782. See also id. at 899-900, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2778.
" Id. at 905, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2782.
"See 429 U.S. at 524.
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a secondary boycott was supported by substantial evidence." The
majority's analysis in Enterprise Association focused upon three issues:
first, the immunizing effect of a valid contract clause upon union
means of enforcing the clause;" second, the viability of the Board's
right-to-control analysis under the totality-of-the-circumstances stan-
dard;" and finally, the correctness of the circuit court's application of
the "substantial evidence" standard of review to the Board's decision. 47
The Court began its analysis in Enterprise Association by rejecting
what it perceived as the court of appeals's conclusion that the exis-
tence of a valid work-preservation clause always would provide an
adequate defense to a section 8(b)(4) unfair labor practice charge
based upon a union's strike or work stoppage to enforce such a
clause." That conclusion, the Court maintained, contravened its hold-
ing in Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door)" that "employer promises in a
collective-bargaining contract provide no defense to a § 8(b)(4) charge
against a union ...."5° In Sand Door, the Supreme Court had rejected
" Id. at 530-31.
" Id. at 514-21.
" Id. at 521-28.
Id. at 528-32.
" Id. at 514-15. The court reached this conclusion by a process of deduction
from the court of appeals proposition that "an employer who is struck by his own
employees for the purpose of requiring him to do what he has lawfully contracted to do
to benefit those employees can [nlever be considered a neutral bystander in a dispute
not his own." Id. at 514, quoting 521 F.2d at 903, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2781, If the employer
could not be considered a neutral, then it followed (and the court of appeals specifically
stated, id. at 904, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2782) that a strike or refusal to handle pursuant to the
employer's breach "would not itself warrant an inference that the union sought to
satisfy secondary, rather than primary, objectives, whatever the impact on the im-
mediate employer or on other employers might be." 429 U.S. at 514-15. If, in turn, no
inference of secondary objectives would be warranted by a mere strike or work stop-
page to enforce the agreement, then the Court concluded "the existence of the agree-
ment would always provide an adequate defense to a 8(b)(4) unfair labor practice
charge." Id. at 515.
In reaching the conclusion that under the circuit court's view the existence of a
valid work-preservation agreement would bar secondary boycott charges, however, the
Supreme Court's reasoning is questionable. In the first place, it does not follow logically
that the existence of such an agreement provides an absolute defense to a section
8(b)(4)(B) violation simply because no inference of secondary objectives arises from
union enforcement of the agreement in and of itself Second, the circuit court's opinion
does not warrant such a conclusion. Indeed, a majority of the court of appeals held that
it would not consider an immediate employer a neutral in a dispute initiated by his
breach of contract where a union merely engaged in a strike in response thereto. 521
F.2d at 903-04, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2781-82. The majority proceeded, however, to remand
the case to the Board for reconsideration of the section 8(b)(4)(B) charges in light of
circumstances in addition to, but including, legal control of the struck work at issue. Id.
at 904-05, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2782. Had the court considered the existence of Local 638's
work-preservation agreement as an absolute defense to the secondary boycott charges, a
remand would not have been ordered. But cf. id. at 903 n.44, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2781 n.44
(suggesting that secondary objectives might not often be found where the only evidence
is of union enforcement of valid work-preservation agreement). See text at notes 37-42
supra for a discussion of the court of appeals's opinion.
4° 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
" 429 U.S. at 517-18.
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the argument that the existence of a collective bargaining agreement,
which contained a then-legal provision that employees could not be
required to handle nonunion material," was a defense to secondary
boycott charges.52 The Enterprise Court reasoned that section 8(e), a
provision designed legislatively to prohibit the type of agreement
found valid in Sand Door, did not impugn Sand Door's holding that
means prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) cannot be employed to enforce
otherwise legal contracts." Moreover, the Enterprise Court continued,
Sand Door's holding was supported by the Court's subsequent decision
in National Woodwork. 54 National Woodwork, the Enterprise Court noted,
rejected the application of a per se. rule that a valid work-preservation
clause may be enforced without violating section 8(b)(4)(B), and held
that all actions by the union must be scrutinized to determine whether
illegal secondary objectives exist.55 Thus, National Woodwork also rec-
ognized that means prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) cannot be
employed to enforce otherwise legal contracts." Therefore, the Court
concluded, a valid work-preservation agreement offered no immunity
from secondary boycott charges."
The majority next focused upon the viability of the Board's
right-to-control analysis under the totality-of-the-circumstances stan-
dard which the Court found applicable to the Enterprise fact situation.
Turning to National Woodwork, the Enterprise majority determined that
the Board's reliance upon Hudik's lack of control did not contravene
the standard set forth there requiring an evaluation of union actions
in light of all circumstances to determine whether such actions were
intended to influence labor relations with a primary employer or to
visit economic sanctions upon another. 58 In contrast to the court of
appeals, the Supreme Court found that the Board had considered all
relevant circumstances, including market conditions, in reaching its
decision." The Court characterized the determination of the existence
5 ' 357 U.S. at 95. At the time contracts embodying such secondary objectives —
boycott of nonunion goods with the objective of changing the manufacturer's labor pol-
icy — were nut unlawful even though union attempts to achieve the same result by eco-
nomic pressure alone were unfair labor practices under section 8(b)(4)(A). Id. at 106.
The loophole in the secondary boycott provisions identified in Sand Doer was closed in
1959 when Congress added section 8(e), which bans such "hot cargo" agreements. For
text of section 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (Supp. V 1975), see note &supra.
"357 U.S. at 107-08.
53 429 U.S. at 517-18.
" Id. at 518.
55 Id. at 520.
55 Id, at 520-21.
" ld. at 521.
"Id. at 524.
" Id, at 523-24 & .n.12. The relevant market conditions were summarized by the
Administrative Law Judge whose findings were adopted by the Board, 204 N.L.R.B. at
760, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1397:
In my opinion, it is an appropriate subject of official notice that in
New York City and probably in all or most of the major cities in this coun-
try, the building and construction industry is unionized, certainly with re-
spect to major industrial, commercial, and public construction. Unionized
1053
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of impermissible secondary union objectives as a factual matter in
which the Board could assign as much or as little weight as it chose to
an employer's lack of control." Such a determination the Court ob-
served falls "well within that category of situations in which the courts
should defer to the agency's understanding of the statute which it
administers ...."" Accordingly, the Court concluded that the Board's
right-to-control analysis was safely within the parameters of National
Woodwork's totality-of-the-circumstances tes L. 6 2
Having determined that the Board applied the correct legal
standard to Local.638's conduct, the Court then addressed the ques-
tion whether there was substantial evidence to support the Board's de-
cision." Rejecting the application of the substantial evidence test by
the court of appeals," the majority determined that the Board's deci-
sion was supported by substantial evidence." Although the court of
in this•context means that craft unions affiliated with the AFL-C10 rep-
resent and have contracts for the employees who work on such projects
and, in fact, the unions are the source of the labor supply and furnish the
employees to the employer-contractors. The strategic position of the un-
ions in the industry is confirmed by the fact that governmental efforts to
increase the number of minority employees in the industry are concen-
trated on the unions and not on the employers. In most industries, if it is
desired to increase the number of minority employees, governmental pres-
sure is effectively directed to the employers. But in the construction in-
dustry it is the unions that control the labor supply and if the union
steamfitter employees of Hudik on the Norwegian job refuse to work,
other steamfitters will not be available to Hudik or to anyone else to per-
form work on the job.
Id. at 764 n.10,
°° 429 U.S. at 524.
°' Id. at 528. Additionally, the Court noted not only had the Board's application
of the test remained unchanged both prior to and subsequent to the National Woodwork
case without legislative disturbance, but also that the courts of appeals had consistently
upheld the Board prior to National Woodwork. Id. at 525-26, 527 n.15. National Woodwork
itself had no occasion to address the propriety of the Board's right-to-control test, be-
cause the contractor-employer in the appeal had the legal right to assign the disputed
work. 386 U.S. at 616 n.3.
62 429 U.S. at 524.
63
 The "substantial evidence on the whole record" standard of review for factual
findings of the National Labor Relations Board is mandated by 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), and
was explicated in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Therein, the
Court stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the Administrative Procedure Act and
the Taft-Hartley Act (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)) direct that courts
must now assume more responsibility for the reasonableness and fairness
of Labor Board decisions.... The Board's findings are entitled to respect;
but they must nonetheless be set aside when the record before a Court of
Appeals clearly precludes the Board's decision from being justified by a
fair estimate of the worth of the testimony of witnesses or its informed
judgment on matters within its special competence or both.
Id. at 490.
° 1 429 U.S. at 531-32.
66 Id. at 529. Despite the Court's earlier reference to other circumstances besides
Hudik's lack of right-to-control, in concluding that the Board's decision had ample sup-
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appeals, had differed from the Board as to the inferences permissible
from the Hudik's lack of control over the disputed work, the Court
held review limited to whether the Board's result was supported by
the record considered as a whole. The reviewing court was not per-
mitted to substitute its judgment for the Board's by deciding whether
it would reach the same result the Board did." Thus, in addition to
finding the Board's right-to-control analysis consistent with National
Woodwork, the Court also upheld the Board's specific application of
this analysis to Local 638's actions. Accordingly, the decision of the
court of appeals was reversed. 67
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Stewart," dis-
sented, taking the position that the Board's right-to-control test was
precluded by National Woodwork. 69 This divergence from the majority's
opinion stemmed primarily from the dissent's differing interpretations
of National Woodwork and Sand Door. In the first place, the dissent
noted, National Woodwork did not require separate evaluations of both
a work-preservation clause and a union's attempts to enforce that
clause in order to determine whether each individually is free from
the taint of secondary pressure. Rather, the dissent concluded, Na-
tional Woodwork stands for the proposition that where a contractual
agreement "is intended to preserve work, its objective, and the objec-
tive of pressure to enforce it, is primary, and therefore legitimate
," unless all the surrounding circumstances indicate a secondary
purpose. 7° From this interpretation of National Woodwork followed the
corollary that Hudik could not be characterized as a neutral based
merely upon a lack of control of the right to assign work that resulted
from its breach of the collective bargaining agreement." To the con-
trary, under National Woodwork, the dissent maintained, Hudik would
retain its primary status as the object of Local 638's efforts to enforce
the breached clause, because it could have complied with the work-
preservation clause in some manner other than boycotting Austin."
Next, the dissenting opinion challenged the majority's applica-
tion of the Sand Door case as inapposite to the facts at hand." In Sand
Door, noted the dissenters, the court held only that pressure brought
to bear on an immediate employer in order to enforce a secondary
boycott clause remains secondary and does not become primary sim-
ply because the secondary objective is embodied within a collective
bargaining agreement." The same inference of secondary objectives,
port in the record, the Court relied almost exclusively on the inference to be drawn
from the absence of the legal right to assign the work. Id. at 528 n.16, 530.
"Id. at 531.32.
" Id. at 532.
" Justice Stewart did not concur with Part V of the dissent. Id. at 544.
"Id. at 532 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 536.
"Id. at 536-38.
"Id. at 539.
7  Id. at 541.
" Id. at 541-42.
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however, does not arise from union enforcement of a clause with ad-
mittedly primary objectives. Indeed, the dissent concluded the oppo-
site inference would be logical: that pressure exerted to enforce a
primary clause remains primary. 75 In view of the primary objectives of
Local 638's work-preservation clause, therefore, the dissent found the
majority's application of Sand Door misplaced."
In conclusion, the dissent predicted that the Enterprise decision
would condone future employer breaches of work-preservation
agreements." In National Woodwork, the dissent observed, the Court
had drawn support from a perceived congressional intent that labor
and management negotiate the resolution of the conflict between
technological change and work preservation. The likely result of
Enterprise Association, the dissenters feared, would be to undermine this
intent by removing work preservation from meaningful consideration
at the bargaining table."
The Board's treatment of right-to-control in Enterprise Association
seems undesirable as a matter of policy because it effectively denies a
subcontractor's employees the right to strike 79 their immediate em-
ployer in response to his breach of a primary clause in their collective
bargaining agreement. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the Supreme
Court reached the correct legal result in allowing the Board substan-
tial latitude to define the scope of proscribed secondary boycotts
under section 8(b)(4)(B). The majority's effective approval of the
Board's right-to-control analysis, however, leaves unanswered two im-
portant questions in future applications of the doctrine: first, the fac-
tors that may outweigh the inference of secondary objectives arising
from a subcontractor's lack of legal right-to-control disputed work;
and second, the identity of the primary employer in the dispute
against whom the union may assert its primary right to strike or pick-
et. This chapter now will explore the analytical principles supporting
the Supreme Court's deferral to the Board's expertise in Enterprise As-
sociation. Then it will define the parameters of the Board's right-to-
control approach with emphasis upon factors that may counterbalance
the absence of authority to assign disputed work, and upon the iden-
tity of a primary employer in work-preservation disputes. 8°
The Supreme Court's result in Enterprise Association is consistent
with judicial review of administrative decisions limited to consideration
of the reasonableness rather than the rightness of the decisions." This
.18 Id. at 542.
78
 Id. at 541.
" Id. at 543.
"Id.
18 Of course, the right-to-control problem would not arise if the collective oar-
gaining agreement contained a no-strike clause.
°° For a discussion of the Board's decisions see text at notes 98-102 infra.
81 See Schwartz, Gray vs. Powell and the Scope of Review, 54 MICH. L. REV, I, 6
(1955).
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limited review is attributable to the leading case of Gray v. Powell"
where the Court applied a two-tiered standard for reviewing an
agency's interpretation and application of the statute which it adminis-
ters. Under this standard, a court first must question whether the
agency is acting within the broad area entrusted to it by Congress."
This question in turn involves two distinct inquiries: whether the
agency has perceived correctly the , parameters of the statutory term it
is applying in light of the underlying rationale of the statutory
scheme; and whether the area is one in which Congress intended the
agency to fill the interstices left by broad or vague statutory lan-
guage." Second, if both branches of this first question have been an-
swered affirmatively, the court examines whether there is a rational
basis for the agency's application of a statutory standard to a particu-
lar factual situation."
Applying this two-tiered standard of limited review to Enterprise
Association requires as an initial matter the identification of the statu-
tory term or classification subject to administrative interpretation. Sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(B) on its face does not identify a particular statutory term
for application. Rather, it addresses proscribed union means and ob-
jectives. Yet, it is well established that the congressional purpose un-
derlying section 8(b)(4)(13) is to protect neutral parties from labor dis-
putes not their own." The statute therefore creates a protected class
of "neutral persons." In Enterprise, the Board perceived its task as de-
termining whether an immediate employer could be characterized as a
neutral and thus afforded the protection of section 8(b)(4)(B). Since in
National Woodwork, the Supreme Court found congressional intent that
immediate employers be considered neutrals under certain circum-
stances," the Board's formulation of the broad statutory question
demonstrates an accurate perception of the parameters of the pro-
tected class of "neutrals" that is consistent with the policies of the sec-
ondary boycott provisions.
as 314 U.S. 402, 411-13 (194 D. Gray v. Powell was not the first case in which the
Supreme Court articulated the doctrine of limited review. As Professor Davis notes, the
concept had been established unequivocally two years earlier in Rochester Tel. Corp. v.
United States, 307 U.S. 125 (1939). 4 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 30.05 at
215 (1958).
" 319 U.S. at 413.
" Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 470, 473-75 (1950),
" 314 U.S. at 413. In Gray v. Powell, the Court summarized its position by stat-
ing:
Unless we can say that a set of circumstances deemed by the Commission
to bring them within the concept "producer" is so unrelated to the tasks
entrusted by Congress to the Commission as in effect to deny a sensible
exercise of judgment, it is the Court's duty to leave the Commission's
judgment undisturbed.
Id.
" National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 624-28; Sand Door, 357 U.S. at 100. See generally
Resnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM, L. Rev. 1363, 1363.66 (1962).
" National Woodwork, 386 U.S. at 644-45.
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Having concluded that the Board correctly perceived that im-
mediate employers may be protected as neutrals under section
8(b)(4)(B), the issue remains whether Congress intended the Board to
determine which employers are protected by the section. The legisla-
tive history of section 8(b)(4)(B) offers little guidance with respect to
the desirability of allowing the Board such discretion to identify neu-
tral parties in work-preservation disputes." In seeking to control sec-
ondary boycotts, Congress did not face squarely the problem of ac-
commodating work preservation with technological advance. In the
absence of affirmative statutory direction, the alternatives of adminis-
trative as opposed to judicial accommodation of these antagonistic
aims must be evaluated from a policy standpoint. 89
 A resolution of the
conflicting goals of work preservation and prefabrication requires
above all intimate familiarity with the labor market. Not only is the
Board closely attuned to market conditions within various segments of
the construction industry, but also it is equipped with the fact-finding
mechanisms necessary to an evaluation of the union-subcontractor-
general contractor triangle. In decisions involving the Board's spe-
cialized knowledge, particularly with reference to the labor market,
the Court generally has deferred to the Board's expertise." It is
suggested therefore that the Board is best suited to identify parties
neutral to work-preservation disputes and, as a consequence, to ac-
commodate work preservation with prefabrication. By accepting this
premise and deferring to the Board's decision in Enterprise Association,
the Supreme Court effected a sensible resolution of this economically
and socially troublesome issue. Thus, it is submitted that both
branches of the first tier of the limited review standard are met in En-
terprise Association.
Fulfilling the second tier of the standard of limited review re-
quires only the existence of a rational basis for the Board's characteri-
zation of Hudik as a neutral. Precisely this type of evaluation was
made in Enterprise Association when the Court considered whether the
Board's decision was supported by substantial evidence." In view of
• " See id. at 639-42 and id. at 649 (Harlan, J., concurring) for an exhaustive re-
view of the legislative history of section 8(b)(4)(B).
" The alternative of leaving the issue within the collective bargaining arena is an
illusory one. Far from reaching that result, a decision to deny subcontractors neutral
status would tip the scales heavily in favor of the union. A subcontractor's choices would
be limited to refusing contracts requiring the use of prefabricated materials or losing a
portion of his profit margin through wage compensation. It is true that the Court's
choice to defer to the Board's expertise has the present effect of favoring technological
changes and management prerogative to embrace such changes. Nontheless, it leaves
the Board the flexibility necessary to adjust to changing economic conditions affecting
the balance of power between unions and employers within the construction industry.
The Court's result in Enterprise may also be reasonably interpreted as accepting the car-
telization analysis that is the logical outgrowth of unbridled union economic power. For
a discussion of the cartel theory see Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts
and Labor Antitrust, 89 HA RV. L. REV. 904 (1976).
"See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,  130 (1944).
91
 429 U.S. at 528 -32m As employed by the federal courts the substantial cvi-
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the conflicting inferences arising from Local 638's refusal to install the
prefabricated units and the weight normally attributed to the Board's
judgment," it is difficult to conclude that the Board's characterization
of Hudik as a neutral lacks a rational basis. As the Court held: "It was
not error for the Board to conclude [from Local 638's jobsite product
boycott] that the union's objectives were not confined to the employ-
ment relationship with Hudik but included the object of influencing
Austin."93 Thus, under the two-tiered tandard of limited review, the
Supreme Court was correct in upholding the Board's right-to-control
analysis.
Despite the soundness of the legal result the Court reached in
Enterprise Association, by determining that the Board's characterization
of Hudik as a neutral was reasonably within the purview of section
8(b)(4)(B), the Court shifted the focus of inquiry in work-preservation
disputes. Rather than focusing on a union's original purpose when it
negotiates the work-preservation clause, the Court emphasized its im-
mediate objective when it attempts to enforce the clause: pressuring
some person in the subcontractor-purchaser chain to boycott the pre-
fabricated product. 94 As a matter of legal reasoning, this change illus-
trates the Enterprise majority's deviation from the rationale of both Na-
tional Woodwork and Sand Door." In practical effect, this shift in em-
dence standard often is more than just a test of the rationality or reasonableness of
Board decisions. In effect, it is a shorthand Method of applying a Cray v. Powell type of
analysis in which reasonableness is a secondary inquiry. See Nathanson, Administrative Dis-
cretion in the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VANI. L. REV. 470, 475 (1950). As such, the test's
application presumes that the agency has perceived correctly the broad statutory ques-
tion within which the agency is competent to act at its discretion. See discussion in text
at notes 82-90 supra.
"The Board's expertise in interpreting broad statutory terms and the consis-
tency of their application, both of which were found in Enterprise, 429 U.S. at 528, favor
enforcement of Board decisions. Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298,
303-04 (1977). While these factors enter into the initial determination of whether the
Board is acting within an area entrusted to it by Congress, see discussion in text at notes
82-89 supran they also weigh heavily in favor of the reasonableness of the Board's deci-
sion. See text at notes 91-93 infra. As the Court stated in I3ayside where the interpreta-
tion of the jurisdictional term "employee" was at issue: "Regardless of how we might
have resolved this question as an initial matter, the appropriate weight which must be
given to the judgment of the agency whose special duty is to apply this broad statutory
language to varying fact patterns requires enforcement of the Board's order." 429 U.S.
at 304 (footnotes omitted).
" 429 U.S. at 530-31.
"Id. at 520. There the Court stated: "The substantial question before us is
whether, with or without the collective bargaining contract, the union's conduct at the time
it occurred was proscribed secondary activity within the meaning of (section 8(b)(4)(B)J."
Id. (emphasis added). For a further discussion of the Court's opinion see text at notes
49-57 supra.
"Enterprise Association signals a retreat from the standard for evaluating work-
preservation objectives enunciated in National Woodwork. National Woodwork instructed
the Board to examine together a work-preservation clause and a union's attempt to en-
force such a clause in determining whether a union's objectives are primary or secon-
dary. 386 U.S. at 644-46. Thus, the dissenting opinion in Enterprise, written by the au-
thor of the majority opinion in National Woodwork, reasoned correctly that the validity of
the clause itself under section 8(e), a function of its primary objectives, was considered
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phasis undercuts substantially the efficacy of work-preservation
agreements in the construction industry. To be effective, work-
preservation clauses in the construction industry inevitably intend the
prevention of factory prefabrication." To achieve this purpose they
must operate with a domino effect: restrictions in a subcontractor's
collective bargaining agreement must restrict indirectly the contractor
and, in turn, the architect or owners' In short, they must reach the
person making the purchasing decision. Enterprise Association effec-
tively denies a union's right to strike a subcontractor over a breach of
the work-preservation clause. Consequently, the viability of such a
clause is now dependent largely upon a subcontractor's voluntary ob-
servance of the clause unless, of course, unions employ other lawful
means of extracting a subcontractor's compliance. In its decision, the
Supreme Court has shifted from the courts to the Board responsibility
for the development and recognition of those alternative means along
with concurrent responsibility for determining the proper balance be-
tween work preservation and technological progress in the construc-
tion industry.
The Supreme Court's deferral to Board expertise in Enterprise
enhances the probability that the Board's future right-to-control de-
cisions will be upheld. Moreover, the Court's deferral leaves for the
Board's determination both the factors that may outweigh the absence
in isolating the tactical objective of the union's enforcement of the clause. 429 U.S. at
542. The crucial question posed by National Woodwork was, on the one hand, whether
the union sought to preserve work that its members traditionally performed or, on the
other hand, whether it sought primarily to impose a product boycott for no legitimate
purpose. Implicit in National Woodwork therefore, was an acceptance that a work-
preservation purpose is a legitimate reason for a union to impose a product boycott.
In Enterprise Association, the Court departed from the reasoning of National
Woodwork by considering the union's actions only at the time it attempted to enforce the
work-preservation clause without regard to the union's original purpose. Id. at 520-21.
This change resulted primarily from the Court's manipulation of the holding in Sand
Door that a contractual provision is not a defense to a secondary boycott charge. Unlike
National Woodwork and Enterprise Association which involved primary objectives embodied
within collective bargaining agreements, Sand Door concerned a secondary objective em-
bodied within such an agreement. What the Court prevented when it examined the un-
ion's actions at the time of enforcement in Sand Door was the union's attempt to trans-
form a secondary boycott into protected activity by virtue of the primary collective bar-
gaining relationship within which the clause was negotiated. It was this primary context
of negotiation rather than the original objective of the clause that the court refused to
consider in evaluating the union's actions. Indeed, the Sand Door Court inferred that
union action to enforce the clause was secondary precisely because the objective of the
clause itself was secondary. Thus, the Enterprise Association Court misconstrued the rea-
soning of Sand Door in analyzing the union's enforcement of the clause without ref-
erence to the primary nature of the clause's objective. The result of this manipulation
of Sand Door and National Woodwork is to undermine the legitimacy of a work-
preservation purpose tor imposing product boycotts.
96 For a perceptive discussion of this problem see Pipefitters Local No. 638 v
NLRB, 521 F.2d 885, 905, 89 L.R.R.M. 2769, 2782 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bazelon, C.J., con-
curring).
"'Local No. 636, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 930 F.2d 906, 909, 74
L.R.R.M. 2851, 2854 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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of right-to-control and hence defeat a subcontractor's neutral status,
and the identity of a primary employer in a work-preservation dis-
pute. Consequently, the Board's decisions are the soundest indicators
of probable resolutions of these questions as well as of the legality of
alternative methods for enforcing work-preservation agreements.
Prior Board decisions indicate that the characterization of a sub-
contractor as a neutral is not inevitable. The Board has held that the
inference of secondary objectives from a subcontractor's lack of con-
trol will be outweighed, and hence a work-preservation strike will be
protected, whenever collusion between contractor and subcontractor
designed to avoid the latter's contractual obligations is demonstrated."
Similarly, the Board has held picketing against a general contractor
who has the right-to-control disputed work to be protected activity by
characterizing the general contractor as the primary employer in the
work-preservation dispute." In addition, the Board has indicated that
it considers some methods for enforcing work-preservation clauses to
be lawful under section 8(b)(4)."° These methods include resort to
contractual grievance and arbitration procedures, and by implication
litigation to enforce arbitration awards, which the Board has not con-
sidered to be coercive."' Another method sanctioned by the Board is
wage compensation agreements in which a subcontractor, in return
for a union promise to install the prefabricated materials, promises to
pay employees for the work that would have been theirs under a valid
work-preservation clause had prefabricated materials not been
913 Painters District Council No. 20, 185 N.L.R.B. 930, 932, 75 L.R.R.M. 1236,
1237 (1970). See Local No. 438 United Pipe Fitters (George Koch Sons, Inc.), 201
N.L.R.B. 59, 64, 82 L.R.R.M. 1113, 1119 (1973). In general, however, the Board's
right-to-control approach seeks to balance the economic power of subcontractors and
their unions, based upon a realistic evaluation of the relevant construction industry
market in order to prevent subcontractors from being competitively crippled. The
Fourth Circuit eleborated upon this analysis in George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490
F.2d 323, 328, 84 L.R.R.M. '2957, 2960-61 (4th Cir. 1973) in an opinion endorsed by
the Enterprise Court as well-reasoned. 429 U.S. at 527 n.15. See note 59 supra for the
market conditions incorporated in the Board's Enterprise decision.
9" Bricklayers and Stone Masons' Union Local No. 8, 180 N.L.R.B. 43, 46-47, 72
L.R.R.M. 1612, 1613 (1969). The Ninth Circuit rejected the Board's conclusion that a
general contractor possessing right-to-control is the "primary" in the dispute. Western
Monolithic Concrete Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 522, 526. 77 L.R.R.M. 3023,
3025.26 (9th Cir. 1971). This holding may have been discredited, however, by the cir-
cuit court's later acceptance of the right-to-control test in Associated General Contrac-
tors of California, Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433, 438, 88 L.R.R.M. 3542, 3544-45 (9th
Cir. 1975).
'" The Supreme Court apparently acknowledged the existence of other means of
enforcement in Enterprise Association when it stated: "Even though a work-preservation
provision may be valid in its intendment and valid in its application in other contexts, ef-
forts to apply the provision so as to influence someone other than the immediate em-
ployer are prohibited by § 8(b)(4)(B)." 429 U.S. at 521 n.8 (emphasis added).
"I See, e.g., Associated General Contractors, 227 N.L.R.B. No. 27 at 14, 94
L.R.R.M. 1210, 1216 (1976); District-Council No. 16, 207 N.L.R.B. 698, 699-700, 84
L.R.R.M. 1513, 1514-15 (1973). The litigation approach was approved by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Pipefitters Local No. 5 v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366, 370, 53 L.R.R.M. 2424, 2427
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
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specified.' 02
 The practical effect of the Supreme Court's decision in
Enterprise Association is that construction industry unions will pursue
effective 'work preservation by these alternative methods rather than
by strikes and refusals to handle prefabricated materials.
II. ARBITRATION—BUFFALO FORGE DEVELOPMENTS—CLEAR AND
UNMISTAKABLE WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO ENGAGE IN SYMPATHY
STRIKES—RECOVERY OF DAMAGES RESULTING FROM SYMPATHY
STRIKES
In the 1970 landmark case of Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Local 770,' the Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the
anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 2
 Under the
Boys Markets exception, federal courts have jurisdiction under section
301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act3 to enforce the
arbitration-no-strike provisions of a collective bargaining agreement by
enjoining strikes called by a union with respect to an arbitrable griev-
ance.4
 During the Survey year, the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge
Co. v. United Steelworkers of ilinerica 5
 restricted the availability of Boys
Markets injunctions by holding that a sympathy strike° was not enjoin-
102
 District Council No. 16, 207 N.L.R.B. at 699-700 & n.5, 84 L.R.R.M. at 1514-
I5 & n.5 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Assoc. General Contractors of California, Inc. v. NLRB,
514 F.2d 433, 439, 88 L.R.R.M. 3542, 3546 (9th Cir. 1975) (wage assessment found
coercive).
' 398 U.S. 235 (1970). For a broad over-view of the Boys Markets decision, see
Axelrod, The Application of the Boys Markets Decision in the Federal Courts, 16 B.C. IND, &
Com. L. REV. 893 (1975).
398 U.S. at 253. The Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits federal courts from en-
joining strikes in most labor disputes. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104-05 (1970). Section 4 of
the Act provides in pertinent part that "kilo court of the United States shall have juris-
diction to issue any ... injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dis-
pute toprohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dis-
pute ... from ... : (a) lc)easing or refusing to perform any work ...." 29 U.S.C. § 104
(1970).
3 29 U.S.C. 185 (1970). Section 301(a) provides that: "Suits for violation of con-
tracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees ... , or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
See 398 U.S. at 253-55. Under Boys Markets, a federal district court has jurisdic-
tion pursuant to section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§185(a) (1970), to enjoin strikes if it finds that: (1) the strike is a breach of a no-strike
obligation under a collective bargaining agreement which contains a mandatory griev-
ance adjustment and arbitration procedure; (2) the strike is "over a grievance which
'both parties are contractually bound to arbitrate;" and (3) traditional equitable consid-
erations require the injunction. Id.
5 428 U.S. 397 (1976), noted in 18 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 518 (1977).
A sympathy strike, the refusal of one union's employees to cross the picket line
of a different union, is a protected activity. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345
U.S. 71, 75-76 (1953); Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 744, 86 L.R.R.M.
1210, 1213 (1974), affd 511 F.2d 284, 287, 88 L.R.R.M. 2830, 2831 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975).
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able by a federal court under the Boys Markets exception even where
the striking union was a party to the collective bargaining agreement
which contained no-strike and arbitration clauses.' The Boys Markets
decision was distinguished by the Buffalo Forge Court as controlling
only those situations where the strike sought to be enjoined resulted
from an underlying dispute between the union and the employer
which was subject to the grievance and arbitration provisions con-
tained in their collective bargaining agreement.° In Buffalo Forge, the
Court noted, the dispute underlying the sympathy strike was a dispute
between the company and other of its employees, and hence was
neither cognizable nor arbitrable under the sympathy strikers' collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Thus, the Court concluded, Boys Markets
could not control the result.°
Two related reasons were set forth by the Court in support of its
conclusion that Boys Markets was not dispositive of the issue presented
in Buffalo Forge. First, the Court pointed out that. Boys Markets in ef-
fecting an accommodation between the anti-injunction provisions of the
Norris LaGuardia Act and section 301 of the Labor Management Re-
lations Act, was designed to strengthen the national policy favoring
arbitration of employer-union disputes over use of economic
weaponry.'° It was not intended, however, to remove completely the
protection which Norris-LaGuardia affords to organized labor's
legitimate economic weapons. If the federal courts were permitted to
enjoin a sympathy strike which was itself the grievance sought to be
arbitrated, they would be enforcing contract provisions which had not
428 U.S. at 400-01, 412-13. In Buffalo Forge, production and maintenance
(P&M) workers represented by the United Steelworkers and two of its locals, refused to
cross picket lines at Buffalo Forge's plants which had been established by fellow
employees who were engaged in an economic strike against the company. Id. at 399-
400. The two collective bargaining agreements between the P&M workers and the com-
pany contained no-strike clauses prohibiting any "strikes, work stoppages or interrup-
tion or impeding of work," id. at 399 n.1, and dispute settlement provisions culminating
in arbitration of grievances over "... the meaning and application of the provisions of
this Agreement." Id. at 400 n.2. Subsequently, Buffalo Forge brought suit under section
301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act seeking damages, a temporary restrain-
ing order and preliminary injunction, and an order compelling arbitration on the pri-
mary ground that the work stoppage violated the no-strike clause in the collective bar-
gaining agreements. Id. at 401. The district court held that it was precluded from grant-
ing injunctive relief by section 4 of the Non4s-LaGuardia Act. 386 F. Supp. 405, 410,
88 L.R.R.M. 2063, 2066-67 (N.D.N.Y. 1974). The district court narrowly construed Boys
Markets to sanction injunctive relief only against strikes which were precipitated by
grievances between the striking employees and their employer and not by the strike of a
sister union. Because the strike sought to be enjoined did not result from any dispute
cognizable under the P&M workers' collective bargaining agreements, but rather from a
dispute between Buffalo Forge and its other employees, the district court denied all re-
lief. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concurred in this
application of Boys Markets and affirmed the district court's decision. 517 F.2d 1207,
1211, 89 L.R.R.M. 2303, 2306 (2d Cir. 1975).
a 428 U.S. at 407.
Id. at 407-08.
" Id. at 407.
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yet been interpreted. Thus, the Court concluded that to allow a fed-
eral court to enjoin a sympathy strike in the Buffalo Forge fact situa-
tion would not further the national policy favoring arbitration of
employer-union disputes over the use of economic weaponry." Sec-
ond, the Court reasoned that the Boys Markets rationale was persuasive
only to the extent that it preserved the bargain of the parties to sub-
mit their grievances to arbitration.' 2
 In this light, although the parties
In Buffalo Forge may have included no-strike provisions in their
agreement which forbade the sympathy strike in question, whether
these provisions in fact controlled the propriety of the employees'
sympathy strike was a matter for an arbitrator to decide. The Court
noted, however, that an injunction against the disputed arbitrable
conduct would have the practical effect not only of depriving the par-
ties of the arbitration for which they bargained, but also of usurping
the function of the arbitrator." As such, the courts would become
"potential participants in a wide range of arbitral disputes ... for the
purpose of preliminarily dealing with the merits of the federal and
legal issues that are subjects for the arbitrator... . "I4 Thus, the Court
concluded that if the disputed conduct was enjoined, it was very likely
that there would be nothing left to arbitrate, and as a consequence the
parties' bargain to submit their grievances to arbitration would be
rendered nugatory.' 5
" Id. at 410-11. Buffalo Forge's admonition to the courts to refrain from enjoining
mere contractual violations were adhered to in United Mine Workers of America v.
Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 416 F. Supp. 74, 94 L.R.R.M. 2409 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
In Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal, the union sought an injunction against the company on
the grounds that it had caused supervisory personnel to perform classified production
work in violation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 77, 94 L.R.R.M.
at 2411. The district court, following Buffalo Forge, refused to require the employer to
fulfill its contractual obligation and instead deferred to the arbitral process. Id. at 77-78,
94 L.R.R.M. at 2411-12.
12




15 Id. at 412. The Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Forge to restrict the availa-
bility of Boys Markets injunctions against sympathy strikes is a controversial one that
gained the support of only five justices. In a vigorous dissent, the four remaining mem-
bers of the Court argued that under the principles enunciated in Boys Markets sympathy
strikes should be enjoinable by the federal courts whenever a collective bargaining
agreement contains no-strike and arbitration provisions and, in addition, there is con-
vincing evidence that the strike is clearly within the no-strike clause. Id. at 431.
The dissent initially rejected the majority's attempt to distinguish the situation in
Buffalo Forge from Boys Markets on three principle grounds. The dissent reasoned first
that injunctions enforcing contractual commitments do not contravene the policy of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act which is concerned primarily with protecting labor's ability to or-
ganize and to bargain collectively rather than with the enforceability of resulting collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Id, at 415-17. Next the dissent disagreed with the majority's
proposition that denying injunctive relief would not deprive an employer of his bargain
because the dissent pointed out an employer's agreement to arbitrate might be the quid
pro quo for a union's commitment to refrain from all strikes, including sympathy strikes.
Id. at 417-19. Finally, while noting that "a sympathy strike in violation of a no-strike
clause does not directly frustrate the arbitration process," nevertheless the dissent main-
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The Court's conclusion with respect to the unavailability of in-
junctive relief had no bearing on its consideration of the arbitrability
of the strike's status. The Court found that because the collective bar-
gaining agreements between Buffalo Forge and the sympathy strikers
contained both no-strike and arbitration clauses, the issue of whether
the no-strike clause prohibited sympathy strikes was arbitrable."' This
result followed from both the specific language of the collective bar-
gaining agreements at issue and the national labor policy favoring ar-
bitration enunciated in the Steelworkers Trilogy."
In analyzing the specific language of the collective bargaining
agreements at issue, the Court noted initially that an arbitration clause
might be broad enough to encompass union-employer disputes not
only over other contractual provisions, but also over the interpretation
of the no-strike clause." Since in Buffalo Forge, the no-strike and ar-
bitration clauses were distinct contractual provisions,' 9 the Court con-
cluded that the catch-all arbitration clause in which the parties agreed
to arbitrate disputes over the meaning and application of all pro-
visions of the agreement could be interpreted logically to give rise to
an obligation to arbitrate the issue of whether the sympathy strike vio-
tained that denial of' injunctive enforcement of the no•strike clause would frustrate the
underlying policy of motivating employers to agree to arbitration in the first place. hi.
at 423-24.
Recognizing that the rationale of Boys Markets is not entirely applicable to Buffalo
Forge, the dissent also addressed the majority's argument that allowing injunctions
against sympathy strikes would conflict with the principle justification for the Boys Mar-
kets decision: fostering dispute settlement through arbitration. Id. at 424. Analyzing the
function of the arbitration process itself, the dissent distinguished situations in which
arbitration is utilized to provide for unforeseen contingencies resulting in labor disputes
from those in which the parties have anticipated and resolved possible conflicts by
negotiating appropriate contractual provisions. In the former case, the dissent reasoned
the meaning of the parties' contract should be resolved by arbitration with an injunction
issuing only to enforce the arbitration award. In the latter case, if the agreement were
so unambiguous as to preclude the need for arbitration then the dissent concluded f'ed-
eral courts should have jurisdiction to enforce directly the parties' bargain. Id. at 425-
26,
In order to reduce the risk of judicial error, however, the dissent added three
qualifications beyond the normal considerations of equitable relief to its conclusion that
federal courts should have jurisdiction to enjoin sympathy strikes. First, the dissent
would require that a union he given adequate opportunity to be heard prior to issuance
of an injunction. Second, under the dissent's view a judge "should not issue an injunc-
tion without convincing evidence that the strike is clearly within the no-strike clause."
Id. at 431 (footnote omitted). Finally, the dissent maintained that any injunction issued
should require the parties immediately to submit the status of the sympathy strike to
arbitration. Id. Thus, with these Factors in mind, rather than holding that the sympathy
strike in Buffalo Forge should have been enjoined, the dissent would have remanded the
case for the lower court's consideration. Id. at 432.
" hi. at 405.
"Id. The Steelworkers Trilogy is comprised of United Steelworkers of America
v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior
& Gulf' Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers of America v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
" 428 U.S. at 405.
" Id, at 399-400 nn. 1 & 2. See note 7 supra for the text of the clauses.
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lated the no-strike clause. 20 Having determined that the parties in-
tended to submit interpretations of the no-strike clause to arbitration,
the Court readily acknowledged the employer's right to invoke the ar-
bitral process. 2 ' The Court, however, qualified this conclusion by ob-
serving that if a collective bargaining agreement contained an arbitra-
tion clause, but either did not contain a no-strike clause or expressly
excluded sympathy strikes from such a clause, then the courts would
be precluded from implying a union's promise not to engage in sym-
pathy strikes from the existence of an arbitration clause. 22
In summary, the most obvious effect of Buffalo Forge, of course,
was to restrict the availability of the Boys Markets injunction to situa-
tions in which a strike is precipitated by an underlying arbitrable griev-
ance." The Court's opinion can also be interpreted as a reaffirma-
2° Id. at 405.
2 ' Id. The National Labor Relations Board has evidenced approval of the arbitral
process by its policy of deferral both to the arbitration process itself, see Collyer In-
sulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.,
175 N.L.R.B. 141, 70 L.R.R.M. 1472 (1969), and to arbitral awards. See Spielberg Mfg.
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
" 428 U.S. at 408. This qualification was unnecessary to the decision in Buffalo
Forge, because in that case the collective bargaining agreements contained no-strike
clauses. Yet, the Court apparently felt constrained to treat the issue in order to clarify
its decision in Gateway Coal Co. v, United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368
(1974). In Gateway Coal, the Supreme Court had broadened Boys Markets by holding that
injunctive relief could be based on a no-strike obligation that was implied from manda-
tory arbitration provisions contained in the collective bargaining agreement between the
striking union and the employer. Id. at 381-82. There, coal miners had gone on strike
to protest safety conditions in Gateway's mine: namely, the company's reinstatement of
supervisors who had been negligent in reporting air flow levels in the mine shafts. Id. at
372. Although the collective bargaining agreement between Gateway and the union did
not contain a no-strike clause, it did contain broad arbitration provisions covering in-
terpretation of contractual provisions and "... any local trouble of any kind arising] at
the mine." Id. at 375. The Court found that the safety dispute was encompassed within
this arbitration clause. Because the parties had agreed to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion, the Court reasoned that the union had an implied obligation not to strike over the
dispute. Id, at 381-82. In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on Teamsters Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 97, 104-05 (1962) which held, in the context of an
employer's suit for damages under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, that the employer's duty to arbitrate implied an obligation not to strike. 414 U.S. at
381-82. Thus, the Gateway Court held that the union's strike over the safety dispute was
in violation of its implied no-strike obligation and, therefore, subject to injunction. Id. at
382.
Several courts of appeals had interpreted Gateway Coal as authority for the prop-
osition that a mandatory arbitration dause implied an obligation not to engage in sym-
pathy strikes. See 428 U.S. at 408 & n.10 and cases cited therein. In Buffalo Forge, this
suggestion was summarily rejected. The Court noted that the determinative factor in
these cases is whether the strike is precipitated by an underlying dispute which is itself
arbitrable. Neither Boys Markets nor Gateway Coal authorized the enjoining of a sym-
pathy strike merely because it is an alleged breach of contract which is arbitrable. 428
U.S, at 408 n.10.
33
 For recent applications of Buffalo Forge with respect to injunctions against sym-
pathy strikes see Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 545 F.2d 1336,
93 L.R.R.M. 2898 (3d Cir. 1976); Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 551
F.2d 695, 94 L.R.R.M. 2609 (6th Cir. 1977); United States Steel Corp. v. United Mine
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tion of the primary position of the arbitral process in national labor
policy. Aside from its general endorsement of arbitration, Buffalo
Forge made two additional pronouncements concerning the sympathy
strike itself. First, the Court established that where a collective bar-
gaining agreement contains both a broad arbitration and no-strike
clause, the question of whether the union has promised not to engage
in sympathy strikes is arbitrable." Second, the Court determined that.
where a collective bargaining agreement contains an arbitration clause,
but does not contain a no-strike clause or contains an express no-
strike clause which specifically excludes sympathy strikes, there are no
grounds upon which to imply a promise by the union not to engage in
a sympathy strike." The ramifications of' these observations concern-
ing sympathy strikes were considered in two subsequent Survey year
decisions. In the first, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit addressed the question of the effect of Buffalo Forge
on the viability of the National Labor Relations Board's (Board or
NLRB) standard requiring a clear and unmistakable waiver of the
right to strike. Then, in a related inquiry, the United States . Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit considered the effect of' Buffalo Forge
on suits for damages resulting from sympathy strikes.
Workers of America, 418 F. Supp. 172, 93 L.R.R.M. 2495 (W.D. Pa. 1976). Southern
Ohio Coal, supra, presented an interesting variation on the Buffalo Forge situation. There,
the court held that a sympathy strike engaged in by a union which was subject to a pro-
spective injunction prohibiting all strikes did not provide the basis for a contempt cita-
tion. 551 F.2d at 710-11, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2620. The court of appeals in Southern Ohio
Coal also addressed the controversial issue of whether Boys Markets sanctions prospective
injunctions against strikes over arbitrable disputes, and concluded that:
prospective injunctions should only be granted in extreme cases where ab-
solutely necessary to preserve the arbitration process agreed to by the par-
ties. The decree must be narrowly drawn and firmly grounded on factual
support in the record. Before an injunction may issue which grants pro-
spective relief, the District Court should expressly find; that the present
strike may be enjoined under Boys Markets; that the union has engaged in a
pattern of strikes over arbitrable grievances that is likely to continue; that
the strikes constituting the pattern of violation would warrant relief under
the Boys Markets formula; and that the decree is limited to specifically iden-
tified areas of dispute which have already been adjudicated and which
satisfy the Boys Markets guidelines,
Id. at 710, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2619-20 (citations omitted). Because the orders in the instant
case failed to meet this standard, the injunctions were vacated. Id, at 711, 94 L.R.R.M,
at 2620.
A discussion of the propriety of prospective injunctions is beyond the scope of
this chapter; however. for similar interpretations of Boys Markets see United States Steel
Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 534 F.2d 1063, 92 L.R.R.M. 2575 (3d Cir.
1976); Donovan Construction Co. v. Construction & Maintenance Laborers Union,
Local 383, 533 F.2d 481, 92 L.R.R.M. 2068 (9th Cir. 1976); Old Ben Coal Corp. v.
Local No. 1487, 500 F.2d 950, 87 L.R.R.M. 2078 (7th Cir. 1974); CF&1 Steel Corp, v.
United Mine Workers of America, 507 F.2d 170, 87 L.R.R.M. 3197 (10th Cir. 1974).
For the opposite view see United States Steel Corp. v. United Mineworkers of America,
519 F.2d 1236, 90 L.R.R.M. 2539 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, 90 linty. L. REV.
790 (1977) for a discussion Of prospective Boys Markets injunctions.
34 Id. at 405.
25 Id. at 408.
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A. Clear and Unmistakable Waiver of the Right to Engage in Sympathy
Strikes: National Labor Relations Board v. Keller-Crescent Co.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Keller-Crescent Co.," the
Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of a Board order directed against
an employer who allegedly violated sections 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(1) of the
National Labor Relations Act" (NLRA or Act) by imposing dis-
ciplinary suspensions on employees who had refused to cross the pick-
et lines of co-workers." In Keller-Crescent, several units of the com-
pany's employees were represented by the Evansville Typographical
Union No. 35 (Local 35) while others were represented by Local 117
of the Evansville Printing and Pressmen and Assistants Union, AFL-
CIO (Pressmen)." Although Local 35 was affiliated with the In-
ternational Typographical Union (ITU), the Pressmen's union was
not.3° The collective bargaining agreement between Local 35 and
Keller-Crescent contained both a no-strike-arbitration clause (Section
13) 31
 and a clause recognizing Local 35's right to honor picket lines
established by other subordinate unions of ITU (Section 12). 32
During the summer of 1972, contract negotiations between the
Pressmen and the company broke down. As a result, the Pressmen
called a strike and established a picket line. 33 In anticipation of the
strike, the company notified an official of Local 35 that it would con-
sider Local 35's refusal to cross the Pressmen's picket line a violation
28 538 F.2d 1291, 92 L.R.R.M. 3591 (7th Cir. 1976).
22 29 U.S.C. §§158 (a)(1)(3) (1970). Section 8(a)(I) provides: "(a) It shall be an un-
fair labor practice for an employer — (1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [the rights
to self-organization, to bargain collectively, to engage in other concerted activities, and
to refrain from any or all such activities]." 29 U.S.C. §158(a)(1) (1970). Section 8(a)(3)
provides in relevant part that it is an unfair labor practice for any employer "(3) by dis-
crimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ...." 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
28 538 F.2d at 1292-94, 1301, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3591-92, 3598.
"Id. at 1292, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3591. Two other unions which were not involved in
this case also represented some of Keller-Crescent's employees. Id.
"Id. at 1295,n.4, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3593 n.4.
31
 Id. at 1293 & n.2, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3591.92 & n.2. Section 13 created a "Joint
Standing Committee" composed of members selected by the employer and the union to
render final and binding arbitration of "all disputes which may arise as to the applica-
tion of and construction to be placed upon any provision of this agreement, or alleged
violation thereof, which cannot be settled otherwise." The section further provided that
"Where shall be no strikes ... during the term of this agreement unless either party re-
fuses to comply with the [above) grievance procedures ...." Id. at 1293 n.2, 92
L.R.R.M. at 3591-92 n.2 (emphasis deleted).
32 Id. at 1293 n.1, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3591 n.l. Section 12 provided that: "No
employee covered by this contract shall be required to cross a picket line established be-
cause of a strike by, or lockout of, any other subordinate Union of the International
Typographical Union, when such strike is authorized by, or such lockout is recognized
by, the ITU." Id.
33 Id. at 1292, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3591. The strike lasted from July 24, 1972 to July
29, 1972. Id.
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of Section 12 and 13 of the collective bargaining agreement. Twelve
members of Local 35, however, honored the picket line notwithstand-
ing the fact that they were addressed by their president on two occa-
sions, at which times they were told to honor their contract with
Keller-Crescent." During the course of the strike the company in-
dicated that it would arbitrate any dispute." At the termination of the
Pressmen's strike, the sympathy strikers returned to work and were
given disciplinary suspensions for refusing to cross the picket line. 36
Local 35 subsequently brought unfair labor practices charges
against Keller-Crescent claiming that the refusal to cross the picket
line was protected activity and, therefore, that the disciplinary suspen-
sions violated sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act. 37 The Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) initially considered whether the sympathy strikers
had lost the protection of the Act by violating the no-strike-arbitration
provisions of Section 13." Noting that Local 35's commitment not to
strike was effective only with respect to arbitrable grievances, the ALJ
determined that Section 13 extended only to disputes arising over in-
terpretations of the contractual provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement between Keller-Crescent and Local 35. 39 Because the un-
derlying issue, the Pressmen's strike, was not cognizable under the
provisions of Local 35's contract and hence, was not subject to arbitra-
tion, he concluded that the sympathy strike did not violate Section
13. 4° The ALJ did find, however, that the reservation contained in
Section 12 of Local 35's right to honor the picket lines of ITU sub-
ordinate unions constituted an implied waiver of its right to honor the
picket lines of non-ITU unions such as the Pressmen.'" Accordingly,
he found that the sympathy strikers, in refusing to cross the Press-
men's picket line, were engaged in unprotected activity, and con-
sequently, that the company's disciplinary suspension of the strikers
was not an unfair labor practice. 42
Adopting the ALJ's reasoning as to the scope of Section 13 of
the collective bargaining agreement, the Board agreed with this de-
termination that Section 13's no-strike clause did not encompass the
sympathy strike by Local 35 members, because the Pressmen's strike
was not an arbitrable grievance under the provisions of Local 35's
34 Id. at 1293, 92 L.R.R.M, at 3591-92.
35 1d., 92 L.R.R.M. at 3592.
"Id. at 1293-94, 92 L.R.R.M, at 3592. Each of the sympathy strikers except
Burdge, the union official, received a one week suspension. Burdge received a two-
week suspension. Id. at 1293, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3592.
" See id, at 1292, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3591,





41 Id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1204-05.
49
 Id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1204.
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contract with Keller-Crescent. 43 However, the Board rejected the
ALJ's conclusion that in Section 12 of the contract Local 35 had im-
pliedly waived its right to honor the picket lines of non-ITU unions. 44
In rejecting the ALJ's interpretation of Section 12 of the con-
tract, the Board initially noted that "the right to engage in a sympathy
strike or to honor another union's picket line is a right created and -
protected by the Act." 45 Moreover, the Board pointed out, such a
statutory right could be waived only by clear and unmistakable lan-
guage, and the Board found no such waiver in Keller-Crescent. 46
Four factors had been advanced by the company in Keller-
Crescent in support of the theory that Local 35 in Section 13 had
waived its right to engage in sympathy strikes other than those ap-
proved by the ITU and in deference to other ITU affiliates. First,
application of the principle inclusio unius est exclusio diterius —the ex-
press inclusion of one thing thereby includes all others—gave rise to
the implication that Local 35's express reservation of its right to refuse
to cross certain picket lines constituted a contractual undertaking not
to cross all others. 47 Second, there was evidence that the union had
proposed a substitute clause for Section 12 encompassing all sympathy
strikes, but that this proposal had been rejected by the company at the
last contract negotiations. 48 Third, during the Pressmen's strike, Local
35's president and the ITU had instructed the sympathy strikers to
honor their contract with Keller-Crescent although neither explicitly
directed Local 35's members to cross the picket line. 49
 Finally, one of
the sympathy strikers indicated his subjective understanding that the
43 1d. at 687, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1204. Keller-Crescent also contended that the dis-
pute over the disciplinary suspension had been resolved against the union by the con-
tractual grievance procedure short of arbitration and that the Board should therefore
defer to the arbitral process under its decision in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). 217 N.L.R.B. at 686, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1203-04. Therein,
the Board had adopted a policy of deferring to arbitral awards unless they were pro-
cedurally unfair or repugnant to the Act, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. 1153. In
the instant case, the grievance procedure provided for a four member standing commit-
tee composed of two employee and two management representatives. 217 N.L.R.B. at
686, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1203. If the committee became deadlocked over a dispute, as oc-
curred here, it was to select a fifth member in order to facilitate a final and binding
resolution. Although the evidence indicated that the union's representatives did not re-
quest a fifth member, neither did it indicate that management's representatives had
done so. Thus the Board was unable to conclude that there had been a final resolution
of the dispute to which the Spielberg doctrine could be applied. Id., 89 L.R.R.M. at
1203-04. The Seventh Circuit did not consider this aspect of the Board's decision. ,
"Id. at 687, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1204,
"Id.
46 Id. This standard was endorsed by the Seventh Circuit in Hyster Co. v. In-
dependent Towing & Lifting Machine Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89, 92, 89 L.R.R.M. 2885, 2887
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976); Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB,
511 F.2d 284, 288, 88 L.R.R.M. 2830, 2832 (7th Cir. 1975).
47 217 N.L.R.B. at 687, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1205.
"Id. at 688-89, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1205-06.
"Id. at 689-90. 89 L.R.R.M. at 1206-07.
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instruction to honor the contract meant to cross the picket line. 56
Under the "clear and unmistakable" standard, the Board found
all of these factors insufficient to establish a waiver of the union's
right to engage in sympathy strikes and therefore concluded that the
refusal to cross the picket line was protected activity." Thus, the sus-
pensions constituted violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3). 52 Accord-
ingly, the Board ordered that the company cease and desist its unfair
labor practices and pay the twelve strikers any lost wages incurred be-
cause of the suspensions. 53
Upon the Board's application for enforcement of its order, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the Board's approach to determining the
status of the sympathy strike. The court found that the crucial issue
was whether Local 35 was required to arbitrate its dispute over the
application and construction of the picket line clause before refusing
to cross the Pressmen's picket line. Therefore, the court turned to
Buffalo Forge." The court noted that prior to Buffalo Forge it had con-
sidered questions of arbitrability and enjoinability by analyzing the
specific language of' no-strike and arbitration clauses, and had applied
the same standards for both arbitrability and enjoinability. 55 In Buffalo
sold.  at 690, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1207.
"id., 89 L.R.R.M. at 1208.
"Id.
53 Id. at 692, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1209.
54 538 F.2d at 1295, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3593-94.
55 Id. at 1296, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3594. Two pre-Buffalo Forge decisions, Hyster Co.
v. Independent Towing & Lifting Machine Ass'n, 519 F.2d 89, 89 L.R.R.M. 2885 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976), and Gary-Hobart. Water Corp. v. NLRB,
511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), had held that a refusal to cross
another union's picket line was not arbitrable under the no-strike provisions involved
therein. 519 F.2d at 91, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2887; 511 F.2d at 288, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2832,
Hyster was an injunction decision. There, the defendant union's members had refused
to cross stranger union's picket lines at their employer's plant. Id. at 90, 89 L.R.R.M. at
2886. The sympathy strikers' collective bargaining agreement contained no-strike and
arbitration clauses which did not provide for arbitration concerning "differences ...
about !natters not specifically mentioned" in the agreement or relating to "any local
trouble." Id. at 91, 89 L.R.R.M. at 2887. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's grant of an injunction on the grounds that: (1) the union had not waived the
right to engage in sympathy strikes in clear and unmistakeable language; (2) the dispute
was not arbitrable; and (3) therefore, Boys Markets did not apply. Id. at 92, 89 L.R.R.M.
at 2887. In Gary-Hobart, clerical employees went on a sympathy strike during an eco-
nomic strike by production and maintenance employees who were represented by a sis-
ter local. Id. at 286, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2830-31. The company discharged all clerical unit
workers who had refused to cross the picket fines, refused to reinstate them following
an unconditional offer to return to work, and prematurely terminated their collective
bargaining agreement. Id., 88 L.R.R.M. at 2831. A complaint was issued alleging viola-
tions of El 8(a)(1), (3) & (5) of the Act, but the Board deferred to the arbitral process
although retaining jurisdiction. Id. Upon the company's refusal to arbitrate, the Board
decided the case on the merits and found that the contractual no-strike provisions did
not waive the clerical workers' statutory right to engage in sympathy strikes. Id. at 286-
87, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2831. Therefore, the discharges contravened section 8(a)(3) and (1).
Id. Accordingly, the discharged workers retained employee status, giving the union a
majority status at the time the company had terminated its contract. Id. This resulted in
the Board's finding an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain violation. Id. at 287, 88 L.R.R.M. at
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Forge, however, the Supreme Court had clearly stated that regardless
of the availability of injunctive relief, the contractual status of a sym-
pathy strike could be arbitrable. Thus, the Seventh Circuit concluded
that it could no longer blend enforcement decisions with injunction
decisions."
Employing a straightforward analysis, the court in Keller-Crescent
reasoned that the arbitration clause in Section 13 was designed to
reach all disputes relating to the application, construction and alleged
violation of any provision of the agreement. The picket-line clause,
Section 12, was a provision of the agreement. 57 The dispute over the
meaning of Section 12, therefore, was arbitrable. In view of this fact,
Local 35's refusal to arbitrate prior to engaging in the sympathy strike
violated its collective bargaining agreernent. 59 This, in turn, the court
concluded, rendered the strike an unprotected activity which caused
the unfair labor practice charges to fail. 59 Accordingly, the court re-
versed the Board's decision.
It is submitted that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Keller-
Crescent is sound. In Buffalo Forge the Supreme Court stated that an
arbitration clause may be broad enough, as were the clauses at issue in
Buffalo Forge, to reach disputes concerning the inclusion of sympathy
strikes in a union's undertaking not to strike." Under well-settled
principles of labor law, if the legality of a sympathy strike is arbitrable
the strike loses its status as protected activity under the NLRA when
the union rejects an employer's legitimate request for arbitration. 6 '
2831. The Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's order because it agreed that the no-
strike-arbitration clause, which provided that "...there shall be no lockouts ... and ...
no strike, stoppages of work or any other form of interference with [production or
operation] ..., and any and all disputes and controversies arising under or in connec-
tion with the terms of provisions hereof shall be subject to the grievance procedure ..."
was not broad enough to render sympathy strikes arbitrable. Id. at 288, 88 L.R.R.M. at
2832. The court added that even if it had not agreed with this conclusion it would have
enforced the Board's order nonetheless in view of the Board's initial deference to arbi-
tration and the employer's subsequent refusal to arbitrate. Id. at 289, 88 L.R.R.M. at
2833.
These decisions had been relied upon by the Board in Keller-Crescent to support
its conclusion that a dispute over Local 35's sympathy strike was not arbitrable. 538 F.2d
at 1297-98, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3595-96. (Gary-Hobart was cited in the Board's decision, 217
N.L.R.B. at 687 n.4, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1204 n.4. Presumably, Hyster was raised by General
Counsel on brief. See 538 F.2d at 1297, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3595.) The court emphasized
that this reliance was misplaced not only because of factual distinctions between those
cases and Keller-Crescent, in particular the absence of a picket line clause, but also be-
cause of language in Buffalo Forge indicating that an arbitration clause might be broad
enough to reach the meaning and application of the no-strike clause itself. 538 F.2d at
1296, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3595.
"Id. at 1296, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3594.
37 1d. at 1298, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3596.
"Id. at '1300, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3598.
59 Id.
"" 428 U.S. at 405.
91
 This results because the strike is in violation of the parties' contract. See, e.g.,
Section on Labor Relations Law, Am. Bar Ass'n, The Developing Labor Law 124 (C.
Morris ed. 1971).
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Thus, Buffalo Forge, by heightening the presumption of arbitrability,
sanctions an implied waiver of a union's right to engage in sympathy
strikes. By contrast, the standard applied by the Board in its pre-
Buffalo Forge decision in Keller-Crescent required a clear and unmistak-
able waiver of the right to engage in a sympathy strike before the
strike would be found arbitrable and hence unprotected." Thus, it is
apparent that the Board's "clear-and-unmistakable" standard could no
longer remain viable after Buffalo Forge, because that case indicated
that a finding of arbitrability is not dependent upon an express waiver
of the right to sympathy strike, but rather is dependent upon the
breadth of the arbitration and no-strike clauses at issue."
In view of this strong presumption of arbitrability, the language
and structure of Local 35's contract clearly warranted the circuit
court's conclusion that the union's sympathy strike was arbitrable. The
logic of the court's determination that the interpretation of section 12,
a provision of the agreement, was arbitrable under Section 13, which
made disputes over the meaning of all contractual provisions subject
to arbitration, is unquestionable." Once it had been concluded that
" 2 In Keller-Crescent, the Board did not expressly apply the "clear and unmistak-
able" test as a standard for arbitrability. See 217 N.L.R.B. at 687, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1204.
It did, however, approve a portion of the Administrative Law Judge's opinion in which
he applied the test in considering whether the sympathy strike was arbitrable under
Section 13, the no-strike-arbitration provision of the contract. 217 N.L.R.B. at 696. Both
the Board and the ALJ once again utilized the "clear-and-unmistakable" standard to de-
termine whether Local 35 had impliedly waived its right to honor the Pressmen's picket
line by Section 12, the limited picket line clause, 217 N.L.R.B. at 687, 696, 89 L.R.R.M.
at 1204. See text at notes 41-52 supra, That the "clear and unmistakable" standard has
functioned as a test of arbitrability is more clearly demonstrated in Gary-Hobart Water
Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 86 L.R.R.M. 1210 (1974). There, the Board prefaced its
examination of whether the sympathy strikes at issue came within the no-strike and ar-
bitration provisions with a statement of the standard. Id. at 744-45, 86 L.R.R.M. at
1213.
63 The language of Buffalo Forge not relied upon by the Seventh Circuit further
supports this conclusion. In dicta, the Supreme Court noted that a sympathy strike
would not present an arbitrable grievance if: (1) the collective bargaining agreement did
not contain a no-strike clause; or (2) sympathy strikes were expressly excluded from such a
clause. 428 U.S. at 408. From this language it can be assumed that a rule requiring
clear and unmistakable inclusion of all sympathy strikes in a no-strike-arbitration clause
or separate sympathy strike clause, prior to a finding of arbitrability would be pre-
cluded by Buffalo Forge. See 428 U.S. at 408. See text at note 25 .supra. The Sixth Cir-
cuit, however, has interpreted this language as preserving the "clear and unmistakable"
test. Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 551 F.2d 695, 705,
94 L.R.R.M. 2609, 2615 (6th Cir. 1977). The collective bargaining agreement in South-
ern Ohio Coal, in fact, did not contain an express no-strike clause, id. at 705, 94 L.R.R.M.
at 2615, and therefore the court's result is not incompatible with that of the Seventh
Circuit. A comparison of the courts of appeals discussions does indicate that the "clear
and unmistakable" test is not accorded consistent interpretations. The most accurate
reading of Buffalo Forge's effect on the "clear and unmistakable" test results from a
combination of the two courts' views. First, the test has survived to the extent that the
existence of some type of no-strike clause is a prerequisite to finding a sympathy strike
arbitrable. Buffalo Forge, however, no longer sanctions a test which requires express
inclusion of all sympathy strikes, within either a general no-strike clause or a limited
picket line clause, prior to finding arbitrability.
64 See notes 31 and 32 supra for the text of section 12 and 13.
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the status of Local 35's sympathy strike was arbitrable, it followed that
the strikers' refusal to cross the picket line was unprotected activity
and hence was susceptible to the employer's disciplinary actions. It is
submitted therefore that Keller-Crescent is correct both in its funda-
mental reasoning and in its result. The Court's decision effects the
policy favoring arbitration reaffirmed in Buffalo Forge by preserving
the bargain of the parties to arbitrate disputes rather than to engage
in economic warfare.
The practical result of Keller-Crescent will be that employers will
seek express no-strike or no-sympathy-strike clauses and'broad arbi-
tration clauses which apply to disputes over all contractual provisions.
Unions, on the other hand, will optimally negotiate-for express exclu-
sion of sympathy strikes from no-strike clauses and, at a minimum,
will avoid the inclusion of any limited sympathy strike clause which
might give rise to an implied waiver of the general right to engage in
sympathy strikes."''
B. Recovery of Damages Resulting from Sympathy Strikes: United States
Steel Corp. v. United Mine Workers, Local 6321
In another Survey year decision, United States Steel Corp. v. United
Mine Workers, Local 6321," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that an employer could not recover damages re-
sulting from a sympathy strike where the collective bargaining agree-
ment did not contain an express no-strike clause."' There, a mine
complex operated by U.S. Steel was closed for approximately one
week because employees who were members of the defendant union
refused to cross picket lines maintained by certain coal miners." The
picketing miners were members of another United Mine Worker
(UMW) load, but were not employed at the U.S. Steel plant." The
collective bargaining agreement between UMW and U.S. Steel did not
contain a clause prohibiting either strikes or refusals to cross picket
lines." It did, however, contain a detailed grievance-arbitration pro-
cedure which covered disputes as to interpretation of provisions, as to
66
 Two theories of implied waiver could be advanced against the union: first, im-
plied waiver through arbitrability where there is a broad arbitration clause and a no-
strike or picket line clause; and second, implied waiver simply from the existence of a
limited picket line clause. Although the court refrained from deciding the latter issue, it
did indicate that it considered this argument as to implied waiver to be persuasive. 538
F.2d at 1297, 92 L.R.R.M. at 3595.
6R
 548 F.2d 67, 94 L.R.R.M. 2049 (3d Cir. 1976).
87 Id. at 74, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2053.
68 Id. at 69, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2050.
Be Id.
7° Id. at 70, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2050. The collective bargaining agreement in effect
was the National Bituminous Coal Lease Agreement of 1968. Id. at 69-70, 94 L.R.R.M.
at 2050.
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matters not specifically mentioned in the agreement, and as to any
local trouble. 7 '
U.S. Steel brought an action for damages under Section 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act claiming that the work-stoppage
was a sympathy strike and that the union's failure to invoke the
grievance-arbitration procedure had breached the collective bargain-
ing agreement." A jury rendered a verdict for U.S. Steel," and the
trial judge denied the union's alternative motions for a judgment not-
withstanding the verdict or a new trial." In so doing the trial court re-
lied upon a pre -Buffalo Forge case decided by the Third Circuit, Island
Creek Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 75 which held that a dispute over
whether the union had the right to refuse to cross a picket line was
arbitrable under a grievance-arbitration clause" virtually identical to
that in the instant case." The Third Circuit had based this holding of
arbitrability in Island Creek upon its conclusion that a no-sympathy-
strike obligation could be implied from the existence of a mandatory
arbitration clause78 under the Supreme Court's decision in Gateway
Coal.'" There, the Supreme Court had held that injunctive relief could
be predicated upon a no-strike obligation implied from a mandatory
arbitration agreement. 8° Unlike the situation in Island Creek, however,
the underlying grievance in Gateway Coal, a safety dispute, was arbi-
trable under the parties agreement."
While the United Mine Workers' appeal was pending, the Su-
preme Court decided Buffalo Forge." Accordingly, the Third Circuit
turned its attention to the effects of that case on the viability of its
holding in Island Creek. The court noted that although Buffalo Forge
had specifically addressed only the availability of injunctions, the prin-
ciples which it announced with respect to the arbitrability of sympathy
strikes were relevant to the instant case. 83 In fact, the crucial issue in
U.S. Steel was whether the union had been under a contractual duty to
arbitrate over the sympathy strike. 84 Absent such a duty, there could
be no finding of a contractual violation and hence, no damage re-
covery. The Third Circuit then focUsed upon the language of Buffalo
7 ' Id. at 70, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2050. Additionally, the parties agreed both that the
integrity of the contract be maintained and that all disputes not settled by agreement be
settled by the machinery for disputes. Id. at 70, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2050-51.
" Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 2051.
"Id., 94 L.R.R.M. at 2050.
74 1d. at 70-71, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2050.
" 507 F.2d 650, 88 L.R.R.M. 2364 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 877 (1975).
" Id. at 653, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2366.
"548 F.2d at 71, 94 L.R.R.M. 2051.
" 507 F.2d at 651, 88 L.R.R.M. at 2366.
'° 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
8° Id. at 381-82.
81 Id. For a fuller discussion of Gateway Coal see note 22 supra.
" 548 F.2d at 71, 94 L.R.R.M, at 2051.
8 ° Id. at 72, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2052.
&Old,
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Forge which indicated that in the absence of a no-strike clause, there
was no basis for implying a promise not to engage in a sympathy
strike. 85 In addition, the circuit court noted that the Supreme Court
while discussing Gateway Coal had specifically disapproved the Island
Greek holding that a promise to refrain from engaging in sympathy
strikes could be implied from the mandatory arbitration clause in-
volved therein." Thus, the court concluded that the defendant un-
ion's sympathy strike could not have violated the collective bargaining
agreement, whose arbitration clause was so similar to the clause in Is-
land Creek. Accordingly, the circuit court reversed the judgment of the
district court thereby denying the recovery of damages from the sym-,
pathy strike. 87
In light of Buffalo Forge's pronouncement not only that a manda-
tory arbitration clause alone could not give rise to a promise not to
sympathy strike, but also that a mandatory arbitration clause practi-
cally identical to that in U.S. Steel did not give rise to such a promise,
there is little question that the Third Circuit's decision is correct. The
probable effect of the decision will undoubtedly be that management
will seek express no-strike clauses in order to insure that a dispute
over a sympathy strike will be found arbitrable. Without such a clause,
the employer will be precluded not only from obtaining an order
compelling arbitration and damages, but also from discharging sym-
pathy strikers without exposing itself to the risk of unfair labor prac-
tice charges.
" Id. at 73, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2053; see 428 U.S. at 408.
86 548 F.2d at 73, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2059; see 428 U.S. at 408 n.10.
87 548 F.2d at 74, 94 L.R.R.M. at 2053-54. The concurring opinion in U.S. Steel is
noteworthy for its discussion of Buffalo Forge which analyzes the latter case in terms of
its implications with respect to three categories of collective bargaining agreements: (I)
agreements which expressly forbid sympathy strikes in addition to all other strikes, and
provide for mandatory arbitration; (2) agreements which contain only general no-strike
and arbitration clauses; and (3) agreements which contain arbitration clauses but do not
contain any express no-strike clauses. Id, at 75, 94 L.R.R.M. 2054, at 2055. According to
the concurring judge's interpretation of Buffalo Forge, a contract in the first category—
express no-sympathy-strike clause—would lend itself both to injunctive relief against,
and an order to arbitrate, a sympathy strike as well as to damages. Under the provisions
of a contract in the second category—express no-strike-arbitration clause—an employer
could obtain an order to arbitrate and damages, but no injunctive relief. Finally, under
contracts in the third category—no express no-strike clause—such as in the instant case,
neither injunctive relief or damages, nor an order compelling arbitration would be
available. Id.
Although the concurring opinion seems correct in its interpretation of Buffalo
Forge with respect to the implications of agreements in the second and third categories,
it is submitted that under Buffalo Forge an injunction would not be available against a
sympathy strike in the first category where the collective bargaining agreement con-
tained an express no-sympathy-strike clause. Such a result is precluded by Buffalo Forge
for several related reasons. First, the essence of the Supreme Court's rationale is that a
strike sought to be enjoined must be precipitated by an underlying grievance arbitrable
under the provisions of the sympathy strikers' contract with their employer. 428 U.S. at
407-08 & n.10. Even if sympathy strikes were expressly precluded, there would not be
any underlying grievance arbitrable under the sympathy striker's collective bargaining
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In primary effect, the Supreme Court's decision in Buffalo Forge
forecloses federal courts from enjoining unions engaged in sympathy
strikes. Yet, by indicating a preference for dispute resolution by arbi-
tration rather than by injunction, the Court also enhanced the pre-
sumption that the legality of a sympathy strike is arbitrable. At the
same time, however, the Buffalo Forge majority delineated one instance
in which a union's promise to arbitrate the legality of a sympathy
strike may not be Unpile& where a collective bargaining agreement
does not contain an express no-strike clause. The Seventh Circuit's
decision in Keller-Crescent, overruling the Board's "clear and un-
mistakable" standard for determining whether a union has waived its
right to sympathy strike, is illustrative of the unanticipated effects fol-
lowing from Buffalo Forge's renewed endorsement of the arbitral pro-
cess with respect to sympathy strikes. The Third Circuit's decision in
U.S. Steel, on the other hand, in denying an employer recovery of
damages resulting from a sympathy strike where its contract with the
union did not contain an express no-strike clause, represents the logi-
cal extension of Buffrao Forge's observation that an implied promise to
arbitrate does not arise absent an express no-strike clause. The
breadth of Buffalo Forge's impact upon other areas of federal labor law
will be revealed only by future decisions.
agreement. The issue of the legality of the sympathy strike itself would be the only mat-
ter subject to arbitration. Second, Buffalo Forge established that it is not the federal
courts' role to enjoin contractual violations. Id. at 410-11. The Court, in its Gateway Coal
discussion, specifically noted that absent an underlying grievance, neither Boys Markets
nor Gateway Coal " . furnishes the authority to enjoin a strike solely because it is
claimed to be in breach of contract and because this claim is itself arbitrable." Id. at 908
n.10. A sympathy strike, allegedly in violation of a clause expressly prohibiting such
strikes would present precisely this situation.
Filially, the Supreme Court concluded in Buffalo Forge that absent any no-strike
clause, an obligation to refrain from sympathy strikes could riot be implied from a
mandatory arbitration clause. Id. at 408. It was an underlying premise of this conclusion
that sympathy strikes are not arbitrable under the collective bargaining agreement be-
tween the sympathy strikers and the employer. Rather, it is proper to imply no-strike
obligations from arbitration provisions only when a union may be deemed to have
agreed to refrain from striking over contractual disputes which it has promised to re-
solve peacefully. If there is no dispute capable of resolution under the collective bar-
gaining agreement over which the strike was called, then there can be no implied obli-
gation to refrain from striking. In Buffalo Forge, the Supreme Court concluded that
mandatory arbitration clauses did not give rise to a union's promise not to engage in
sympathy strikes precisely for this reason: the dispute underlying the strike could not
be cognizable under the sympathy strikers' collective bargaining agreement, but only
under the contract between the primary disputants and the employer. Thus, regardless
of whether an agreement contained a no-sympathy-strike clause, a sympathy strike
would not be subject to injunction, although clearly an employer could obtain both an
order compelling arbitration and damages if the strike were found illegal. To reach a
contrary result would contravene directly Buffalo Forge's ruling that the courts should
not usurp the function of the arbitrator by deciding the arbitrable dispute themselves.
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III. APPLICABILITY OF STATE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS: Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp.
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act' (NLRA)
allows employers and labor unions to include union-security
agreements2
 in their collective bargaining contracts. Concurrently,
Section 14(b) of the Act3
 enables individual states to enact so-called
right-to-work laws prohibiting such union security agreements. This
provision gives rise to a choice of law problem as to which state's law,
if any, shall apply where an employment relationship extends to sev-
eral states, some of which have right-to-work laws and some of which
do not. 4
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) provides:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in
this subchapter, or in any other statute of the United States, shall
preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor or-
ganization • .. to require as a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such
employment ....
There are several types of union security agreements, including the agency
shop, the union shop and the closed shop. The agency shop agreement provides that
union membership is optional but generally imposes the same financial obligations on
non-member employees as does union membership. See NLRB v. General Motors
Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 736 (1963). In the union shop, union membership is required
within a specified period of time after hiring as a condition of continued employment.
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 409 n.1 (1976)
(Mobil Oil). Under § 8(a)(3), this specified period can be no less than thirty-one days
after the employment date or after the effective date of the union security agreement,
whichever is later. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). See note I supra. In the closed shop, a
prospective employee must be a union member in order to be hired. Mobil Oil, 426 U.S.
at 409 n.l. Closed shops are banned by § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970). In addi-
tion to the agency shop and the union shop, other forms of union security agreements,
such as maintenance of membership and dues checkoff are permitted by § 8(a)(3). See
generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 639-76 (1976).
' 29 U.S.C. § I64(b) (1970) provides: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be con-
strued as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which
such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
' The issue of the application of section 14(b) in a multi jurisdictional situation has
arisen previously in cases before the National Labor Relations Board. Western Electric
Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 1019, 24 L.R.R.M. 1367 (1949); Giant Food Shopping Center, Inc., 77
N.L.R.B. 791, 22 L.R.R.M. 1070 (1948); Northland Greyhound Lines, 80 N.L.R.B. 288,
23 L.R.R.M. 1074 (1948). For example, in Northland Greyhound, the employer operated
buses and bus stations throughout eight states, three of which prohibited union shops.
80 N.L.R.B. at 290 & n.7, 23 L.R.R.M. at 1074 & n.7. The union which represented the
employer's maintenance employees, office employees, station employees and bus drivers
petitioned for authorization to establish a union shop agreement with the employer
pursuant to the Taft-Hartley Act, ch. 120, § 9(e)(1), 61 Stat. 144 (1947) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 159(e)(1) (1970) ). 80 N.L.R.B. at 288-89, 23 L.R.R.M. at 1074. Determin-
ing that the headquarters of the employees "represenged] the focal points of the
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During the Survey year, the Supreme Court in Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp. 5 held that the location of the pre-
dominant job situs of the employees is determinative of the applicabil-
ity of states' right-to-work laws.° The decision provides a test to de-
termine the applicability of state right-to-work laws to employment re-
lationships which extend to several states.'
The controversy in Mobil Oil involved a 1969 collective bargain-
ing agreement which a division of Mobil Oil Corporation (Mobil) en-
tered into with Maritime Local 8-801 of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union (Union)." The Union represented un-
licensed seamen who worked on Mobil's fleet of ocean-going pe-
troleum tankers.° The agreement contained an "agency shop" provi-
sion under which employees were required either to join the union or,
in lieu of membership, to pay the union initiation fee and regular
dues within thirty-one days of their employment date.'° The employ-
ment relationship governed by this agreement had roots in Texas,
where right-to-work laws were in force;" Mobil's headquarters—the
site of final hiring decisions, personnel and other corporate adminis-
trative functions—was located in Beaumont, Texas." Texas was also
the residence of 123 of the 289 seamen involved in the agreement."
The seamen, however, spent eighty to ninety percent of their working
time outside Texas on the high seas or in ports outside Texas."
Almost two years after entering into the collective bargaining
agreement at issue, Mobil filed suit in United States District Court for
employment relationship"--being the location where the employees "reportlfedl to
work, received] their instructions, and [were] paid their salaries,"—the Board con-
cluded that the states which were the location of the individual employees' headquarters
could determine the validity of ,the union shop agreement as to those employees. 80
N.L.R.B. at 291, 23 L.R.R.M. at 1075. This headquarters rule was subsequently applied
in Western Electric. 84 N.L.R.B. at 1022-23, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1368.
5
 426 U.S. 407 (1976).
'id. at 414.
7
 Railway and airline employees, however, are not affected by the decision, since
they are exempted from the operation of § I4(b) and state right-to-work laws by the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 152, eleventh (1970).
° 426 U.S. at 410.
° Id. at 410-11,
t° The provision read as follows: "For the duration of the Agreement all
employees hired shall, as a condition of employment, become members of the union
and/or in the alternative pay the regular union dues and initiation fees within 31 days
from the employment date." 426 U.S. at 410. The agreement was valid for the purposes
of 8(a)(3). See notes I and 2, supra.
" TEX. RE v. CI v. STAT. ANN. arts. 5154a, 5154g, 5207a (Vernon 1971).
" 426 U.S. at 411. Other administrative functions performed in Beaumont in-
cluded the payment to the State of Texas of unemployment compensation insurance to
cover all personnel on Mobil's tankers, maintenance of payroll records, deduction of all
state and federal taxes from the seamen's wages, monthly remittances of union dues
deducted from the seamen's pay, and consideration of all grievances properly filed by
the seamen. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, 81 L.R.R.M. 2051,
2052 (E.D. Tex. 1972).
" 426 U.S. at 411.
14 id.
1079
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
the Eastern District of Texas" seeking a declaratory judgment under
section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act." Mobil alleged that the agency
shop provision of the collective bargaining agreement violated Texas's
right-to-work statutes and was therefore invalid and unenforceable."
The district court, reasoning that Texas was "intimately concerned
with the collective bargaining agreement and with the employees
working thereunder,"" ruled that Texas law applied and that there-
fore the union security agreement was void and unenforceable." A
three-member panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and held that
Texas's right-to-work laws could not void the agency shop agree-
ment. 2° The panel reasoned that the job situs of the employees—the
place where their work was actually performed—was "the most impor-
tant and logical factor"2 ' in determining the applicability of Texas's
right-to-work laws. Since the Mobil employees' job situs was principally
on the high seas, the panel concluded that Texas law did not apply to
the collective bargaining agreement in question. 22
On rehearing en banc, an eight-member majority of the Fifth
Circuit rejected the panel's analysis." The court of appeals chose to
weigh all of the Texas contacts with the employment relationship in
the light of national labor policy." The majority's analysis thus en-
tailed not only a consideration of the number of contacts Texas had
with the Mobil employment relationship, but also a determination of
the importance of those contacts in the context of the legislative pur-
poses expressed in sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b). 25 Interpreting section
14(b) to "suggest" that a state may apply its right-to-work law where it
has a significant interest in the application of a union security agree-
" Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, 81 L.R.R.M. 2051 (E.D.
Tex. 1972).
" 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). For discussion of the federal district court's jurisdiction
over actions brought by employers seeking declaratory judgments under section 301
and the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970), see Black-
Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 313 F.2d 179, 181-82, 52 L.R.R.M.
2038, 2039-40 (2d Cir. 1962); Weyerhauser Co. v. International Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite
and Paper Mill Workers, 190 F. Supp. 196, 197-98, 47 L.R.R.M. 2337, 2338-39 (D. Me.
1960). But see Mengel Co. v..Nashville Paper Prod. & Specialty Workers, 22! F.2d 644,
648, 36 L.R.R.M. 2028, 2032 (6th Cir. 1955) (with a dissent by Stewart, J.).
11
 426 U.S. at 410.
18
 81 L.R.R.M. at 2052.
'" Id. at 2053.
2° Mobil Oil Corp. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, 483 F.2d 603, 609-10,
83 L.R.R.M. 3046, 3050-51 (5th Cir. 1973), noted in 11 Hous. L. REv. 709 (1974). The
three member panel of the court of appeals rejected the union's contention that the
dispute with Mobil had not ripened into a present case or controversy. 483 F.2d at
607-08, 83 L.R.R.M. at 3048.49.
21
 483 F.2d at 609, 83 L.R.R.M. at 3050.
22 1d. at 610, 83 L.R.R.M. at 3050.
23
 504 F.2d 272, 87 L.R.R.M. 2673 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc), noted in 44 CIN. L.
REV. 384 (1975); 88 HARV. L. REV. 1620 (1975).
24
 504 F.2d at 274-75, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2675.
2 Id. at 275, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2675.
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ment, the court also examined Texas's interest in the agreement in
question. 29 Based upon this analysis of national labor policies and
Texas's interests, the court concluded "that the federal labor legisla-
tion, the predominance of Texas contacts over any other jurisdiction,
and the significant interest which Texas has in applying its right to
work law to this employment relationship warranted] application of
Texas law, and consequently, invalidation of the agency shop provi-
sion."" Accordingly, the en banc court of appeals reversed the panel's
decision and. upheld the district court judgment invalidating the
agency shop provision. 28
On writ of certiorari,29 the Supreme Court reversed the decision
of the Fifth Circuit in a seven to two, decision," and held that it is the
employees' "predominant job situs" which determines the applicability
of state right-to-work laws under section 14(b).3 ' The Court concluded
that Texas's right-to-work laws did not reach the union security
agreement in question because all of the Mobil employees performed
most of their work beyond the territorial boundaries of that state."
Mr. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, focused on the adequacy
of Texas's connections with the employment relationship between the
Union and Mobil in the light of the congressional policies underlying
sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) of the NLRA. 33 The majority considered
three alternative solutions in its analysis. First, the United States as
amicus curiae and the Union contended that the congressional con-
cerns behind the adoption of section 14(b) required that job situs con-
trol the determination of the reach of state right-to-work laws. 34 Since
the job situs of the workers in Mobil was on the high seas, under this
approach Texas would have insufficient contact with the employment
relationship to apply its laws. 35 Hence, federal law in section 8(a)(3)
would apply and the agency shop provision would be valid." Second,
55 Id. at 278-79, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2677-78.
27 /d. at 275, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2675. Six dissenting judges, emphasizing the exten-
sive federal control of maritime labor, concluded that the agency shop provision should
be upheld. The dissenting judges reasoned that Texas contacts with the employment re-
lationship did not justify the application of Texas law to maritime employment affairs
which were traditionally the province of federal law. Thus, the dissent determined that
the state's right-to-work laws should not reach a union security agreement permitted by
§ 8(a)(3) where maritime workers are involved. Id. at 282-86, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2681-84.
(Ainsworth, J., dissenting). Two of the six dissenters would have preferred that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, rather than the federal courts, exercise primary jurisdic-
tion in this type of case. Id. at 287, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2684 (Brown, J., dissenting).
re Id. at 282, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2681.
3°423 U.S. 820 (1975).
30 Mr. justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, White and Blackmun.
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stevens concurred in the judgment. Jus-
tice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented. See note 66 infra.
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Mobil, echoing the reasoning of the court of appeals en bane," ar-
gued that the Court should consider all contacts between Texas and
the Mobil-Union employment relationship in order to determine the
applicability of Texas law.38 Under this approach, Texas contacts with
the employment relationship, including, inter alia, the residencies
maintained by many of the seamen in Texas and the significant
amount of Mobil's personnel administration which took place in that
state, would be sufficient to enable state law under section 14(b) to in-
validate the agency shop agreement. 39 Third, the majority considered
the view, adopted by the dissenting justices," that the policies un-
derlying the enactment of both section 14(b) and Texas's right-to-
work laws required the application of Texas law in this case because
the final decisions to hire the Mobil seamen were made in Texas.'"
The majority accepted the job situs test advanced by the Union
and rejected the other two approaches. The Court reached this con-
clusion through its interpretation of the congressional concerns un-
derlying sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b). 42
 Although the Court saw congres-
sional concern with the hiring process reflected in the federal ban of
the closed shop in section 8(a)(3), it perceived the remaining provisions
of section 8(a)(3) as governing post-hiring employment conditions.'"
As an example of this congressional concern with post-hiring condi-
tions, the Court cited the provision of section 8(a)(3) which protects
from discharge employees denied union membership for reasons
other than failure to pay the union fees. 44 Moreover, that union
security agreements were allowed at all under the Taft-Hartley Act,
the Court interpreted as evidence of congressional concern with the
possibility of non-union member employees already hired receiving
the benefits of union representation without bearing any of its finan-
cial burden." Like a discharge, this potential receipt of unfair benefits
would occur during the post-hiring employment relationship." The
Court further saw section 8(a)(3)'s concern with the post-hiring re-
lationship among employer, union and employee mirrored in section
14(b). 47 This conclusion, the court reasoned, followed because section
14(b) deals with union security agreements in allowing state policy to
control their validity, and under the Court's interpretation of section
8(a)(3), such union security agreements, except for closed shop
agreements, are related to the post-hiring employment relationship."
21 See text at notes 27.31 supra.
34 426 U.S. at 413.
39 /d. at 413-14.
4° See text at notes 60-65 infra.
4 ' 426 U.S. at 414.
42 Id.
"Id. at 414-16.
44 Id. at 415.
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Having concluded that Congress intended sections 8(a)(3) and
14(b) primarily to focus on the post-hiring employment relationship,
the Court then considered which of the three proposed approaches
would best reflect this congressional intent. Concluding that job situs
is the center of the post-hiring employment relationship, the Court dis-
missed all other state contacts as being insufficiently related to this re-
lationship to trigger the application of state right-to-work laws under
section 14(b). 49 Thus, the Court determined that a state having such
right-to-work laws cannot apply them to invalidate a union security
clause of an employment contract where the covered employees' job
situs is beyond the territorial boundaries of that state." Since the
maritime job situs in Mobil Oil was outside any state's territorial
boundaries, neither Texas nor any other state could apply its laws to
the agency shop clause in question." Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded, the federal rule "favoring" such agreements, section 8(a)(3),
assured the validity of the agency shop provision involved in Mobil
Oil.' 2
In addition to the statutory policy reasons supporting the job-
situs test, the majority added two "practical considerations" as reasons
for rejecting both the place-of-hiring approach advanced by the dis-
senters" and the generalized weighing of state contacts with the
employment relationship advocated by Mobil and adopted by the
court of appeals en banc." First, permitting the state, where nothing
but hiring occurs, to apply its right-to-work laws would create the pos-
sibility of "patently anomalous extra-territorial application"" of such
laws. For example, the Court pointed out, Texas as the place of hiring
could apply its right-to-work laws even where all employees worked in
another state." Second, although under a generalized weighing of
contracts approach the Court perceived no prospect of anomalous re-
sults, it nevertheless found such an approach undesirable as "less pre-
dictable and more difficult of application than a job situs test," be-
cause a generalized weighing of' contacts would require a case-by-case
analysis of all contacts between a state and an employment re-
lationship." Thus, holding that job situs is determinative of the
" Id. at 417-18.
"Id. at 414.
31 1d. at 420.
52 Id. The Court did not expressly disclose how it determined that "Mederal pol-
icy favors" union and agency shop agreements, id. Presumably, this conclusion was
drawn from its reading of the legislative history of the NLRA. See text at notes 44-50
supra. The conclusion that federal policy favors such union security agreements appears
open to debate. See 426 U.S. at 427 & 11.5 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 65 infra.
sa See text at notes 60-65 infra,
54 See text at notes 28-31 supra.
55 426 U.S. at 418.
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applicability of state right-to-work laws, the Court reversed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals. 58
In contrast to the majority's interpretation of the legislative
policies underlying sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b), Justice Stewart in dis-
sent" reasoned that the federal interest in union security agreements
was limited to the ban of the closed shop in section 8(a)(3), with fed-
eral sanction of lesser union security agreements ceding to state con-
trol through section 14(b)." Justice Stewart found the language in sec-
tion 14(b), assigning such control to states wherein the "execution" or
"application" of a union security agreement takes place, too broad to
provide a clear choice of law rule in a multi-jurisdictional situation
such as that in Mobil. 8 ' Accordingly, Justice Stewart decided that, since
Congress had left to each individual state the power to enforce its own
policy with regard to the validity of most union security agreements,"
the applicability of Texas's policy should be fashioned in this instance
from consideration of the state interests underlying the Texas right-
to-work laws." Finding the interests reflected in this law to lie primar-
ily in regulation of the hiring process, Justice Stewart maintained that
the law of the place of hiring, Texas, should apply." He therefore
would have affirmed the decision of the court of appeals en bane."
Mobil Oil is significant in that it establishes predominant job situs
as the test of the applicability of state right-to-work laws in a mul-
tijurisdictional context." Under this test, where an employment re-
lationship has connections with several states, the law of the state
"Id. at 414, 421.
" Id. at 422 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 424-27.
"' Id. at 428-29.
" Id. at 429-30.
"See id. at 429-31.
" Id. at 430-32.
"Id. at 437. The dissent also concluded that even if job situs was selected as the
key factor in deciding what law should govern union security agreements, Texas law
should still apply because the Mobil employees performed more work in Texas than in
any other state. Id. at 434.1n making this determination, the dissent rejected the view
that where the Mobil employee's predominant job situs was beyond any state's bound-
aries, no state law could abrogate the federal rule in section 8(a)(3) sanctioning most
forms of union security agreements. Id. at 434-37. The dissent premised that the high
seas are not a federal territory governed strictly by federal law. Id. at 434-35. Accord-
ingly, federal law may preempt state law dealing with maritime affairs "only when the
nature of the problem require[s] the application of a uniform rule or when the state law
unduly hamperfs) maritime commerce." Id. at 435. The dissent next conduded that
maritime labor law is not an area preempted by federal control, despite extensive fed-
eral regulation of maritime labor. Id. at 436-37. Since, under this analysis, some state's
law should apply, the dissent concluded that even under the job situs test Texas law
would control due to the relative amount of work occurring in that state. Id. at 437.
" 426 U.S. at 414. Only three justices joined in the opinion of Mr. Justice Mar-
shall setting forth the job situs test. Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment
without opinion. Id. at 421. Justices Stevens and Powell each filed concurring opinions.
Id. at 421-22. The predominant job situs test is thus the product of a plurality opinion,
arguably mitigating the decisiveness and significance of the holding.
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which is the predominant job situs of the employees will determine
the validity of a union security agreement affecting such employees.
This test appears to have the advantages of predictability and ease of
application sought by the Court," allowing both labor contract
negotiators and the courts to determine readily in most cases whether
a union security clause will be valid. It is submitted, however, that the
job situs test, fails to reflect adequately the congressional policies un-
derlying sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b), and thus may lead to anomalous
and unsatisfactory results. Although' the dissent's approach in focusing
on the place of hiring was less ambitious and limited to the present
case, it is further submitted that the dissent's analysis of the legislative
concerns underlying the NLRA was overly narrow. As a result of
these considerations, it is submitted that some method of weighing
statutorily significant state contacts with the employment relationship
at issue, similar to that advanced by the court of appeals en bane,
would have provided the best solution in Mobil Oil. Such a flexible
method would have permitted the court to attach appropriate signifi-
cance to all state contacts and at the same time would have avoided
over-simplification of the legislative concerns underlying sections
8(a)(3) and 14(b) of the NLRA.
Analysis of sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) was the starting point for
both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Mobil Oil." Section
14(b) definitively allows the prohibition of a union security agreement
by any state or territory where the "execution or application" of the
agreement occurs." That section, however, does not indicate explicitly
what connection or contact a state must have with a multi-jurisdictional
employment relationship to constitute the location where a union se-
curity agreement is executed or applied." Thus, both the majority
and the dissent turned to analysis of the underlying legislative policies
of sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) to determine the adequacy of Texas's
contacts with the Mobil Oil employment relationship. 7 ' It is therefore
appropriate to begin an analysis of the Mobil Oil opinions with an
examination of these provisions and their legislative history.
Of the concurring Justices, however, only Justice Powell explicitly objected to the
job situs lest. Id. at 421. Justice Stevens expressed reservations about the majority's
suggestion that federal policy favors union security agreements, but otherwise joined in
the Marshall opinion. Id. This suggests that the job situs test is supported by at least a
five-member majority of the Court. Moreover, in the context of a 5-4 opinion, it seems
to have been incumbent on the Chief Justice to articulate his reservations concerning
the majority opinion. That he did not suggests that any reservations he had were not
strongly held.
"7 Sec 426 U.S. at 419. Ease of application and predictability may not be satisfied
in some situations, however. See text at notes 96-99 infra.
"See 426 U.S. at 412-14, 424-25.
" 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970). See note 3 supra.
'° See 426 U.S. at 428-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
" See text at notes 29.65 supra. The considerations of the policies, interests and
purposes reflected in conflicting rules of law is common to several of the choice of law
methods advanced by leading commentators. Professor Brainerd Currie was the first
scholar to develop a choice of law method based upon a consideration of a state's "gov-
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Sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) were enacted in the 1947 Taft-Hartley
amendments to the NI-RA." While the Taft-Hartley Act reaffirmed
the rights to organize and bargain collectively established by section 7,
of the NLRA," its enactment resulted partly from anti-union senti-
ment and concern with the abuses of power by organized labor."
Thus, the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act generally represented a
retreat from the more pro-union policy characteristic of the NLRA as
originally enacted." Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, the NLRA pro-
ernmental interest" in applying its law to a multi jurisdictional occurrence. Currie, Com-
ments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1242-43 (1963); Currie, The Con-
stitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interest and the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cult. L.
REV. 9, 9-12 (1958). See, D. CAVERS. THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS. 63-64, 72-74 (1965); R.
LEELAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS OF LAW § 97 (1968); Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of
Competing Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 Mo. L.REv. 407, 421-23
, (1975). According to Curries approach, the policies and purposes underlying a law are
the principal sources of a jurisdiction's governmental interests in the application of that
law in a multijurisdictional context, and the primary determinants of the applicability of
that law to the occurrence in question. See Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra,
at 1242-43; Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law, supra, at 9-10. To identify
policies and purposes, Currie would have courts rely upon "the ordinary processes of
construction and interpretation," whether the conflict involves statutes or common-law
rules. Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, supra, at 1242; Currie, The Disinterested
Third State, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. Pima. 754, 761-62 (1963). Other scholars, although
giving consideration to governmental purposes and policies, assign such analysis a more
restricted role in the resolution of choice of law problems. See generally R. LErt-Aksupra,
at §§ 97, 99, 105, 109-11; D. CAVERS, supra, at 93; Cheatham & Reese, Choke of the
Applicable Law, 52 COLVIN, L. REV. 959 (1952).
The approach taken by the dissenting justices appears consistent with a variation
of governmental interests analysis, the "functional analysis" advanced by Professors Von
Mehren and Trautman. Generally, this approach looks to a consideration of policies to
identify all "concerned jurisdictions," the latter consisting of jurisdictions with an in-
terest in regulating some aspect of a multi-jurisdictional occurrence. If a jurisdiction has
such an interest, a "regulating rule" is constructed for that jurisdiction which reflects
the jurisdiction's policies. Where comparison of these regulating rules reveals that a true
conflict exists, an attempt is made to determine whether there is a "predominantly con-
cerned jurisdiction" which either has "ultimate effective control" or has a preempting
interest by agreement of all concerned jurisdictions. See A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAu-r-
MAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS, 76-79 (1965). Where there is no pre-
dominantly concerned jurisdiction, the claims of all concerned jurisdictions are weighed
with a view towards "the relative strength of the several policies in issue and the relative
significance to the jurisdictions concerned of the vindication of their policies." Id, at 77.
The dissent's approach in Mobil Oil resembled this analysis insofar as it looked to
both the policies expressed in the federal law and in Texas's right-to-work laws. Finding
federal interest in union security agreements exhaused with the ban of the closed shop
in section 8(a)(3)'s and section 14(b)'s allocation to the states of the power to regulate
lesser agreements, see text at notes 60-65 supra, Justice Stewart apparently concluded
that Texas was the predominantly concerned jurisdiction and proposed a solution based
on Texas's policies. 426 U.S. at 424-34.
"Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). See gener-
ally A. Cox. D. BOK & R. GORMAN. CASES AND MATERIALS ON LABOR LAW, 75-94 (8th ed.
1977) (hereinafter cited as Cox, BOK & GORMAN).
" Cox, BOK & GORMAN supra note 72, at 93.
"Id, at 88-94. See text at notes 76-86 infra.
75 See Cox, Box & GORMAN supra note 72, at 93-94.
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hibited employers from discriminating against employees on the basis
of union membership, but permitted agreements between employers
and labor unions requiring compulsory union tnembership. 76 In its
consideration of the Taft-Hartley amendments, Congress perceived
abuses by organized labor in enforcing such union security
agreements." In particular, Congress was concerned with hiring re-
strictions placed on workers and employers by the closed shop, and
with the oppressive abuse of union enforced discharges.'" Under the
closed-shop agreement, individuals were required to be union mem-
bers in order to be hired.'" Under all forms of union security
agreements, unions had authority arbitrarily to require the discharge
of workers whom union officials, for any reason, had declared were
not in good standing with the union."
To address these concerns, Congress banned the closed-shop in
section 8(a)(3)." However, other forms of union security agreements
imposing union obligations after hiring were still permitted due to a
concern that non-union employees would share with union members
the benefits of union representation without sharing any of its finan-
cial burdens." Nonetheless, Congress did place restrictions on the
employee discharges which a union can require under a union secu-
rity agreement, prohibiting any such discharges for reasons other than
an employee's dereliction in fulfilling his financial obligations to the
union." 3 Moreover, in section 14(b), Congress reserved to individual
states the power to ban the union security agreements otherwise per-
mitted by section 8(a)(3)." Thus, the congressional interests in section
8(a)(3) focused upon hiring conditions in forbidding the restrictions of
the closed shop, but upon post-hiring employment conditions in sanc-
tioning lesser forms of union security agreements subject to state pol-
icy under section 14(h) and to limitations on union enforced dis-
charges."
In light of these congressional interests reflected in sections
8(a)(3) and 14(b), the majority in Mobil Oil appears to have been cor-
rect in seeking a solution which permitted the state most concerned
with the post-hiring relationship to govern the validity of a union se-
78 See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 738-40 (1963).
"See H.R. REP. NC). 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 34 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 324-25
(1948) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; S. REP. No 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7
(1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY supra, at 412-13 (1948).
r9
	
H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 39 (1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY supra note 77, at 924-25 (1948); S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6-7
(1947), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE His'roxvsupra note 77, at 412-13 (1948).
" See note 2 supra.
" See authority cited in note 77 supra.
8 ' See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 740-41 (1963).
as
'3 Id. at 740-44.
" 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970). The text of § 14(b) is set out at note 3 supra.
"See 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) (1970).
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curity agreement affecting this relationship. Since the closed shop is
the only. form of union security agreement that requires union mem-
bership as a condition of hiring,86
 it is logical to conclude that the
congressional interest in the hiring process ended with section 8(a)(3)'s
ban of the closed shop. Because the other forms of union security
agreements permitted by section 8(a)(3) chiefly affect post-hiring
conditions, it is also logical that the state most connected with the
post-hiring employment conditions should be permitted to determine
the validity of such agreements pursuant to section 14(b). By corol-
lary, the dissent was incorrect in concluding that there is no federal
interest in union security agreements other than that underlying the
ban on the closed shop." That Congress, in section 8(a)(3), permitted
certain forms of union security agreements at all is evidence of some
degree of federal interest in their preservation.
In seeking a test which would allow the state most concerned
with the post-hiring employment conditions to control the validity of
union security agreements, the majority selected job situs as the con-
tact determinative of such concern. 88
 The legislative history of section
8(a)(3), however, reveals that Congress sought primarily to avoid the
prospect of non-union members benefiting from union bargaining
88
 See note 2 supra.
" See text at note 60 supra. On the basis of this conclusion, the dissent turned to
a consideration of Texas's right-to-work laws to determine whether Texas had a suffi-
cient interest in the Mobil employment relationship to apply these laws. The dissent
concluded that these laws evidenced a concern with the hiring process, justifying appli-
cation of Texas law in this case because it was the place of hiring. See text at notes
63-64 supra.
Whether Texas's right-to-work laws are primarily concerned with the hiring pro-
cess is debatable, however. Justice Stewart premised that "the language of the ["Texas]
statutes suggests that their principal purpose was, indeed, to democratize the hiring
process." 426 U.S. at 430. The preamble of public policy in the Texas statute, however,
contains no language explicitly supporting this premise. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5154a, § 1 (Vernon 1971). Section 3 of Texas's right-to-work statute, id., art. 5207a, § 3,
voids contracts requiring union membership as a condition of employment of
"employees or applicants for employment," thus including both the hiring process and
post-hiring contract in its ambit. The public policy declaration states "that the right of
persons to work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmem-
bership in any labor union ..." (emphasis added), apparently extending protection both
to job applicants and to employees well past the hiring stage. Id., art. 5154g, 3. The
dissent cited Lungford v. City of Bryan, 156 Tex. 520, 297 S.W.2d 115, 39 L.R.R.M.
2306 (1957), as authority for its interpretations of Texas's right-to-work statutes. 426
U.S. at 431. Yet Lungford, because it involved an already hired employee discharged for
joining a union, not job applicants discriminated against in the hiring process, hardly
supports the proposition that the concerns underlying Texas's right-to-work laws deal
primarily with the hiring process. Indeed, Justice Stewart seems to have conceded this
when he acknowledged that "Texas' right-to-work laws are concerned with the process
by which employees are hired and conditions which, after their hiring, may burden their
employment." 426 U.S. at 431 (emphasis added). Accordingly, while the language of
Texas's right-to-work statutes does indicate an interest with the hiring process, it pro-
vides no evidence of an overriding concern with the hiring process to the exclusion of
other policy considerations involving the posthiring employment relationship.
" 426 U.S. at 417-18.
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without providing the union any financial support, and at the same
time to eliminate abuse of union power in enforcing employee dis-
charges." Both of these purposes deal with the administration of
union security provisions, which occurs, for example, where union
dues are subtracted from employee paychecks and where the decision
to discharge an employee for failure to meet his union obligations is
finalized. Thus, the transactions related to the principal legislative in-
terests embodied in sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b) do not necessarily occur
at the job site. Thus, because it ignores the significance of congres-
sional policies relating to the post-hiring administration of union secu-
rity agreements, the job situs test oversimplifies the choice of right-
to-work laws in a multi-jurisdictional context.
This oversimplification inherent in the job situs test can produce
results inconsistent with the legislative policies behind sections 8(a)(3)
and 14(b) where significant post-hiring contacts exist with a state that
is not the predominant job situs. For example, in view of the multiple
post-hiring concerns reflected in sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b), the result
in Mobil Oil seems inadequate. Almost half of the seamen listed Texas
as their residence." Texas was the site of all personnel administration
involving the Mobil seamen: 91 all payroll records were maintained in
Beaumont and all paychecks were written and mailed from there;'' all
check-offs of union clues were performed in Texas, as were all de-
ductions for federal and state taxes; 93 all final hiring decisions and
termination decisions were made in Texas."' Thus, it is clear that.
Texas is the site of all administration of the union security clause re-
lating to the major congressional concerns reflected in sections 8(a)(3)
and 14(b). 03 Yet, because Texas lacked sufficient connection with one
contact tangential to these concerns—job situs—the state was pro-
hibited from enforcing its policy with regard to the validity of the
union security agreement.
The job situs test may also produce anomalous results where the
predominant job situs is difficult or impossible to identify. For exam-
ple, an interstate carrier might be headquartered in Georgia, and
travel a route limited to Alabama, Georgia and Florida. All three
states have enacted right-to-work laws;" yet, under the job situs test,
this carrier might be subject to a union security clause in his employ-
ment contract because no one of these states was the predominant job
situs. Although the employment relationship has contacts exclusively
See text and notes 76-85 supra.
°° 426 U.S. at 4 1 1.
01 See 504 F.2d at 273-74, 87 L. R.R.M. at 2674.
'2 1d. at 273, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2674.
" Id.
94 1d, at 274, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2674.
95 See text at notes 88.90 supra.
'" ALA. Cone tit. 26, § 375(1)-375(7) (1958); GA. Corm ANN. § 54.902-905
(1974); FtA, CoNs -r. art. 1, § 6.
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with right-to-work states, it would be subject to no state's right-to-work
laws. Thus, the job situs test is not only insensitive to the multiple
legislative purposes reflected in section 8(a)(3) and 14(b)," but also is
overly restrictive in placing paramount importance upon one state
contact which can lead to awkward and anomalous results.
It is submitted that a generalized weighing of state contacts simi-
lar to that performed by the en banc panel of the court of appeals"
would have been the most appropriate approach to the resolution of
Mobil Oil. Such a weighing of contacts would avoid oversimplification
because it is sensitive to the multiple legislative concerns underlying
sections 8(a)(3) and 14(b). Although this approach requires case-by-
case analysis, in view of the anomalous results which might occur by
ignoring contacts relevant to these concerns, concession to uncertainty
appears necessary. In application, all statutorily significant state con-
nections with an employment relationship could be given appropriate
weight based on their significance in relation to federal policy. As one
such contact, job situs could be considered, as it was in the court of
appeals majority opinion, but not at the expense of the other state
contacts important in the light of congressional concerns." Thus, in
Mobil Oil, the extensive contacts between Texas and the Mobil
employment relationship'°° should not have been eclipsed by exclusive
reliance upon the single factor of job situs to determine where the
union security agreement in question was applicable.
IV. REGULATION OF INTERNAL UNION AFFAIRS—ACCESS TO THE
UNION BALLOT UNDER THE LMRDA
Congress enacted the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act (LMRDA)' in 1959 as a response to revelations of
widespread corruption and oppressive leadership in labor unions. 2 By
21
 Several commentators criticize reliance upon statutory construction and in-
terpretation as a choice of law tool. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 99
(1968); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OE LAW PROCESS, 73-74, 93, 96-97, 108-09 (1965); Reese,
Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 679, 686 (1963).
Particularly in point is Professor Cavers' suggestion that ordinary statutory construction
is insufficient to resolve choice of law problems because statutes often have multiple
purposes which occasionally lead to different conclusions regarding their application in
a multi-jurisdictional context. D. CAVERS, supra, at 74, 108. This criticism, however, ap-
pears inapplicable to a generalized weighing of contacts approach, similar to that
employed by the court of appeals en banc, where several contacts can be weighed ac-
cording to their statutory significance. See text at notes 99-100 infra.
9" See text at notes 27-31 supra.
"See 504 F.2d at 274-75, 87 L.R.R.M. at 2674-75. See text at notes 27-31 and
notes 88-90 supra.
'°') See text at notes 90-96 supra.
Pub. L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959), codified in 29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970).
'See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1959), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1 959, at
398 (1959) (hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY) (LMRDA influenced by the
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providing financial reporting and disclosure requirements; 3
 limitations
on trusteeships;' a union member's "Bill of Rights" which guarantees,
among other rights, equal participation in union affairs and freedom
of speech and assembly; 5 and regulations governing union elections,6
Congress sought to further two goals. First, Congress believed that reg-
ulation of unions' financial dealings would insure "high standards of
responsibility and ethical conduct...." Second, Congress sought, by
promoting union democracy, to protect employees' rights to "or-
ganize, choose their own representatives, bargain collectively, and
otherwise engage in concerted activities....""
As a means of sustaining union democracy, Congress established
in Title IV" of the LMRDA procedural safeguards for the election of
union officers. Section 401 of the LMRDA" sets maximum terms of
office," mandates elections by secret ballot," and guarantees access to
the election machinery to all candidates.' 3
 Section 401 also prohibits
use of union funds for election campaigns." In particular, section
401(e) protects participation in the election process by providing that:
In any election required by this section which is to be held
by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the
nomination of candidates and every member in good standing
shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject
to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifactions uni-
formly imposed) and shall have the right to vote for or
otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice
.... Each member in good standing shall be entitled to one
vote."
Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor and Management Field ("McLellan
Committee") investigation of labor raCketeeridg).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 431-41, 501-04 (1970).
4 74, at §§ 461-66 (1970).
3 1d. at §§ 411-15 (1970).
7(2, at §§ 481-83 (1970).
1 1d, at § 401(b) (1970).
3 1d. at § 401(0 (1970). These rights were established by the National Labor Re-
lations Act (NLRA), id. at § 157 (1970). The NLRA, however, operates primarily to pro-
tect these rights against employer interference rather than union interference. Compare
id. at	 158(a)(1) (1970) (absolute prohibition against employer interference with § 7
,rights) with id. at
	 158(b)(1) (1970) (qualified prohibition against union interference
with § 7 rights).
5 Id. at §§ 481-83 (1970).
"Id. at § 481 (1970).
"Id, at §§ 481(a), (b) (1970).
12 Id.
"Id. at § 481(c) (1970). This includes access to membership lists, and use of poll
workers.
' 4 1x1. at § 481(g) (1970).
"Id. at § 481(e) (1970) (emphasis added). Section 401(e) also requires fifteen-
day notice of elections, prohibits disqualification from voting for non-payment of dues,
requires preservation of election records, and union elections to be conducted in ac-
cordance with the union's by-laws.
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Section 402 of the Act in turn empowers the Secretary of Labor to en-
force these guarantees."
The precise meaning of "reasonable opportunity" for nomina-
tion and of "reasonable qualifications" under section 401(e) is not set
out either in the Act or in its legislative history. In the 1968 decision
of Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Local 6," however, the Supreme Court
examined section 401(e) and held that it proscribed a union rule
which excluded from major union office candidates who had not held
prior union office. The Court construed the section against a
backdrop of Title IV's "special function" in furthering the overall
goals of the LMRDA—"[tjo insure 'free and democratic'
elections" 18—and accordingly premised that careful scrutiny is re-
quired in evaluating the reasonableness of restrictions on eligibility for
union office." Regulations for enforcement of the LMRDA pro-
mulgated by the Department of Labor subsequent to Hotel Employees
further delineate the meaning of "reasonable qualifications" for union
office." While acknowledging the general limits to nomination re-
quirements imposed by the careful scrutiny required under Hotel
Employees, these regulations nevertheless recognize "that labor organi-
Section 504 disqualifies members of the Communist Party and persons convicted
of specified major felonies from holding union office or acting as labor relations consul-
tants. Id. at § 504 (1970). The provision disqualifying Communist Party members was
held an unconstitutional bill of attainder in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(1965).
le 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970). Section 482 provides for the following enforcement
procedure:
I. A labor organization member who has exhausted his internal remedies
may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor. The challenged election
is presumed valid pending the final outcome of the challenge. Id, at §
482(a) (1970).
2. The Secretary must then investigate. If the Secretary finds probable
cause for a 401 violation, he must then file an action in federal district
court. Id. at § 482(b) (1970).
3. If the district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a §
401 violation has occurred which "may have affected the outcome" of the
election, the challenged election is declared void and a new election, to be
supervised by the Secretary of Labor, is ordered. Id. at § 482(c) (1970).
The Secretary's decision not to bring an action if he finds no probable cause is subject
to limited judicial review. See Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1975), noted
in 17 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 581 (1976).
" 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
"Id. at 496, quoting Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463,
470-71 (1968). See also S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 7 (1959), reprinted in 1
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 403.
"fr 391 U.S. at 499. See also 29 C.F.R. 452.35 (1976) ("[R]estrictions placed on the
right of members to be candidates must be closely scrutinized ....").
40 29 C.F.R. 452.32-.54 (1976) (qualifications for office); Id. at 452.55 (1976)
(nomination procedures).
The Department of Labor standards set out factors to be considered in assessing
the reasonableness of a qualification of union office:
(1) The relationship of the qualification to the legitimate needs and in-
terests of the union;
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zations may have a legitimate institutional interest in prescribing
minimum standards for candidacy and officeholding in the organiza-
tion."21 The Labor Department regulations thus outlined the consid-
erations which counterbalance those articulated in Hotel Employees.
Two Survey year decisions involved the definitions of "reason-
able qualifications" . and "reasonable opportunity" under section
401(e). In Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery, 22 the Supreme Court
resolved a split between circuits23 by holding that a provision restrict-
ing eligibility for union office to members who attended at least half
of a union's monthly meetings for three years preceding an election is
not a "reasonable qualification" within the meaning of section
401(e). 24 In Usery v. District 22, United Mine Workers, 25 a case of first
impression decided prior to Local 3489, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit mirrored the reasoning of Local 3489 in
(2) The relationship or the qualification to the demands of union office;
(3) The impact of the qualification in the light of' the congressional pur-
pose of fostering the broadest possible participation in union affairs;
(4) A comparison of the particular qualification with the requirements for
holding office generally prescribed by other labor organizations; and
(5) The degree of difficulty in meeting a qualification by union members.
Id. at 452.36(b)(I)(5) (1976).
Hotel Employees involved a prior office-holding requirement which excluded 93%
of the union's members from running for major union office. In striking down this
union rule, the Supreme Court placed great emphasis on the numerical impact of the
requirement in relation to the democratic goals of Title IV. See 391 U.S. at 502. The
Court considered other factors as well however-the tenuous relationship or the restric-
tion to the demands or union office, especially when members without prior office-
holding .experience could be appointed to major office: the uniqueness of the rule in
labor union practice; and the control which it vested in incumbents. 391 U.S. at 504-05.
Thus, Hotel Employees, while displaying especial emphasis on numerical impact, involved
virtually all of the factors which, according to the Labor Department's guidelines, can
be used in judging the reasonableness of eligibility requirements.
2 ' 29 C.F.R. § 452.35 (1976).
:2 429 U.S. 305 (1977).
23 Brennan v. Local 3489, United Steelworkers, 520 F.2d 516, 521, 89 L.R.R.M.
3211, 3215 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding § 401 violation); Brennan v. Local 5724, United
Steelworkers, 489 F. 2d 884, 891, 85 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2007 (6th Cir. 1973) (finding no §
•401 violation). Both courts examined an identical provision in the United Steelworkers'
International Constitution. Local 3489, ,supra at 518, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3212; Local 5724,
supra at 885, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2002. See text at notes 28-33 infra.
The majority of district courts ruling on this same question have found no § 401
violation. Shultz v. Local 1150, United Steelworkers, 75 L.R.R.M. 2869, 2877 (S.D. Ill.
1970); Shultz v, Local 1299, United Steelworkers, 73 L.R.R.M, 2673, 2680 (E.D. Mich.
1970); Shultz v, Local 6799, United Steelworkers, 71 L.R.R.M. 2820, 2826 (C.D. Cal.
1969). Contra Brennan v. Local 3911, United Steelworkers, 372 F. Supp. 961, 966, 82
L.R.R.M. 3 185 (N.D. III. 1973) (dictum).
24 429 U.S. at 307. A third Survey year decision involving § 401(e), decided prior
to Local 3489, was virtually identical to that case. In Usery v. Local 1205, Amalgamated
Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1300, 1304, 93 L.R.R.M. 2870, 2874 (1st Cir. 1976), the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit invalidated a union election con-
ducted under a rule which required candidates to attend half the Local's monthly meet-
ings over a twenty-four month period disqualified 94% or the Local's members from of-
. lice.
25 543 F.2d 744, 93 L.R.R.M. 2648 (10th Cir. 1976).
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holding that a prerequisite of the support of five of sixteen local
unions for nomination to union district office does not afford
"reasonable opportunity for nomination." In both Local 3489 and
District 22 the courts, taking a broad view of the LMRDA's mandate
for promotion of union democracy, focused on the numerical impact
of challenged union rules." As a result, although arguably legitimate
union interests supported the rules, both courts deemed them un-
democratic in their effects, and consequently voided the contested
union elections.
A. Local 3489, United Steelworkers v. Usery
The United Steelworkers of America's International Constitu-
tion, binding on the Steelworkers' 3,700 chartered locals, provided
that eligibility for union office was limited to members in good stand-
ing who had attended at least one-half of the regular monthly meet-
ings in the thirty-six months preceding an election." The effect of
this provision was to disqualify 84.8 percent to 96.5 percent of union
members from holding office." The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit balanced this restrictive effect against the union's
legitimate interest in candidates' fitness and members' participation, 3 °
and held the Steelworkers' rule a "reasonable qualification" under sec-
tion 401(e). 3 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, however, considered such a limitation on the number of
members eligible for office and the concomitant discouragement of
insurgent candidates to be "clearly unreasonable" 32 and hence a viola-
tion of section 401(e). 33
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Local 3489 in order to
resolve this conflict between circuits over the Steelworkers' meeting at-
tendance rule.34 In a six-to-three opinion, the justices affirmed the
decision of the Seventh Circuit 35 holding that the meeting attendance
rule was an unreasonable qualification for union office within the
meaning of section 401(e). With justice Brennan writing for the
"Id. at 749, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
" See text at notes 37-45, 77-79 infra.
se
	 Steelworkers Union, Coast, art. VII § 9(c), cited in Local 3489, 429
U.S. at 307 & n.1.
" Brennan v. Local 3489, United Steelworkers, 520 F.2d 516, 519, 89 L.R.R.M.
3211, 3214 (7th Cir. 1976) (96.5%); Brennan v. Local 5724, United Steelworkers, 489
F.2d 884, 888, 85 L.R.R.M. 2001, 2004-05 (6th Cir. 1973) (84.8% to 93.1%); Brennan v.
Local 3911, United Steelworkers, 372 F. Supp. 961, 966, 82 L.R.R.M. 3185, 3189 (N.D.
Ili. 1973) (94%).
$D Brennan v. Local 5724, United Steelworkers, 489 F.2d 884, 889, 891, 85
L.R.R.M. 2001. 2005, 2006 (6th Cir. 1973).
31 Id. at 891, 85 L.R.R.M. at 2007.
32 Brennan v. Local 3489, United Steelworkers, 520 F.2d 516, 519-20, 89
L.R.R.M. 3211, 3213-14 (7th Cir. 1976).
33 1d. at 521, 89 L.R.R.M. at 3215.
" 424 U.S. 907 (1976). See 429 U.S. at 307 (stating reason for grant of certiorari).
n 429 U.S. at 307.
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majority, the Court began by reviewing the principles governing "rea-
sonable qualifications" under section 401(e). Taking Hotel Employees"
as its touchstone, the Court premised that the reasonableness of the
Steelworkers' rule for the purposes of section 401(e) should be mea-
sured closely against Title IV's broad objective of union democracy.
Applying these principles in Local 3489, the Court established as a
starting point that "an attendance requirement that results in the ex-
clusion of 96.5% of the members from candidacy for union office
seems hardly to be a 'reasonable qualification' consistent with the goal
of free and democratic elections." 37 The Court did not rest its decision
here, however. Instead, it proceeded to examine the union's argu-
ments in support of its charter provision in order to balance them
against the provision's exclusory effect.
First, the union argued that a member could assure his eligibility
for office simply by attending eighteen of his local's thirty-six monthly
meetings over the three years preceding an election. This require-
ment, the union contended, would not unduly burden any one in-
dividual. 38 The Court rejected this argument, noting that since impor-
tant issues which might prompt an insurgent candidacy will often arise
less than three years before election, requiring members to plan a
candidacy eighteen months in advance might foreclose late-starting
candidacies." Furthermore, the CoUrt declined to measure the rea-
sonableness of the attendance rule by the extent to which it bur-
dened an individual candidate. Rather, the Court stated that it is more
appropriate to 'judge the eligibility rule ... by its effect on free and
democratic processes of union government." 4 °
Second, the union contended that the Secretary of Labor, in
challenging the attendance requirement, had a burden to show that
the attendance rule actually had resulted in an "entrenched" leader-
ship, and that the Secretary had not met this burden. The Court re-
jected this contention also. Congress, the Court noted, believed that
union members themselves could correct abuses of power through
free and democratic election procedures; 4 t accordingly, the LMRDA
sought to insure union democracy by regulating only the election pro-
cedure itself and not the results of that procedure. 42 Therefore, in the
Court's view, the attendance rule should be judged on its face in
38 See text at notes 17-19 supra.
87 429 U.S. at 310.
38 Id. The union sought by this argument to distinguish the prior ofliceholding
requirement. in Hotel Employees, see notes 17-18 supra, which allowed an individual
member little control over his eligibility.
se Id. at 311.
40 Id. at 310 n.6, citing Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 499.
4 ' 429 U.S, at 311-12. Cf. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6.7, 20 (1959),
reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 402.03 (union corruption cannot be
prevented without governmental coercion, but free and democratic elections give union
members power to insure responsive leadership).
87
 429 U.S. at 311-12.
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terms of its potential to result in entrenched leadership, without re-
quiring any showing of actual entrenchment.
Finally, the union argued that the attendance rule advanced
legitimate union interests in fostering both attendance at meetings and
candidates informed and committed with respect to union affairs."
These arguments the Court rejected on two grounds: first, the evi-
dence tended to show no actual effect on attendance due to the rule,
and second, the voting members themselves could best judge the ex-
tent of candidates' knowledge and dedication." Accordingly, the
Court found none of the union's arguments sufficient to justify the
exclusory impact of the meeting attendance rule. The Court therefore
concluded that the limitation of "reasonable" qualifications in section
401(e) of the LMRDA "disabled unions from establishing eligibility
qualifications as sharply restrictive of the openness of the union politi-
cal process as is [the Steelworkers'] attendance rule.""
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dis-
sented," contending !that the majority's decision did not accommo-
date sufficiently the federal policy of avoiding unnecessary interven-
tion in internal union affairs.'" Against the background of this policy,
Justice Powell criticized the majority for adopting what he found
amounted to a per se rule whereby the exclusion of 96.5% of Local
3489's members from union office was given "controlling weight.""
This he found an unduly rigid extension of Hotel Employees, since the
rule in that case was unique among union rules in requiring prior of-
ficeholding as a nomination qualification." In the present case, Justice
"Id. at 312.
"Id. The Court asserted that "the election provisions of the LMRDA express a
Congressional determination that the best means to this end is to leave the choice of
leaders to the membership in open democracy unfettered by arbitrary exclusions." Id.
This analysis amounts to something of a tautology. § 401(e) provides that every union
member in good standing is eligible to be a candidate "subject ... to reasonable qualifi-
cations uniformly imposed." If the "best means" of determining qualification for leader-
ship is, as a rule, the choice of the union electorate, however, then any formally im-
posed qualifications seem inappropriate. At the very least, the Court's analysis indicates
categorical disfavor of qualification requirements for union office.
45 Id. at 313. The Court also briefly took up and rejected a defense that the ab-
sence of a specific standard of reasonableness articulated by the Secretary of Labor
made impossible the drafting of a requirement valid under 401(e). Id. at 313-14. The
Court found that the determination of "reasonableness" by its nature requires flexibil-
ity. Further, the Court concluded that in the light of the Secretary's outline of the vari-
ous factors affecting the reasonableness of meeting-attendance requirements, then in ef-
fect, 29 C.F.R. 452.38(a) (1974), coupled with the Court's clear disapproval of an
eligibility requirement disqualifying 93% of the union members in Hotel Employees, 391
U.S. at 502, the union in the instant case had adequate notice that its rule could be
found unreasonable. 429 U.S. at 313-14.
46 Id. at 314-17 (Powell, J., dissenting).
"1d. at 314, citing Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 389 U.S. 463,
470-71 (1968) ("Congress weighed how best to legislate against revealed abuses without
departing needlessly from its long-standing policy against unnecessary governmental in-
trusion into internal union affairs.").
" 429 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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Powell contended, the effects of the Steelworkers' requirement stem-
med from members' own choice or indifference, not automatically
from the attendance rule as did disqualification resulting from the
Hotel Employees rule." Accordingly, Justice Powell would have bal-
anced the restrictive effect of the Steelworkers' meeting attendance
rule against the legitimate union interests which the rule advanced
and the relatively small burden which it placed on any individual
member by requiring meeting attendance for what amounted to two
hours per month. 51 Thus, Justice Powell would have agreed with the
Sixth Circuit 52 and found that the Steelworkers' rule was a reasonable
qualification for union office.
The significance of Local 3489 lies in the Court's treatment of
the exclusory impact of the Steelworkers' meeting attendance re-
quirement. Although the Court applied a balancing test in measuring
the reasonableness of the union's rule for the purposes of section
401(e), the Court gave almost conclusive weight to the exclusory effect
of the rule and required the union to present "substantial justifica-
tion" for the rule.53 This approach indicates that where the effect of a
restriction on eligibility for union office is to exclude a large percent-
age of the union's members from running for office, a heavy pre-
sumption arises against the reasonableness of that restriction under
section 401(e). 54
 While the Court foreshadowed this approach in Hotel
Employees," and several lower federal courts have followed such an
approach, 5 " Local 3489 represents the Supreme Court's first clear
adoption of an effects-oriented approach to Section 401(e).
Id. at 315-16. See text at notes 17-18 supra.
"Id. at 316. Justice Powell conceded that these legitimate interests might he
over-restrictively advanced, but termed this a "judgment call." Id. at 317.
53 See text at notes 29.31 supra.
53 429 U.S. at 314.
5 ' This approach changes the litigation posture of a challenge to a union election
based on an alleged unreasonable qualification for office. Under If 402(a) of the
LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. 482(a), a union election is presumed valid pending a decision,
based on a preponderance of the evidence, that it was invalid. Thus, the statute con-
templates that the burden of proof falls on the Secretary to show that an eligibility re-
quirement is unreasonable. Local 3489 indicates that a showing of substantial exclusory
impact satisfies this burden. The dissenters, on the other hand, would have had the
Secretary retain the burden. See 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, J., dissenting).
This presumptive approach is not entirely new, although Local 3489 marks its
first clear enunciation by the Supreme Court. See 29 C.F.R. 452.7(b) (1970) deleted in 29
CFR. 452.38 (1974) ("[S]hould the actual effect of the eligibility qualification be to dis-
qualify from holding office all but a handful of the labor organization's members, its
reasonableness would be subject to serious question."). For cases in which a similar ap-
proach was taken, see note 56 infra.
55 391 U.S. at 502 ("Plainly, given the objective of Title IV, a candidacy limitation
which renders 93% of union members ineligible for office can hardly be a 'reasonable
qualification' "). Hotel Employees could be distinguished on its facts, however. See 429
U.S. at 315-16 (Powell, J., dissenting), discussed in text at notes 49-50 supra.
5° A number of courts have given conclusive weight to the numerical impact of
eligibility requirements. See Brennan v. Local 639, Intl Bhd. of Teamsters, 494 F.2d
1092, 1098-99, 85 L.R.R.M. 2594, 2599-2600 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (attendance at 75% of
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At the same time it clarified this effects-oriented approach, the
Local 3489 Court implicitly rejected any per se rule against restrictions
on eligibility for union office which disqualify a substantial percentage
of union members. The government in Local 3489 argued that such a
per se rule had already been enunciated in Hotel Employees." The
majority opinion did not address this argument, but apparently re-
jected it sub silentio by applying a balancing test, though a weighted
one, rather than resting its decision on the exclusive effect of the
Steelworkers' rule." Nevertheless, as the dissenting Justices com-
mented," the presumptive weight which the Court gave the exclusive
effect of the Steelworkers' attendance requirement approaches a per
se "effects" rule; the arguments which the union advanced in favor of
meetings in previous two years required-97% of members disqualified); Wirtz v. Local
153, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass'n, 405 F.2d 176, 177-78, 69 L.R.R.M. 2890, 2890-91 (3d.
Cir. 1968) (attendance at 75% of meetings in previous two years required-97% of
members disqualified); Wirtz v. National Maritime Union, 399 F.2d 544, 549-50, 68
L.R.R.M. 3017, 3020 (2nd Cir. 1968) (prior officeholding required for national
office-99% of members disqualified); Brennan v. Local 3911, United Steelworkers,
372 F. Supp. 961, 966-67, 82 L.R.R.M. 3185, 3189 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (dictum) (same rule
as in Local 3489-94% of members disqualified); Wirtz v. Local 263, Glass Bottle Blow-
ers Ass'n, 290 F. Supp. 965, 966-67, 69 L.R.R.M. 2265, 2267 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (atten-
dance at 75% of meetings in previous two years required-98.4% of members dis-
qualified); Wirtz v. Independent Workers Union, 65 L.R.R.M. 2104, 2109-10 (M.D.
Fla. 1967) (attendance at a meeting in each of thirteen quarters preceding election
required-99% of members disqualified).
Several other courts have accorded considerable weight to exclusory impact, but
have treated it in conjunction with other factors. See Usery v. Local 1205, Amalgamated
Transit Union, 545 F.2d 1300, 1303, 93 L.R.R.M. 2870, 2872-73 (1st Cir. 1976) (atten-
dance of six meetings per year over two years required attendance beginning eighteen
months before election-94% of members disqualified); Hodgson v, Local 18, Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers. 444 F.2d 485, 76 L.R.R.M. 3025, 3026-27 (6th Cir.
1971) (membership in parent union required, causing expensive dues-60% of mem-
bers disqualified); Wirtz v. Load 406, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 254 F. Supp.
962, 964-65, 62 L.R.R.M. 2309, 2310-12 (E.D. La. 1966) (dues payment required with
no grace period for arrears-97% of members disqualified); Wirtz v. Local 9, Int'l
Union of Operating Engineers, 254 F. Supp. 980, 982-83, 58 L.R.R.M. 2550, 2550 (D.
Colo. 1965) (dues payment required without notice or grace period for arrears-87% of
members disqualified); Goldberg v. Amarillo Gen'l Drivers Local 577, 214 F. Supp. 74,
75-76, 79, 52 L.R.R.M, 2339, 2339-40, 2343 (N.D. Tex. 1963) (dues payment required
without grace period and dues paid through employer checkoff-40% of members dis-
qualified). Another court has struck down an eligibility requirement without examining
its exclusory impact. Hodgson v. Local 624-A-B, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers, 80
L.R.R.M. 3049, 3050-51 (S.D. Miss. 1972) (attendance at each of eight meetings in dif-
ferent parts of the state required-no impact determined).
In addition to the Steelworkers cases upholding the meeting attendance require-
ment at issue in Loral 3489, see note 23 supra, a meeting attendance requirement has
been held reasonable in spite of severe exclusory impact in Martin v. International Bhd.
of Boilermakers Local Lodge 636, 245 F. Supp. 375, 376, 378, 55 L.R.R.M. 2576, 2577,
2579 (W,D. Pa. 1963) (attendance at meeting in each of five quarters required but
found not burdensome-92% of members disqualified). The result of this latter case is
clearly questionable after Local 3489.
" See 429 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J., dissenting).
" See text at notes 37-44 supra.
59 429 U.S. at 315 (Powell, J„ dissenting).
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its requirement were accorded little weight in the Court's balancing."
Thus, at least where a union eligibility requirement is as exclusive as
that in Local 3489, virtually any purpose underlying such a require-
ment is unlikely to rise to the level of "substantial justification."
What degree of exclusive effect or percentage of excluded mem-
bers triggers this presumption and whether the justification it requires
varies with such degree are questions left open after the decision in
Local 3489. The Court, however, did indicate that Congress in the
LMRDA sought a flexible rule rather than specific Department of
Labor regulations in measuring "reasonableness" for the purposes of
section 401(e)." This preference for flexibility suggests that as the ex-
clusive effect of a union eligibility rule diminishes, the burden of jus-
tification might become lighter. Because "reasonableness" is inherently
an issue involving all of the facts and circumstances at hand, such a
sliding scale in the operation of the Local 3489 presumption seems
appropriate.
In contrast to the Local 3489 majority's presumptive, effects-
oriented approach to the Steelworkers' meeting attendance rule, the
dissenting Justices explicitly preferred to impose on the Department
of Labor the burden of showing the rule unreasonable." These dif-
ferences in approach to a section 401(e) inquiry reflect divergent
views of the purpose and operation of the LMRDA. The majority
premised that the principal purpose of Title IV of the LMRDA is to
foster "free and democratic" union elections." Thus, the majority's
view indicates that where union office eligibility rules do not meet ob-
jective norms of democratic union elections they are likely to be struck
down.. By comparison, the dissenters' contention—that judicial in-
tervention is inappropriate where a qualification for union office re-
flects legitimate union purposes"—reflects a view of the LMRDA as
intended largely to correct the evil of corrupt or abusive union leader-
ship; in effect, the dissenters viewed democratic election procedures
chiefly as a device to prevent this perceived evil and not as a discrete
statutory goal. Under this view of the LMRDA, a qualification for
union office should be struck down only where it either serves no
legitimate union purposes on its face, or where on balance it sub-
jectively promotes evils at which the LMRDA is directed.
The majority's approach would seem to be the preferable view.
First, both the LMRDA's Declaration of Purposes and•Policy" and the
3° See text at notes 38.44 supra.
a' 429 U.S. at 313, tinting the various factors for judging reasonableness of meet-
ing attendance requirements enunciated in 29 C.F.R. § 452.38(a) (1976). For the text of
this regulation see note 20 supra.
HI 429 U.S. at 317 (Powell, j., dissenting). Thus, justice Powell would not alter
the prima facie burden on the Secretary established in § 402(a), The effect of the
majority's approach on this prima facie burden is discussed at note 54 .supra.
429 U.S. at 309, quoting Hotel Employees, 391 U.S. at 504.
°' 429 U.S. at 316-17 (Powell, j., dissenting).
65 29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1970) ("It continues to be the responsibility of the Federal
Government to protect employees' rights to organize, choose their own representatives,
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legislative history of Title IV" stress as a goal of the Act rank and file
participation in union affairs including election of union officers.
Thus, they support the view that democratic union election proce-
dures are an independent primary goal of the Act. The majority's ap-
proach in Local 3489 focuses on the effect of the eligibility rules on
rank and file participation and is less willing than the dissenters to
admit of justification for exclusory rules. Thus, the majority's ap-
proach seems more apt than the dissenters' to advance the policy of
rank and file participation embodied in the LMRDA by allowing more
union members to run for office and giving the remainder a wider
choice of candidates. Furthermore, even if the dissenting Justices in
Local 3489 were correct in viewing democratic union elections largely
as a prophylactic device against abusive union leadership, their inquiry
as to whether the Steelworkers' rule at issue had in fact resulted in en-
trenched leadership seems misplaced. The LMRDA's provisions
safeguarding union election procedures would have little prophylactic
value if it were necessary to show that a union is burdened with an
entrenched or abusive leadership; an evil the provisions seek to pre-
vent, before the union members may invoke the provisions' protec-
tion. The majority's approach in Local 3489, then, is more consistent
with a view of democratic union elections either as a discrete goal of
the LMRDA or as a means toward the goal of responsive union lead-
ership.
B. Usery v. District 22, United Mine Workers"
District 22 of the United Mine Workers consists of sixteen local
unions in Wyoming, Utah and Arizona." According to its constitu-
tion, the district required that a candidate for district office be nomi-
nated by five locals, and candidates for sub-district office by three lo-
cals." Since the locals vary greatly in size, it was possible for a candi-
date for district office to be nominated by the five smallest locals rep-
resenting five percent of the total district membership, or to fall
short of nomination with the support of the four largest locals rep-
resenting . fifty-eight percent of the total district membership. 7 ° In
the 1973 elections for the United Mine Workers International Execu-
bargain collectively, and otherwise engage in concerted activities for their mutual aid or
protection ....").
" S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., lst Sess. 6-7 (1959) reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 2, at 402-03 ("Union members have a vital interest ... in the
policies and conduct of union affairs. To the extent that union procedures are dem-
ocratic they permit the individual to share in the formulation of union policy.").
67
 543 F.2d 744, 93 L.R.R.M. 2648 (10th Cir. 1976).
"Id. at 747, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
69 Id.
7° Id. The International Constitution of the United Mine Workers was amended
after the 1973 election to limit the number of nominations which may be required by a
district to no more than one-fifth of the locals in the district. Thus the specific facts of
District 22 will not recur. See id. at 751, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2653.
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tive Board, member Frank Roybal was nominated by three local
unions representing thirty-eight percent of the district membership,
while his opponent was nominated by eleven locals representing
forty-eight percent of the membership. 71 Since he lacked the required
five locals, Roybal was disqualified as a candidate."
Contesting his disqualification, Roybal filed a complaint with the
Secretary of Labor," contending that the five-local requirement did
not constitute "reasonable opportunity" for the nomination of candi-
dates as required by section 401(e) of the Act. The Secretary accepted
Roybal's contention and pursuant to section 402 of the LMRDA
brought an action in district court seeking a new election. 74 The court
in turn upheld the Secretary's and Roybal's view and ordered a new
election for membership on the International Executive Board."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit af-
firmed," and held that the requirement of nomination by five of six-
teen locals does not provide reasonable opportunity for nomination in
accordance with section 401(e). The court considered this question
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Local 3489 and found no au-
thority directly relevant to union preliminary support requirements.
Hence, the court addressed the issue as one of first impression and
analogized to Hotel Employees and other decisions dealing with eligibil-
ity requirements for union office under section 401(e), and to pre-
liminary support requirements in political election cases. 77 On the
"Id. at 747, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2650.
"Id. at 746-47, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2649.
73 Before filing his complaint, Roybal exhausted his internal union remedies, id.,
93 L.R.R.M. at 2649-50, thus complying with 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).
74 543 F.2d at 747, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2650. See 29 U.S.C. § 482, discussed in text
and note at note 16 supra.
The Secretary's action also sought a new election for lour sub-district offices sub-
ject to the three-local rule, although the would-be candidates for those offices had not
yet exhausted intra-union remedies. Because of this failure to exhaust remedies, the dis-
trict court dismissed this portion of the Secretary's claim. 93 L.R.R.M. 2026, 2027 (D.
Utah 1975). On cross-appeal by the Secretary, the court of appeals, finding that the
Secretary's action was not limited to the complaint before him, reversed this finding and
voided the elections affected by the three-local requirements. 543 F.2d at 750-51, 93
L.R.R.M. at 2652-53. Cf. Wirtz v. Local 125, Laborers Int'l Union, 389 U.S. 477, 484
(1968) (Secretary has broad authority to prosecute 401 violations discovered in-
cidentally to an investigation).
Since the three-local rule was found unreasonable on the same grounds as the
Five-local requirement, this discussion will focus, as did the Tenth Circuit court, on the
latter requirement.
73 93 L.R.R.M. 2026, 2033 (D. Utah, 1975). The new election was completed Jan-
uary 16, 1976, and this time Roybal was elected. See 93 L.R.R.M. 2364, 2365 (D. Utah,
1976) (certifying new election).
7 " 543 F.2d at 751, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2653, with the modification that new elections
were ordered in elections affected by the three-local requirement. See note 74 supra.
" Id. at 748-49, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2651, citing Wirtz v. Hotel Employees Union
Local 6, 391 U.S. 492 (1968) (union office eligibility); Wirtz v. Local 153, Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n, 405 F.2d 176, 69 L.R.R.M. 2890 (3d Cir. 1968) (union office eligibility);
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (political election preliminary support require-
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basis of these analogies the District 22 panel found the effects of the
District 22 rule to be the critical inquiry. The court found the effects
burdensome because the rule in fact had excluded from running for
office both Roybal, the choice of a substantial portion of the district's
members, and an undetermined number of other candidates; and po-
tentially could exclude a candidate supported by a majority of the dis-
trict's members." These effects, the court found inconsistent with the
LMRDA's mandate of free and democratic elections."
In light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Local
3489, District 22 appears correctly decided. The Tenth Circuit in Dis-
trict 22 focused on the five-local rule's actual effects. Thus, the court
gave controlling weight to its findings that the rule excluded Roybal,
the choice of a significant percentage of union members from district
office, and an undetermined number of other candidates from run-
ning for office, and potentially could deny nomination to a candidate
supported by a majority of the District's members. 8° This emphasis on
numerical effects is similar to the Supreme Court's treatment of the
Steelworkers' meeting attendance rule in Local 3489. Like the Su-
preme Court in Local 3489, the circuit panel emphasized the role of
Title IV of the LMRDA, first articulated by the Supreme -Court in
Hotel Employees, 8 ' as a guarantor of free and democratic union elec-
tions. The District 22 panel measured the exclusory effects of the five-
local rule against this perceived role of Title IV, and found them "in-
consistent."82 At the same time, the union evidently advanced no ar-
guments supporting the reasonableness of its rule." Thus, by analogy
to the presumptive approach of Local 3489, 84 the circuit court's find-
ing of inconsistency between the rule and Title IV implies a presump-
tion of the rule's invalidity. This presumption, left unrebutted by the
union, required the conclusion that the rule did not afford "reason-
able opportunity for nomination," thereby violating section 401(e).
Thus, the result and reasoning of District 22 are consistent with the
Supreme Court's opinion in Local 3489.
In both Local 3489 and District 22 the courts adopted broad views
of Title IV's goal of union democracy as mandating strict review of
restrictions on access to the ballot. Their practical effect is to indicate
that any elections affected by restrictions which exclude a substantial
number of union members from participation in the union election
ment); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 21 (1960) (political election preliminary support
requirement). The circuit court also looked to the Department of Labor's factors relat-
ing to the reasonableness of eligibility requirements, see text and notes at notes 20-21
supra, and concluded that the preliminary support did not "bear up well" in that light.
543 F.2d at 748 n.3, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2651 n.3.
79 1d. at 749, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2652.
79 Id.
9° Id., 93 L.R.R.M. at 2651-52. See text at note 78 supra.
83 Id.
92 ld.
83 Id. at 748, 93 L.R.R.M. at 2651.
84
 See text at notes 53-54 supra.
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process are open to successful challenge under section 401(e) of the
LMRDA, even where some valid union interest exists to support the
restrictions at issue. 85
V. CERTIFICATION OF A DISCRIMINATORY BARGAINING REPRESENTA-
TIVE — Bekins OVERRULED: Handy Andy, Inc.
In the 1974 decision of Bekins Moving & Storage Co.,' the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) confronted for the
first time the question whether as a matter of constitutional law the
NLRB is prohibited from certifying as bargaining representative a
labor organization which discriminates on the basis of race or some
other invidious classification.2 A plurality of the Board, though dis-
agreeing on the proper test for determining whether a union is dis-
criminatory, 3 held that the NLRB, as a federal instrumentality, may
not certify a discriminatory union without sanctioning private dis-
85 In recent years the effectiveness of LMRDA in protecting union democracy has
been called into question. See Note, Union Elections and the LMRDA: Thirteen Years of Use
and Abuse, 81 Yale L.J. 407, 409-10 (1973); N.Y. Times, July 14, 1971, at 12, col. 4
(comment of Senator Griffin, co-author of LMRDA that widespread irregularities in
1969 United Mine Workers election between W. Anthony Boyle and Joseph Yablonski,
culminating in Boyle's conviction for Yablonski's murder, indicated the Act had been
unsuccessful). The more activist approach on the part of both the Labor Department
and the courts reflected in Local 3489 and Distrkt 22 suggests the possibility that a re-
newed effort may be under way to make the Act effective. It remains to be seen
whether such an effort will continue under President Carter and Secretary of Labor
Marshall.
' 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974), noted in Annual Survey of Labor Re-
lations & Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. !No.& Com. L. REV. 965, 986 (1975).
2 211 N.L.R.B. at 138, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325. The employer in Bekins sought to
dismiss a union petition for an election on the ground that the union engaged in in-
vidious discrimination against women and Spanish-speaking and Spanish-surnamed in-
dividuals. Id., 86 L.R.R.M. at 1324.
3 Member Jenkins and Chairman Miller authored a "lead" opinion. Member
Kennedy concurred. Members Pennello and Fanning dissented.
Member Kennedy agreed with the lead opinion that the Board should hold a
precertification inquiry to consider employer charges that a union discriminates in its
recruitment or admission policies on the basiS of race, alienage, or national origin. Id. at
143, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1329. He disagreed, however, with the lead opinion's test of "pro-
pensity to fail fairly to represent employees," id. at 139, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1326, because
he believed that this test incorporated issues of fair representation into the precertifica-
tion inquiry. Issues concerning fair representation, Member Kennedy stated, "must, of
necessity, relate to actions following certification. Until a union has become the
employees' exclusive bargaining representative, it is not subject to a duty to represent
them fairly." Id. at 145, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1331 (Member Kennedy, concurring). Accord-
ingly, Member Kennedy concluded, such issues should be deferred until after a certifi-
cation has issued, and the precertification hearing should focus only on whether a
union invidiously excludes employees from membership. Id., 86 L.R.R.M, at 1331
(Member Kennedy, concurring).
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crimination in violation of the fifth amendment.' In the Survey year
decision in Handy Andy, Inc.,' a reconstituted Board abruptly over-
ruled the Bekins' rationale that certification of a discriminatory labor
organization amounts to unconstitutional "state action." 6 A majority,
comprised of the two Bekins dissenters and Chairman Murphy, held
that under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) the Board "is
not authorized to withhold certification of a labor organization duly
selected by a majority of the unit employees."'
In so holding, the Handy Andy Board indicated that henceforth
the NLRB will consider employer allegations of invidious discrimina-
tion by a labor organization in the context of unfair labor practice
rather than representation proceedings, unless an employer presents
specific proof of clearly existing invidious discrimination which in-
terferes with the employees' right to select a bargaining representa-
tive.° The Board thus has drastically limited its review of employer
claims of union discrimination, and now will review only those dis-
crimination claims connected with specific labor grievances arising
within the familiar framework of labor-management relations and or-
ganizational rights. As a result, the Board apparently has deferred to
other federal agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission the responsibility of redressing alleged employment dis-
crimination practiced by labor organizations.°
The dispute in Handy Andy arose when a union sought certifica-
tion following its successful consent election." The employer, Handy
Andy, Incorporated, filed timely objection to this request in accord-
ance with Bekins, alleging invidious discrimination by the union." This
allegation was based on several federal court decisions which had held
that the challenged union's bargaining agreements with other employ-
ers had perpetuated the effects of those employers' past dis-
criminatory practices." Accordingly, Handy Andy contended that
these decisions indicated that the requesting union would discriminate
4 Id. at 139, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325. The constitutional rationale proffered in fir-
kins largely followed the reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit in NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471, 82
L.R.R.M. 2608 (8th Cir. 1973). The court in Mansion House ruled that evidence support-
ing an employer's discrimination defense to a refusal to bargain was erroneously
excluded by the Board. Id. at 475, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2612. Consequently, the court denied
enforcement of the Board's bargaining order, holding that the remedial machinery of
the NLRA was constitutionally unavailable to a union which was unwilling to correct
past practices of racial discrimination. Id. at 477, 82 L.R.R.M. at 2613. See generally
Comment, 58 MINN. L. Rev. 335 (1974).
3 228 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 94 L.R.R.M. 1354 (February 25, 1977).
6 94 L.R.R.M. at 1355.
7 Id.
Id. at 1361.
9 See note 30 infra.
'° Id. at 1355.
" Id.
"See, e.g., Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 505 F.2d 40, 88 FEP Gas.
1246 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 395, 406 (1977). The United States
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in membership requirements and, additionally, had shown a pro-
pensity to discriminate in employee representation." Although the
regional director recommended dismissal of Handy Andy's claims, the
Board decided to hear oral argument on the employer's objections."
Rather than consider only the sufficiency of the employer's
allegations, the Board reopened the question presented in Bekins
whether NLRB certification of an allegedly discriminatory union con-
stitutes unconstitutional "state action.""
The Handy Andy Board's reversal of the Bekins doctrine was
grounded primarily in a rejection of the Bekins' analysis of Supreme
Court "state action" decisions. In Bekins the plurality, relying on the
1948 Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer," reasoned that by
conferring benefits of certification on a discriminatory union the
NLRB "would surely appear to be sanctioning • • [private] discrimina-
tion, thereby running afoul of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment."" The Handy Andy Board, by contrast, canvassed more
recent Supreme Court "state action" decisions, in particular Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. /mit," and concluded that the NLRB must be "signif-
icantly involved" with a union's discriminatory practices before its ac-
tions could constitute prohibited "state action.""' To amount to such
involvement, the Board determined, certification would have to have
"enforced,"" "required," 2 ' "authorized,"22 or "fostered and encour-
Court of Appeals For the Fifth Circuit had found in Rodriguez that the union's collective
bargaining agreements establishing separate seniority rosters for different classifications
of truck drivers tended to perpetuate the effects of past hiring discrimination practiced
by the employer. 505 F.2d at 60, 8 FEP Cas. at 1261.
15 94 L.R.R.M. at 1355.
"Id.
" The Board in fact joined several cases. See id. at n.l.
16 334 U.S. 1 (1948). in Shelley, the Court held that state action enforcing or sup-
porting the practice of private invidious discrimination contravenes the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 20. The federal government is bound by
equal protection requirements even though the fifth amendment contains no equal pro-
tection clause because such requirements are implicitly embodied in the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
" 211 N.L.R.B. at 139, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325 (citation omitted).
" 407 U.S. 163 (1972). The Court in Moose Lodge held that the licensing of a pri-
vate club to serve liquor by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board did not sufficiently
implicate the state in the club's discriminatory guest practices so as to make those prac-
tices "state action" within the purview of the fourteenth amendment. id. at 175-77. The
Court, however, stated that a particular regulation promulgated by the Liquor Board
could be enjoined because the regulation required compliance by the club with racially
discriminatory provisions in its constitution and by-laws. Id. at 179.
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357.
20 Id. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See note 16 supra.
"94 L.R.R.M. at 1357. See Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248
(1963) (state convictions for trespass overturned because they had the effect of enforc-
ing city ordinance compelling private restaurants to discriminate against patrons on the
basis of race).
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (state
constitutional provision violated equal protection clause because it authorized racial dis-
crimination in the housing market, thus involving the state in private discrimination).
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aged"23 union discrimination." The Board then reasoned that NLRB
certification, while conferring substantial benefits on a union as a re-
sult of its exclusive bargaining status, does not enforce, require, au-
thorize or foster and encourage any of a labor organization's ac-
tivities. 25
The Board proffered two arguments in support of this conclu-
sion. First, NLRB certification does not permit unions to engage in
discriminatory practices otherwise prohibited both by the NLRA 28 and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 27 Second, certification of
labor organizations is merely an acknowledgement by the NLRB that
a majority of employees in the relevant unit have properly selected
the exclusive representative with whom the employer is statutorily re-
quired to bargain. 28
 Thus, in the Board's view, the facially neutral act
of certification does not significantly involve the NLRB - with a union's
discriminatory practices and hence does not rise to the level of un-
constitutional "state action." 28 Accordingly, the Board concluded that
denial of certification of an allegedly discriminatory union is not con-
stitutionally required.3°
U 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176-77
(1972). See note 18 supra.
"94 L.R.R.M. at 1357.
25
 Id.
"Id. at 1358. The Board noted that "the duty of fair representation in its vari-
ous forms specifically prohibit a union from practicing unlawful discrimination under the
[NIRLA1." Id. (emphasis in original). See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554, 564 (1976). This duty of fair representation requires a statutory bargaining
representative to represent all unit employees equally, whether or not they are members
of the union. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). Moreover, a breach of
the duty can be redressed through an unfair labor practice proceeding. See, e.g., Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 178 (1967), citing Local No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 19-20, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395, 2397-99 (5th Cir.
1966).
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1358. Title VII provides that it is an unlawful employment
practice for a labor organization to exclude any individual from membership or other-
wise adversely to affect an employee's status on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. * 2000e-2(c) (Supp. II 1972).
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1358.
25
 The Handy Andy Board took issue with the constitutional rationale of Mansion
House, see note 4 supra, because the Eighth Circuit seemingly would require the NLRB
to consider the discriminatory effects of its actions contrary to the test enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In Davis, the Supreme
Court held that action by a federal or state agency will not violate the equal protection
clause unless there is demonstrable proof of a racially or invidiously discriminatory in-
tent or purpose. Id. at 239, 252. Thus Davis, as the Handy Andy Board recognized, 94
L.R.R.M. at 1358, stands for the proposition that there are distinctions between the
duties imposed by Title VII and those required by the Constitution with respect to
employment discrimination.
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1355, 1357. The Handy Andy Board also concluded that as a
consequence of Bekins' constitutional determinations with respect to employment dis-
crimination claims, the NLRB was permitted to intrude into the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) primary, and perhaps exclusive area of federal re-
sponsibility. Id. at 1358-59, citing NAACP v. Federal Power Commission, 425 U.S. 662
(1976) (FPC is authorized only to consider the consequences of employment discrimina-
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Having decided that there is no constitutional impediment to
certification of an allegedly discriminatory labor organization, the
Handy Andy Board then considered whether it was nevertheless re-
quired to deny certification by the provisions of the NLRA. In resolv-
ing this question, the Board first examined the certification re-
quirements outlined in section 9(c)(1) of the Act. 3 ' Focusing on the
mandatory language in that provision which states that the Board
'shall" certify the results of a representation election, the Board re-
iterated the reasoning of the Bekins dissent that " 'absent unfairness in
the election itself, the section commands the Board to issue a certifica-
tion of representative to the winning labor organization.' "32 The
Board thus reasoned that its only duty under section 9(c)(1) was to en-
sure the fairness of the election process and, therefore, concluded that
it lacked authority to consider in representation proceedings the po-
tential future consequences of union discrimination. 33 Moreover, not
only did the Board perceive denial of certification of an allegedly dis-
criminatory union as precluded by section 9(c)(1), but also it believed
that, as a practical matter, such denial could thwart the choice of a
majority of employees and provide employers with a device for delay-
ing or altogether avoiding collective bargaining.' 4 Permitting such
results, the Board concluded, would interfere impermissibly with the
Lion practices when such consequences are directly related to the FPC's primary author.
ity to establish just and reasonable rates). Similarly, commentators have argued that be-
cause an overlapping responsibility to consider employment discrimination claims con-
fuses the federal government's task to eradicate such discrimination, Congress must
have assigned to one centralized agency, the EEOC, not the NLRB or other federal
agencies, the authority to remedy employment discrimination. See, e.g., Meltzer, The Na-
tional Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination: The More Remedies the Better?, 42 U.
Cut. L. REV. I, 10-11 (1974) (hereinafter Racial Discrimination); see also Lopatka, Protection
Under the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act For Employees Who
Protest Discrimination in Private Employment, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1179, 1256 (1975).
The Handy Andy Board further attacked the constitutional rationale of Bekins by
contending that the Behins' construction of section 9(c)(I) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C.
159(c)(1) (1970), amounted to an unauthorized adjudication of the constitutionality of a
congressional enactment by an administrative agency. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1359. But see gen-
erally Note, 90 HAP.V. L. REV. 1682, 1706-07 (1977).
31 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(I) (1970), which provides in relevant part:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed ... the Board shall in-
vestigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a ques-
tion of representation ... exists shall :provide for an appropriate hearing
• . If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that such a ques-
tion of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and
shall certify the results thereof.
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1359, quoting Bekins, 211 N.L.R.B. at 147, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1334
(Members Fanning and Penello, dissenting) (emphasis added).
33 94 L.R.R.M. at 1359.
34 Id. at 1360. in the instant case, noting that a substantial percentage of the
minority employees voted in favor of the union, the Board reasoned that these
employees would not have selected the union as their exclusive bargaining agent if they
had suspected that it would not represent them fairly. Consequently, the Board charac-
terized the employer's purpose in raising his discrimination allegations as an attempt to
delay the onset of bargaining, rather than to protect minority employees. Id. at 1360-61.
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NLRB's primary statutory responsibility to promote collective bargain-
ing and facilitate the employees' selection of:a bargaining representa-
tive.":'
After determining that denial of certification of an allegedly dis-
criminatory union would contradict both the express language of sec-
tion 9(c)(I) of' the NLRA and its underlying labor policy, the Board
next examined whether the Bekins doctrine was an effective tool for
implementing federal antidiscrimination policies. First, the Board
noted, entrenched unions, which would have the least natural incen-
tive to lower racial or other discriminatory barriers, can attain rep-
resentative status by means other than an NLRB representation elec-
tion. Therefore because the doctrine applied only in certification pro-
ceedings, it could not reach those unions which the Board believed
were most likely to employ discriminatory practices." Second, the
Board pointed out that, because the doctrine was invoked before the
union actually represented a challenged unit, an employer, as in
Handy Andy, could seek to prevent unit certification by relying on evi-
dence• that other bargaining units of the union engaged in dis-
criminatory practices." In such cases, the Board reasoned, the poten-
tial for a challenged unit to fail to represent fairly all employees fre-
quently only could be presumed without actual proof of discrimina-
tion."" Third, the Board noted that the Bekins doctrine allowing denial
of certification was capable of anomalous results, such as where the
complaining etnployer is party to the alleged discrimination or where
the challenged union is significantly supported by the discriminatee
minority." Consequently, the Handy Andy Board determined that de-
nial of certification was an ineffective way to combat employment dis-
crimination, and hence that the NLRA policy in favor of speedy res-
olution of questions concerning representation overrode the value of
such denial as a means of advancing federal antidiscrimination
policies:1 °
Although the,Handy Andy Board concluded that neither the Con-
stitution, the NLRA, nor federal antidiscrimination policies require it
to consider discrimination issues in representation proceedings, it
stated that nevertheless it will continue to do so where necessary to
protect the integrity of its own processes:" The Board noted, for
example, that it will consider "the possible impact of clearly existing
° Id. at 1359-60.




' 1' Id. at 1360-61.
41 Id. at 1361. Fur this authority to protect its processes, the Handy Andy Board
cited to its earlier decision in Pioneer Bus Company, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 51 L.R.R.M.
1546 (1962), which held that the NLRB has the authority to revoke certification of a
union with collective-bargaining agreements which patently discriminate between black
and white employees. Id. at 55, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1546.
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invidious discrimination within the unit at issue or of appeals to prej-
udice directed at employees in such unit in cases where ... necessary
to protect the fairness of the election process."'" The Board cau-
tioned, however, that it will undertake such a review only when it is
necessary to protect employees in their right to choose a bargaining
representative. 43 Thus although the! Board retained this option to re-
view alleged union discrimination in representation proceedings, it re-
stricted this review to the narrow circumstance where the employer
demonstrates a specific nexus between the alleged discrimination and
the election process.
All claims of discriminatory practices by a union other than those
allegations of practices directly implicating the election process, the
Board indicated it will consider in the context of unfair labor practice
proceedingo 4 The Board explained that it has long utilized such pro-
ceedings to police a union's conduct with respect to unit employees
through its power to remedy a labor organization's breach of its
statutory duty of fair representation. 45 This mechanism, the Board
pointed out, provides a remedy for such practices as rejection of an
employee's grievance solely on the basis of his race; 46 allocation of the
employees' work assignments by a labor organization on the basis of
race; 47 or attempts by a union to force employers to continue practices
which perpetuate past discrimination." The Board further noted that
even the remedy of revocation of a discriminatory union's certification
is available. 49 Moreover, such proceedings, the Board reasoned, will
accord bargaining representatives charged with employment dis-
crimination the full panoply of procedural rights guaranteed by the
NLRA, including judicial review, and will avoid delay in representa-
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361 (citation omitted). See, e.g., Sewell Manufacturing Com-
pany, 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532, 1535 (1962) (the employer's election vic-
tory overturned due to employer's racially-oriented election propaganda).
45 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
44 Id. at 1361-62,
45 Id. This approach is derived from the Board's decision in Miranda Fuel Co.,
Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 161, 185, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584, 1587 (1962) where it held for the first
time that section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I)(A) (1970), prohibits a
union, when acting in a statutory representative capacity, from taking any action against




L.R.R.M. at 1362. See Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum
& Plastic Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 322-23, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535, 1540 (1964), enforced,
368 F.2d 12, 25, 63 L.R.R.M. 2395, 2404 (5th Cir. 1966) (union's refusal to process
grievances protesting an employer's segregated plant violated the duty of fair rep-
resentation); Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No. 1, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573,
1577, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1294 (1964) (union's certification revoked).
"94 L.R.R.M. at 1362-63. See Local 1367, International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
AFL-CIO (Galveston Maritime Ass'n, Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. 897, 897-98, 57 L.R.R.M.
1083, 1084 (1964).
:45 94 L.R.R.M. at 1363. See Houston Maritime Ass'n, Inc. and Its Member Corn-
panics, 168 N,L.R.B. 615, 617, 66 L.R.R.M. 1337, 1340 (1967).
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1363. See,	 independent Metal Workers Union, Local No. I,
147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1577, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289, 1294 (1964).
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tion proceedings. 5° Thus, the Handy Andy Board concluded that be-
cause unfair labor practice proceedings were the most effective and
appropriate means to combat union discrimination based on unlawful,
invidious and irrelevant reasons, Bekins would be overruled and the union
challenged in the present case would be certified. 5 '
Member Walther concurred in the majority decision, agreeing
that both Bekins and the employer's objections should be overruled. 52
Member Walther supported the majority's basic rationale, but dis-
agreed in one significant aspect. On one hand, he agreed with the
Board in viewing the employer charges of union discrimination as re-
lating to a union's duty of fair representation and, as such, cognizable
only in the adversarial context of an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing." At the same time, however, he believed that the Board could
not ignore blatant discrimination in a challenged local union's con-
stitution, by-laws, or other written policy statement restricting access to
union membership on the basis of sex, race, national origin, or alien-
age.54 Therefore, without addressing the "state action" issue, Member
Walther, as a matter of discretion, would deny such a blatantly dis-
criminatory union access to Board election machinery in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the NLRB's processes."
Member Jenkins, the only extant member of the Bekins majority,
dissented primarily to defend the "state action" analysis underpinning
the Bekins' conclusion that Board certification of a discriminatory labor
organization is constitutionally proscribed by the due process clause of
the fifth amendment." To Member Jenkins, Board certification of a
discriminatory union, at a minimum, would "appear to be sanction-
ing," if not actually assisting private discrimination. 57 He perceived
such potential assistance occurring as a result of the substantial ben-
efits flowing to a union upon its certification. Specifically, Member
Jenkins noted, the union becomes the exclusive, statutorily protected
bargaining agent for all employees;" minority employees who might
have voted against the union cannot choose a separate representa-
tive; 5 " nor can they engage in concerted activities to protest dis-
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361, 1363.
01 1d. at 1363.
"Id. at 1363-64 (Member Walther, concurring).
"Id.
54
 Id. Member Walther recognized that the proviso to section 8(h)(I)(A) of the
Act prohibits litigation of membership discrimination claims in unfair labor practice
proceedings, without explaining how that proviso affected the Board's ruling. Id, at
1364. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), wherein the proviso states: "That this para-
graph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein...."
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1363-64 (Member Walther, concurring).
"Id. (Member Jenkins, dissenting).
57
 Id., quoting Bekins Moving Co., Inc., 211 N.L.R.B. at 139, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1325.
55 94 L.R.R.M. at 1365,
55 Id.
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crimination by their employer or their union; 6° and a certified union's
bargaining status in most instances cannot be challenged for a year
and presumptively such status continues beyond one year.°' In con-
ferring such benefits on a discriminatory union, Member Jenkins con-
tended, the Board, as a federal agency, would be fostering, support-
ing, and assisting union discrimination. Thus, in contrast to the major-
ity's analysis, Member Jenkins believed that NLRB certification of a
discriminatory union would amount to unconstitutional "state ac-
tion."62
Member Jenkins also disagreed with the majority's conclusions
both that unfair labor practice proceedings are more effective than
denials of certification as a remedy for union discrimination and that.
the Bekins doctrine unduly hampered the NLRA policy that questions
concerning representation by expeditiously resolved.° 3 First, Member
Jenkins viewed unfair labor practice proceedings, which might never
be instituted, as no substitute for the immediate disqualification of a
discriminatory union in a representation proceeding." He added that
the majority was "clearly in error" in stating that the participants in
representation proceedings are denied the procedural rights of adver-
sary proceedings since the NLRB had provided precertification pro-
cedures comparable to those in an unfair labor practice proceeding,
including the opportunity to secure judicial review. 63 Second, Member
Jenkins rejected the majority's contention that the Bekins doctrine un-
duly delayed the Board's representation process by encouraging em-
ployers to present inadequate evidence relating to discrimination
claims, In the two-and-one-half years of applying the Bekins doctrine,
Member Jenkins observed, the Board had dismissed expeditiously
such spurious objections." Whatever propensity employers had to
"Id. at 1366. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Or-
ganization, 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975).
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1365. Sec Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 104 (1954).
" 94 L.K.R.M. at 1366. Moreover, Member Jenkins contended that the Board, by
denying certification, would not be ignoring the mandatory provisions of the NLRA,
nor impermissibly adjudicating the constitutionality of this statute. Rather, the Board
would be applying the NLRA to a pa rtitular fact situation in a constitutional manner.
Id.
" 3 /d. at 1367-68.
"Id. at 1367.
65 1d. at 1368. Member Jenkins explained that under Bekins a Hearing Officer
would be appointed to conduct a hearing with the normal procedural 'brutalities to
consider genuine questions of discrimination. Id. He then cited Miami Newspaper Print-
ing Pressman's Union Local 46 v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d 993, 53 L.R.R.M. 2786 (D.C.
Cir. 1963), as authority for the proposition that upon denial of certification, the union
may obtain judicial review in United States District Courts. 94 L.R.R.M. at 1368. The
majority disputed this proposition, contending that such a review would be available
only to consider whether the Board acted in excess of its statutory authority and con-
trary to a specific prohibition in the NLRA, but not to consider a factual finding that
the union engaged. in discrimination warranting disqualification. Id. at 1361n. 56. See
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184, 189 (1958).
66 94 L.R.R.M. at 1367.
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delay collective bargaining by raising discrimination issues in certifica-
tion proceedings, he continued, was irrelevant to the "question
whether certification should be denied when conclusive evidence of
... discrimination is presented."'" For example, whenever a union's
governing instruments expressly exclude minorities from membership
or segregate them in separate locals, Member Jenkins believed that
this is "irrebutable (sic) evidence of invidious discrimination."" As
such, he would find a sufficient basis to disqualify such a union in a
representation proceeding." Thus, Member Jenkins disagreed with
both the majority's constitutional analysis and policy arguments. Ac-
cordingly, he concluded that the constitutionally-based remedy of a
denial of certification set forth in Bekins should be retained."
The practical significance of the Handy Andy decision lies in the
Board's apparent intention to confine its consideration of employment
discrimination charges to those arising within the statutory framework
of the NLRA—those charges implicating the union's duty of fair rep-
resentation or affecting the employees' right to select a bargaining rep-
resentative. Thus, employer charges that a union has a propensity to
discriminate invidiously against unit employees will be considered in
unfair labor practice proceedings under section 8(b)( I)(A) of the
NLRA as violations of the union's duty of fair representation. When
such a violation is found, the Board will fashion an appropriate rem-
edy, including possible decertification to enforce a union's duty to
represent fairly unit employees." Additionally, when an employer
charges that discriminatory union conduct, such as appeals to racial
prejudice, adversely affected the outcome of a Board-conducted rep-
resentation election, 72
 the Board will, under its section 9(c)(I) author-
ity, review the election process in representation proceedings to en-
sure that the employees made a reasoned choice of a bargaining
representative. 73
The Handy Andy Board also indicated that when. an employer
presents specific evidence of "clearly existing invidious discrimination"
within a unit, the Board will consider in representation proceedings
the impact of such discrimination on the outcome of the representa-
tion election." The Board nevertheless neglected to explain how
"clearly existing invidious discrimination," as distinguished from "ap-




7° Id. at 1368.
T 1 Id. at 1362-63.
" See, e.g., NLRB v. Sumter Plywood Corp., 535 F.2d 917, 929, 92 L.R.R.M.
3508, 3517 (5th Cir. 1976) (a racially-oriented election campaign directed almost exclu-
sively toward a predominantly black bargaining unit did not rise to inflammatory stat-
ure so as to warrant reversal of the union's victory). See also Sewell Manufacturing
Company, 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962).
73 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
"Id.
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thereby interfering with the employees' right to select a bargaining
representative. This failure to identify a nexus between "clearly exist-
ing invidious discrimination" and employee rights ordinarily protected
in representation proceedings implies that the Board may be reserving
the additional authority, as Member Walther would have had the
Board do explicitly," to prevent a blatantly discriminatory union from
attaining NLRB certification, regardless of whether the discrimination
affects the integrity of the election process. Such an inference is
further reinforced by the Board's stated intention to retain its existing
decertification remedy for unions that engage in blatantly dis-
criminatory representation." Decertification, no less than a denial of
certification, can frustrate the employees' choice of bargaining rep-
resentative and afford employers the opportunity to delay collective
bargaining.
This continued willingness on the part of the Board to deny or
revoke certification of a blatantly discriminatory union is difficult to
reconcile with the basic rationale of Handy Andy. Specifically, the
Board in Handy Andy ruled that it has no discretion under section
9(c)(I) of the Act to deny certification to a union having won a fairly
conducted representation election" and, concurrently, that Board cer-
tification does not amount to "state action" so as to override the man-
datory character of section 9(c)(1)." Yet, the Board in Handy Andy
claimed that it has the discretionary authority, similar to the "wholly
discretionary" authority under its contract-bar rules," to retain the
option to examine in representation proeedings "clearly existing in-
vidious discrimination." 8° In so doing, however, the Board did not
explain the basis of this authority to consider such discrimination in
circumstances where there appears to be no demonstrable nexus be-
tween the discrimination and the election process.
The Board's apparent willingness to retain this discretionary au-
thority would not seem to be based on provisions or policies underly-
" See id. at 1364 (Member Walther, concurring).
"Id. at 1361, citing Pioneer Bus Company, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 54, 55, 51
L.R.R.M. 1546, 1546 (1062) (collective bargaining contracts executed by union dis-
criminatory between employees on the basis of race would warrant revocation of certifi-
cation).
"94 L.R.R. M. at 1359.
" Id. at 1357.
19 The contract-bar rules are invoked by the NLRB to stabilize the employer-
union relationship by allowing a valid collective-bargaining agreement to prevent the
holding of a representation election for a certain period of time. The Board in Handy
Andy explained that because these rules are self-imposed and discretionary, the NLRB
can refuse to apply them in situations where to do so would not contribute to stability in
labor relations, see The Pulitzer Publishing Company (Owner and Operator of Stations
KSD and KSD-TV), 203 N.L.R.B. 639, 83 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1973), or adversely affect the
integrity of the NLRB's processes by extending a governmental sanction to racially
separate groupings, see Pioneer Bus Company, Inc., 140 N.L,R.B. 54, 55, 51 L.R.R.M.
1546 (1962). 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361 n.51.
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1361.
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ing the NLRA, for the Board concluded that the specific mandatory
language of section 9(c)(1) does not allow it to deny certification to an
allegedly discriminatory union which has validly obtained a majority."
The policies underlying section 9(c)(1) appear to support this conclu-
sion." In particular, the nonadversary, factfinding character which
the NLRA specifies for such hearings, coupled with their exemption
from judicial review, indicates a congressional perception that certifi-
cation involves no legal issues. Moreover, the fundamental labor policy
of facilitating collective bargaining, as the Handy Andy Board rec-
ognized," would be impaired by allowing the NLRB discretion to
deny the majority's choice of a bargaining representative or to allow
employers to delay certification,"
The absence of statutory authority for the Board's apparent wit-
" N. at 1359-61.
"Compare Miami Newspaper Printing Pressman Local 46 v. McCulloch, 322 F.2d
993, 997-98, 53 L.R.R.M. 2786, 2790 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Section 9(c)(1) is mandatory ex-
cept that the Board can set aside an election which has been unfairly conducted either
because of union or employer misconduct or because of some reason implicating the
mechanics of the election process) with R. & M. Kaufman v, NLRB, 471 F.2d 301, 304,
81 L.R.R.M. 2309, 2312 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 906 (1973) (Board must
consider prior to certification the conduct of a bargaining representative whose in-
dependence and loyalty are properly drawn into question). One commentator has ar-
gued that while the Board's implied authority to depart from the language of section
9(c)(1) to proscribe union conduct is unclear, the Board should attack discriminatory
union practices only in unfair labor practice proceedings. Meltzer, Racial Discrimination,
supra note 30, at 25-26.
" 94 L. R. R. M. at 1359-60.
" If the Board did exercise such implied discretion under section 9(c)(1) to
remedy employment discrimination, it is submitted that it would be expanding its au-
thority under the NI.RA in at least two ways. First, such expansion would result because
the Board would be implementing federal antidiscrimination policies, not labor policies.
To do so appears to conflict with the 1975 Supreme Court decision in Emporium Cap-
well Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization. 420 U.S. 50 (1975), noted in An-
nual Survey of Labor Relations & Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. IND. & Cont. L.
Rev. 965, 994 (1975), in which the Court held that the Board could not enlarge the
scope of 'section 7 to protect minority employees attempting to bargain separately from
their elected bargaining representative. 420 U.S. at 69-70. The Court in Emporium Cap-
well cautioned that "the employees' substantive right to be free of racial discrimination
.. cannot be pursued at the expense of the orderly collective-bargaining processes
contemplated by the NLRA." Id. at 69. Thus the principles enunciated in Emporium
Capivell would seem to prevent the Board from implying authority under the NLRA to
implement federal policies against employment discrimination by denying certification
to an allegedly discriminatory union.
Second, the Board would be expanding its authority by deciding that it has wide
discretion to determine that a particular union is not a proper employee representative.
Such action would conflict with the fundamental labor policy of avoiding judicial or
Board intervention in either internal union affairs or the conduct of a bargaining rep-
resentative so long as such conduct remains within the defined contours of labor law.
Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(l)(A) (1970). See also Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423, 428-30
(1969). Accordingly, there appears to be no discretionary authority. under either the
NLRA or federal antidiscrimination policies for the Board's apparent willingness to
hear in representation proceedings questions of "clearly existing invidious discrimina-
tion" within a labor organization that has prevailed in a valid representation election.
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lingness to consider in representation proceedings instances of "clearly
existing invidious discrimination" not affecting the election process
suggests that any such authority necessarily must be grounded on a
constitutional rationale capable of superseding the mandatory com-
mand of section 9(c)(I). The Board, of course, specifically rejected a
constitutional rationale in Handy Andy because it concluded that under
no circumstances could there be a "nexus between the Board's certifi-
cation and any discrimination undertaken by the union which has re-
ceived such a certification."85 It is submitted, however, that there may
be circumstances where the Board may be allowed, and even required,
under a constitutional "state action" rationale to consider prior to cer-
tification whether NLRB certification would amount to a constitution-
ally prohibited degree of involvement with the union's discrimination.
This premise is predicated upon an interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvisss which differs from
the one advanced by the Board in Handy Andy.
The Court in Moose Lodge held that the licensing and general
regulation of a private club by a state liquor control board did not in-
volve the State in the club's discriminatory guest practices so as to rise
to the level of unconstitutional "state action." 87 The Court additionally
found, however, that even though a particular liquor control board
regulation requiring regulated organizations to adhere to their con-
stitutions and by-laws was neutral on its face, the result of its applica-
tion to an organization whose constitution and by-laws require dis-
crimination "would be to invoke the sanctions of the State to enforce a
concededly discriminatory private rule."88 Interpreting these holdings,
the Board in Handy Andy reasoned that the NLRB's involvement
through certification with a labor organization is no greater than the
State's involvement with the private club through the general licensing
and regulatory scheme found constitutional in Moose Lodge. 89 In addi-
tion, the Handy Andy Board distinguished NLRB certification from the
unconstitutional state regulation requiring the club to adhere to its
discriminatory constitution and by-laws. In the Board's view, certifica-
tion is not an act which has the effect of specifically requiring a union
to discriminate."
The Board's interpretation of Moose Lodge, however, seemingly
ignores two fctors concerning certification. First, Board certification
accords a labor organization an exclusive bargaining status for one
" 94 L.R.R.M. at 1357.
" 407 U.S. 163 (1972). See text and notes 16-19 .stipm for a discussion of the
Board's "state action" analysis.
CT 407 U.S. at 177.
55 1d. at 178-79.
" 94 L.R.R.N1. at 1357.
90 1d. The Board in Handy Andy primarily derived this constitutional analysis from
a student law review article, see Note, 47 S.CAt.. L REV. 1353, 1372-73 (1974) {Hereinaf-
ter De Facto Discrimination]. Handy Andy, 228 N.L.R.B. at_n.6a (The Board ap•
pended footnote 6a as a correction after the Handy Andy opinion was published in the
Labor Relations Reference Manual).
H15
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
year," similar to a monopoly status found lacking in the State's reg-
ulatory scheme in Moose Lodge." Moreover, this status is further en-
hanced, as Member Jenkins pointed out, by other substantial benefits
flowing to a labor organization upon its certification." Second, Board
certification implicitly requires a labor organization to adhere to its
constitution, by-laws, and other stated policies, thereby imparting to
certification characteristics of the state regulation found un-
constitutional in Moose Lodge." At a minimum, when the Board is
aware that a union's governing instruments blatantly restrict access to
membership on the basis of invidious classifications, certification ap-
pears to put the weight of the NLRB, concededly a valued and impor-
tant adjunct to a labor organization, behind the labor organization's
discrimination.95
 Therefore if the Board certifies such a union without
proscribing this "clearly existing invidious discrimination," it would
appear to be enforcing a discriminatory private rule and, as such, cer-
tification could be viewed as "significant involvement" by the NLRB in
a union's discriminatory practices. Accordingly, where it is specifically
demonstrated that the challenged unit engages in open, documented
and pervasive discriminatory membership practices rising to the level
of "clearly existing invidious discrimination," it is submitted that the
NLRB should employ a constitutional approach to deny such a union
access to its representation machinery."
It is further submitted that the Board's conclusion in Handy Andy
that there was no nexus between NLRB certification and the chal-
lenged union's alleged discrimination was correct because the alleged
discrimination did not rise to the level of "clearly existing invidious
discrimination." The employer in Handy Andy never demonstrated that
the challenged union intended to discriminate against employees in
the requesting unit. Instead, the employer's allegations were limited to
claims of potential discrimination arising from past practices of the
challenged union in other bargaining units." On the basis of these
allegations, Board consideration in a representation proceeding of the
constitutionality of its certification decision is unwarranted because the
challenged unit had not demonstrated an intent to discriminate. In-
tent to discriminate is a necessary element in a claim of un-
9 ' 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(3), 159(e)(2)(1970).
92 407 U.S. at 177.
92 See text at notes 57-61 supra.
" Cf. McNamara v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1163, 90 L.R.R.M. 2401, 2405 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976) (Labor Management Reporting and Dis-
closure Act § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1975), requires union representatives when acting
in it fiduciary capacity to act within authority conferred by the union's constitution, by-
laws and policies).
92 Cf. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 182-83 (Douglas J., dissenting). But see De Facto Dis-
crimination, supra note 90, at 1375-78.
" See Bekins, 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 143, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323, 1329 (1974) (Member
Kennedy, concurring). See note 3 supra.
97 See text and notes 10-13,supra.
1116
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
constitutional "state action" after Washington v. Davis, 98 where the Su-
preme Court held that a showing of an intent or purpose to dis-
criminate on the part of a governmental agency is a prerequisite to a
finding of unconstitutional governmental action under the fourteenth
amendment. Accordingly, no "state action" could have been found in
Handy And because there was no demonstration of discriminatory in-
tent on the part of the union which then could have been imputed to
the Board.
"State action" might be found, however, as noted above, where a
union's intent to discriminate invidiously in membership requirements
against certain employees clearly exists within its constitution, by-laws
or other written or oral policy statements. In such cases, an intent to
discriminate could be imputed to the Board if it certifies the union as
an exclusive statutory bargaining agent with knowledge of such
"clearly existing invidious discrimination."'"
Furthermore, grounding a response to "clearly existing" union
discrimination not affecting the election process on a constitutional ra-
tionale provides a principled method for dealing with such discrimina-
tion without conflicting with the mandatory character of section
9(c)(I). Such an approach also avoids the danger of the Board engag-
ing in broad discretionary review of a union's qualifications or rep-
resentative status, since this constitutional stricture could be invoked
only when the union's intent to discriminate is sufficiently manifest to
give rise to the inference that NLRB certification condones such dis-
crimination.
Thus the NLRB, as it did in Handy Andy,'" should defer consid-
eration of questions of discrimination based only on claims of poten-
tial union discrimination until they are raised in unfair labor practice
proceedings. The Board should reserve its constitutional review in
certification proceedings for cases in which intentional union dis-
crimination is clearly demonstrated. Accordingly, it is submitted that
the Board should apply the Handy Andy ruling only in two circum-
stances: where allegations of union discrimination are based either on
violations not reaching the constitutional dimensions of intentional
discrimination, or on discrimination claims regarding other bargaining
units not probative of the intent to discriminate in the challenged
unit. However, where a clear showing is made that the specific unit
requesting certification intends to discriminate in membership re-
quirements on the basis of race or other invidious classifications, it is
submitted that the Board should deny certification to the union.
" 426 U.S 229, 239, 252 (1976).
"Cf. Washington, 426 U.S. at 253 (Stevens, J., concurring) (governmental agency
is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of its deeds).
'°° 94 L.R.R.M. at 1355, 1363.
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VI. SEX DISCRIMINATION—EXCLUSION OF PREGNANCY FROM
DISABILITY BENEFITS: General Electric Co. v. Gilbert
In 1974, the Supreme Court by a divided vote of 6-3 held in
Geduldig v. Aiello' that California's exclusion of normal pregnancy
from coverage under its disability insurance program did not violate
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' The
Geduldig Court determined that the pregnancy exclusion did not
create a sex-based classification.' Since the exclusion was rationally re-
lated to the state's legitimate interest in maintaining a self-sufficient
disability insurance program, the Court concluded that the program
did not violate the equal protection clause." Subsequent to Geduldig,
the question logically arose as to whether the Geduldig Court's finding
that exclusion of pregnancy from disability insurance programs did
not constitute sex discrimination under the fourteenth amendment
mandated a similar finding where similar pregnancy disability exclu-
sions were challenged under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.° The four circuit courts of appeals which addressed this ques-
tion unanimously concluded that Geduldig was not dispositive of this
issue and that such an exclusion did constitute illegal sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII.` In a major development during the Survey
year, the Supreme Court, by a divided vote,' held in General Electric
Co. v. Gilberts that a private employer may without violating Title VII
adopt a disability program which compensates employees for all tem-
porary disabilities except pregnancy.°
417 U.S. 484 (1974).
'Id. at 496-97.
3 Id. at 496.
Id. at 496-97.
5
 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See, e.g., 1974-75 Annual Sur-
vey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 16 B.C. IND. & Cost. L. REV. 965,
1063-68 (1975).
€ See Satty v. Nashville Gas Co., 522 F.2d 850, 855, 11 FEP Cas. 1, 4 (6th Cir.
1975); Hutchinson v. Lake Oswego School Dist., 519 F.2d 961, 965, 11 FEP Cas. 161,
164 (9th Cir. 1975); Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661, 663, 10 FEP Cas.
1201, 1202 (4th Cir. 1975), reversed, 429 U.S. 125, 128 (1976); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut.
Iris. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 207, 9 FEP Cas. 227, 232 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on jurisdictional
grounds, 424 U.S. 737, 746 (1976). See also Communication Workers v. A.T. & T. Co.,
513 F.2d 1024, 1028, 10 FEP Cas. 435, 438 (2d Cir. 1975) (reversing the district court
ruling which had held that, absent a showing of discriminatory pretext, Geduldig re-
quired that exclusion of pregnancy from a disability benefits program would not consti-
tute a violation of Title VII). Cf. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1097-98, 11 FEP Cas.
972, 977-78 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting constitutional challenges to Georgia bar examina-
tion, and stating that Geduldig was applicable only to constitutional challenges and not to
Title VII challenges).
The vote was 4-2-3. Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion in which
Justices Powell, White and Chief Justice Burger joined. Justices Stewart and Blackmun
concurred in separate opinions. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented.
Justice Stevens also dissented.
8 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
9 Id. at 145-46.
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The Gilbert plaintiffs challenged a disability plan by which Gen-
eral Electric (G.E.) provided non-occupational sickness and accident
benefits to all employees." Disabilities arising from pregnancy, how-
ever, were excluded from the plan's coverage." The plaintiffs filed a
timely suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia alleging that this exclusion of pregnancy under the G.E.
program constituted sex discrimination in violation of section
703(a)(1) of Title VII." The district court determined that the G.E.
plan violated Title VII and accordingly entered a judgment which
both enjoined G.E. from continuing to exclude pregnancy-related dis-
abilities from its plan and provided for future monetary awards to
those who had been affected." By a divided vote the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court." The Supreme Court then granted certiorari and re-
versed.'
In Gilbert, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, initially noted
that there were similarities between the language of section 703(a)(1)
of Title VII, which forbids employment discrimination on the basis of
"race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,"" and the language
employed in judicial consideration of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment." Although the Court admitted that this
similarity did not necessarily imply that Congress intended to in-
corporate into Title VII those concepts of discrimination which had
emerged from judicial consideration of the equal protection clause, it
concluded nevertheless that those concepts supplied "a useful starting
point in interpreting the [congressional language of Title VII]."" Ac-
cordingly, the Co.urt determined that its decision in Geduldig, involving
as it had a "strikingly" similar disability plan, was "relevant" in decid-
ing whether the pregnancy exclusion in Gilbert constituted sex dis-
crimination within the meaning of Title VII.'"
'" Id. at 127.
" Id.
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970), Section 703(a)(1) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or other-
wise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
la 375 F. Stipp. 367, 386, 7 FEP Cas. 796, 810-11 (El), Va. 1974).
" 519 F.2d 661, 663, 10 FEP Cas. 1201, 1202 (4th Cir. 1975).
la 429 U.S. at 146.
H For the text of § 703(a)(1) sec note 12 supra.
17
 429 U.S. at 133.
18 Id. In particular, the Court cited the use or the term "discrimination" which
was not defined in Title VII, but which was extensively analyzed in equal protection
cases "in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress man-
ifested in enacting Title VII." Id.
" Id. It should be noted that the California disability program involved in Gerbil-
dig was, in one respect. different from the G.E. plan involved in Gilbert. Whereas the
Gilbert plan excluded all disabilities arising from pregnancy, 429 U.S. at 127, the Gedul-
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Particularly, noting that "it is a finding of sex-based discrimina-
tion that must trigger ... the finding of an unlawful employment
practice under [section] 703(a)(I) ...," the Gilbert Court found "pre-
cisely in point" Geduldig's finding that a disability program's exclusion
of pregnancy from its coverage did not create a sex-based classifica-
tion. 2° Quoting extensively from Geduldig, the Gilbert Court explained
why it had decided there that California's disability program was not
sexually discriminatory: "'California does not discriminate with respect
to the persons or groups which are eligible for disability insurance
protection under the program. The classification challenged ... re-
lates to the asserted underindusiveness of the set of risks that the
State has selected to insure.' "21 The Court in Geduldig had reasoned
that this underinclusiveness did not create a sex-based classification
since both men and women were covered equally by the disability
program. The simple exclusion of one physical condition-
pregnancy—from possible compensation, the Geduldig Court had de-
termined, did not amount to gender-based discrimination. 22 This de-
termination, the Gilbert Court reasoned, applied equally well to the
G.E. disability benefits program. Accordingly, the Gilbert Court con-
cluded that G.E.'s program was not sexually discriminatory per se."
After determining that G.E.'s program by its terms did not
create a sex-based classification, the Gilbert Court proceeded to the
second stage of the Geduldig analysis. In that stage the Geduldig Court
had undertaken to determine whether despite the fact that the pro-
gram was not discriminatory per se, it could nevertheless be shown
"that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to
effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or
the other ...."24 The Court had determined in Geduldig that such a
design was not shown and consequently had concluded that Califor-
nia's program did not discriminate on the basis of sex." On this issue
of pretext, the Gilbert Court concluded that there was no more show-
ing in Gilbert than there had been in Geduldig that the program was in-
tended to accomplish an invidious discrimination." Despite the fact
that pregnancy is confined to women, the Court cited the district
court's findings that pregnancy is not a "disease" at all and is often a
voluntary and desired condition," and concluded that pregnancy is
thus "significantly different from the typical covered disease or dis-
dig plan excluded disabilities arising from normal pregnancy, but allowed recovery for
disabilities certified by a doctor as arising from abnormal pregnancy. 417 U.S. at 491 &
n.15.
2° 429 U.S. at 136.
21 Id. at I34, quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 494.
22 417 U.S. at 496-97 a.20.
23 429 U.S. at 136.
24 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
"Id, at 496.97.
" 429 U.S. at 136.
27 ld. thing 375 F. Supp. at 375, 377, 7 FEP Cas. at 802-03.
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ability."" By thus distinguishing pregnancy from the disabilities which
G.E.'s program did cover, the Gilbert Court justified its conclusion that
the program was not a pretext for discriminating on the basis of sex."
Having discussed the applicability of Geduldig to the situation
presented in Gilbert and having advanced its conclusion that G.E.'s
program did not constitute sex discrimination per se, the Court in Gil-
bert proceeded to examine whether the G.E. program was nevertheless
discriminatory in its effect. Recognizing that prior cases had held that
a Title VII violation may be established by a showing that an other-
wise facially neutral program has the effect of discriminating against a
protected class, the Court stated, however, that it found no such show-
ing in Gilbert." The Court pointed out that the district court had not
found—nor was there any evidence which could have supported such
a finding—that the financial benefits of the program worked to dis-
criminate against a particular group or class of people in terms of the
coverage supplied by the program. 3 ' Consequently, the Court de-
termined;
As there is no proof that the package is in fact worth more
to men then to women, it is impossible to find any gender-
based discriminatory effect in this scheme simply because
women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive
benefits; that is to say, gender-based discrimination does
not result simply because an employer's disability-benefits
plan is less than all-inclusive."
Thus, because there was no proof that the program was "worth" more
to men than to women, the Court determined that the requisite show-
ing of a discriminatory effect had not been met, and accordingly con-
cluded that G.E.'s program was not violative of Title VII."
Having arrived at its conclusion that. G.E.'s program did not vio-
late Title VII, the Court proceeded to analyze an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guideline" which was in direct con-
flict with this conclusion. The guideline explicitly called for the inclu-
sion of "pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery
therefrom" in disability prograrns. 35 The Court, however, discounted
the weight to be accorded the guideline by noting that no authority to
promulgate rules and regulations had been vested in the EEOC by
Congress through the provisions of Title VII. 30 Although the Court
29 429 U.S. at 136.
29 Id.
"Id. at 137.
3 ' Id. at 138.
32 Id. at 138-39 (footnote omitted).
33 Id.
34 29	 § 1604.10(b) (1976).
36 Id
" 429 U.S. at 141. The Court stated:that the EEOC had been given authority to
issue procedural guidelines, by the provisions of § 7l3(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-12(a) (1970), but noted that "(nlo one contends .. • that the above-quoted regula-
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acknowledged that such fact did not mean that the guidelines should
not be entitled to consideration in determining legislative intent, the
Court nevertheless reasoned that the proper weight to be accorded
the guideline "will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its con-
sideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control." 37 Judged by this standard, the
Court determined that the guideline did not fare well.
As an initial factor in considering the guideline, the Court
pointed out that since the guideline was promulgated in 1972, eight
years after Title VII had been enacted, it was not a "contemporaneous
interpretation of [the statute]." 38 As such, its claim to legitimacy was
not as strong as guidelines promulgated soon after passage of legisla-
tion." Second, and even more important to the Court was the fact
that the guideline flatly contradicted the position taken by the EEOC
in several opinion letters issued in 1966, only two years after enact-
ment of Title VII, that exclusion of maternity from a disability plan
would not violate Title V11. 4 ° The Court noted that in the past it has
refused to follow administrative guidelines which conflict with earlier
positions taken by the agency. 4 ' Moreover, the Court pointed out that
Congress had specifically provided in an amendment to Title VII that
differences in compensation based on sex which were authorized
under the Equal Pay Act would not constitute unlawful employment
practices under Title V11. 42 In fact, Senator Humphrey, who man-
aged the Title VII bill on the Senate floor, had stated that the pur-
pose of the amendment was to make it "unmistakably clear" that "dif-
ferences of treatment in industrial benefit plans, including earlier re-
tirement options for women, may continue in operation under this bill
if it becomes law."'" Because of this amendment, the Court deter-
mined, interpretations of relevant provisions of the Equal Pay Act
were applicable to Title VII as well." In this regard the Court quoted
don is procedural in nature or in effect." 429 U.S. at 141 n.20. The Court neglected to
point out, of course, that it is not the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
which has in past cases led the Court to conclude that EEOC guidelines are entitled to
"great deference." Rather, it is the fact that the guidelines are interpretations of legisla-
tion by the enforcing agency which has resulted in their being accorded such deference.
See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971). See text at notes 99.108 infra.
37
 429 U.S. at 142, quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
38 429 U.S. at 142.
38 1d. The Court has stated that particular deference is due administrative in-
terpretations which involve "contemporaneous interpretations" of statutes by the enforc-
ing agency, See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Power Reactor Co. v. Electri-
cians, 367 U.S. 396, 408 (1961).
40 429 U.S. at 142.
41 Id. at 143, citing United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Furman, 421 U.S. 837,
858-59 n.25 (1975); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94 (1973).
" 429 U.S. at 143-44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
" 110 CONG. REC. 13, 663-13, 664 (1964),
" 429 U.S. at 144.
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an interpretive regulation promulgated by the Wage and Flour Ad-
ministrator under the Equal Pay Act which stated:
If employer contributions to a plan providing insurance or
similar benefits to employees are equal for both men and
women, no wage differential prohibited by the equal pay
provisions will result from such payments, even though the
benefits which accrue to the employees in question are
greater for one sex than for the other."
Consequently, the Court noted, if both the EEOC and the Wage and
Hour Administrator's guidelines were accepted as valid, G.E.'s pro-
gram would be declared an unlawful employment practice under the
EEOC guideline but not under the Wage and Hour Administrator's
guideline.'" It was the combination of all these factors—the promulga-
tion of the EEOC guideline eight years after the enactment of Title
VII, the direct conflict between the EEOC guideline and earlier posi-
tions advanced by the agency, the quoted language of Senator Hum-
phrey, the floor manager of Title VII, and the conflict with the in-
terpretation of the Equal Pay Act by the Wage and Hour
Administrator—which the Court determined justified its conclusion
that the EEOC guideline was inconsistent with the "'plain meaning' of
the language [of Title VII]." 47 Thus, the Court decided that the
guideline was entitled to little weight and accordingly reiterated its
conclusion that G.E.'s program was not violative of Title V11. 48
The Court ended its discussion in Gilbert by again invoking the
theme of the relevance of judicial construction of the fourteenth
amendment to the concept of discrimination under Title VII: When
Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to `discriminate ... be-
cause of ... sex ... ,' without further explanation of its meaning, we
should not readily infer that it meant something different from what
the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant."" Thus, the
Court concluded that G.E.'s exclusion of pregnancy from its disability
program did not violate Title VII, and accordingly reversed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals."
45 14, quoting '29 GER. § 800.116(d) (1976).
46 429 U.S. at 144-45.
" Id. at 145.
411
" Id., quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)( I) (1970).
6° 429 U.S. at 145-46. Both Mr. Justice Blackmun and Mr. Justice Stewart con-
curred in the Court's judgment. Id. at 146. justice Blackmun stated that he agreed with
the Court's holding that G.E.'s program was not a per se violation of Title VII, that dis-
criminatory effect therefore had to be proven, and that no such effect had been shown.
Id. He was careful to note, however, that he did not agree with any inference or
suggestion—if there was one—in the majority's opinion "that effect may never be a
controlling factor in a Title VII case." Id.
Justice Stewart also concurred in the Court's holding that the G.E. program was
not per se violative of Title VII and that no discriminatory effect had been shown. Id.
He added that he, unlike Justice Blackmun, did not read the majority's opinion to ques-
tion the significance of proof of discriminatory effect in Title Vii cases. Id.
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Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall dissented, reject-
ing the majority's holding that G.E.'s program did not violate Title
VII.5 ' Initially, the dissent pointed out that resolution of the issue
presented essentially turned upon which of two views was taken in
analyzing the pregnancy exclusion of G.E.'s program. The dissent
noted that whereas the plaintiffs and lower courts had reasoned that
the exclusion of pregnancy by definition affected only women and was
therefore discriminatory, the Supreme Court's majority chose to view
the program as "a gender-free assignment of risks" which was simply
under-incIusive. 52 Since it was not self-evident which "conceptual
framework" was more appropriate, the dissent elected to subject to
. further scrutiny the soundness of the Court's assumption that the
program was "the untainted product of a gender-neutral risk-
assignment process," using as a backdrop G.E.'s past employment
practices and policies concerning inclusion of compensable risks. 53
In analyzing G.E.'s past practices, the dissent noted the majority's
reliance on Geduldig, with its requirement that even facially neutral
programs be analyzed to see if "distinctions involving pregnancy are
mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against
the members of one sex or the other." 54 Thus, the dissent concluded,
Geduldig itself required the Court to determine whether G.E.'s exclu-
sion of pregnancy from its disability plan resulted from the appli-
cation of "neutral, persuasive actuarial considerations, or rather
stemmed from a policy that purposefully downgraded women's role in
the labor force."55 Despite this requirement, however, the dissent
pointed out that the Court in Gilbert chose to ignore both "a history of
General Electric practices that have served to undercut the employ-
ment opportunities of women who became pregnant while
employed"55
 and "the undisturbed conclusion" of the district court
" Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 147-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
" 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. In a footnote, Justice Brennan catalogued some of G.E.'s historical
employment practices. Id. at 149-50 n.1. For example, Justice Brennan pointed out that
in 1926 G.E. did not after a benefit plan for its female employees because of the com-
pany's belief that "'women did not recognize the responsibilities of life, for they prob-
ably were hoping to get married soon and leave the company.'"Id. at 150 n.1 quoting D.
Loin, SWOPE OF G.E.: STowi' Or GERARD SWOPE ANI) GENERAL. kik:CI -MC IN AMERICAN
BUSINESS (1958). Additionally Justice Brennan continued, the district court had noted in
discussing more recent G.E. policy:
In certain instances it appears that the pregnant employee was required to
take leave of her position three months prior to birth and not permitted to
return until six weeks after the birth. In other instances the periods varied
• In short, of all the employees it is only pregnant women who have
been required to cease work regardless of their desire and physical ability
to work and only they have been required to remain off their job for an
arbitrary period after the birth of their child.
429 U.S. at 149-50 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting) quoting 375 F. Stipp. at 385, 7 FEP Cas.
at 810.
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that G.E.'s "'discriminatory attitude' toward women was `a motivating
factor in its policy' ... and ... the pregnancy exclusion was 'neutral
[neither] on its face' nor 'in its intent.' "57 Thus, the dissent concluded
that the majority's assessment of G.E.'s program as a neutral risk
selection process was difficult to reconcile with the "historical record"
of the case."
After noting the majority's refusal properly to deal with the "his-
torical record" of the case, the dissent proceeded to criticize the
majority's determination that pregnancy was reasonably excluded
from G.E.'s program because, unlike the covered disabilities, it was a
"voluntary" condition and not a "disease." The dissent pointed out
that even if the Court's assessment of "non-voluntariness" and "dis-
ease" as the criteria for coverage by the G.E. plan was accurate, use of
those criteria would not explain why the plan did cover such "volun-
tary" conditions as sport injuries and attempted suicides." Similarly
inexplicable would be the fact that the plan did not cover the ten per-
cent of pregnancies which are complicated by diseases." Thus, the
dissent reasoned that "even if 'non-voluntariness' and 'disease' [were]
construed as the operational criteria for inclusion of a disability in
General Electric's program, application of these criteria [was] in-
consistent with the Court's gender-neutral interpretation of the com-
pany's policy." 6 '
A further point which undermined the majority's position that
G.E.'s plan was neutral, the dissent stated, was the infirmity of the
majority's contention, advanced in a descriptive phrase borrowed from
Geduldig, that "There is no risk from which men are protected and
women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are
protected and men are not."" The dissent argued that this principle
was contradicted by the fact that the plan covered such specifically
male-oriented risks as prostatectomies, vasectomies, and circumci-
sions while it failed to cover the most. common female specific risk —
pregnancy." Consequently, the dissent concluded that the combina-
tion of G.E.'s past employment practices with the "absence of defin-
able gender-neutral sorting criteria" . under its disability program war-
ranted acceptance of plaintiffs' perception of the disability program as
inherently discriminatory over the Court's view of the plan as a
gender-free assignment of risks."
The dissent went on to note that in fact purposeful discrimina-
tion did not have to be shown to recover under Title VII. Rather, all
" 429 U.S. at 150 (Brennan, J., dissenting) quoting 375 F. Stipp. at 382, 383, 7
FEY Gas, at 807, 808.
'" 429 U.S. at 150 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36 Id. at 151 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
62
 417 U.S. at 496-97 (footnote omitted).
63
 429 U.S. at 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
64 Id, at 153 (Brennan,_]., dissenting).
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that was required to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII was
proof that the effect of a facially neutral classification was to dis-
criminate against a protected class of people." In that regard, the
majority by focusing on the fact that the program covered all dis-
abilities which could affect both sexes had concluded that such an ef-
fect had not been shown. The dissent pointed out, however, that if
one focused instead, as the plaintiffs had, on the related facts that all
male-specific disabilities were covered by the program as were all
female-specific disabilities except for the most prevalent-
pregnancy—then a discriminatory effect could reasonably be found."
The discriminatory effect, of course, would result from the fact that
men are protected against all sex-specific risks while women lack
coverage for the most prevalent female specific risk.
Regardless of the focus chosen, however, the most important
consideration in the opinion of the dissent was "whether the social
policies and aims to be furthered by Title VII and filtered through
the phrase 'to discriminate' contained in [section] 703(a)(1) fairly for-
bid an ultimate pattern of coverage that insures all risks except a
commonplace one that is applicable to women but not to men."67 It
was exactly this type of issue, the dissent contended, which Congress
intended to leave to the EEOC to resolve." Thus, past decisions of
the Court had consistently recognized that EEOC guidelines should be
entitled to "great deference," and not simply to "consideration" as the
majority had stated in repudiating the 1972 guideline of the EEOC
which required inclusion of pregnancy in disability programs." The
Court had accorded the guideline little weight under its "considera-
tion" standard because of the related facts that the guideline was not
promulgated contemporaneously with the enactment of Title VII but
rather was issued seven years later, and that in the interim several
opinion letters of the EEOC's General Counsel had stated that preg-
nancy need not be included in disability programs." The dissent,
however, considered neither of these factors persuasive.'[ Rather, the
dissent argued that the seven-year lapse before promulgation of the
guideline was specifically due to the meticulous approach taken by the
EEOC in confronting the problems and concerns with which it was
faced:
g4 Id. at 154-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
299, 238-39 (1976); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975);
McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co„ 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
" 429 U.S. at 155 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
117 Id.
t's Id.
"" Id. at 155-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting), thing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
7° 429 U.S. at 142-43.
Id. at 156 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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It is bitter irony that the care that preceded promulgation
of the 1972 guideline is today condemned by the Court as
tardy indecisiveness, its unwillingness irresponsibly to chal-
lenge employers' practices during the formative period is
labeled as evidence of inconsistency, and this indecisiveness
and inconsistency are bootstrapped into reasons for deny-
ing the Commission's interpretation its due deference. 72
Thus the dissent determined that the guideline was properly entitled
to "great deference" and should have been accepted by the Court."
The concluding aspect of the dissent's discussion concerned the
more general policies inherent in Title VII and invoked the Court's
prior recognition of the fact that discrimination does not operate in
a vacuum, but rather in a social context requiring that discrimina-
tion take its meaning from the ultimate social objectives sought by the
relevant legislation." These objectives, the dissent pointed out, may
require "due consideration to the uniqueness of 'disadvantaged' in-
dividuals."" Accordingly, the dissent determined that the G.E. pro-
gram with its sole exclusion of pregnancy should be considered in
light of the historic and continuing suppression of women in the labor
market." The dissent reasoned that .proper recognition both of this
"disadvantaged" position of today's working woman and of G.E.'s past
and present employment practices, including its otherwise all-inclusive
disability program, fully justified the EEOC's determination that ex-
clusion of pregnancy from a disability program constituted illegal sex
discrimination under Title VII." That interpretation by the EEOC,
the dissent determined, was also in keeping with Title VII's "ultimate
objective ... `to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fos-
tered [sexually] stratified job environments to the disadvantage of
[women].' "7" Consequently, the dissent. concluded, the judgment of
the court of appeals should have been affirmed. 79
72 Id, at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7' N. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
"See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). In Lou, the Court held that the City of
San Francisco violated the ban on racial or national origin discrimination of § 601 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), by failing to take affirmative ac-
tion to provide Chinese-speaking students with special English language instruction. 414
U.S. at 565, 569. The Court reversed a court of appeals decision which, in upholding
San Francisco's refusal to provide special instruction, had reasoned that "[e]very student.
brings to the starting line of his educational career different advantages and dis-
advantages caused in part by social, economic and cultural background, created and
continued completely apart from any contribution by the school system." 483 F.2d 791,
797 (9th Cir. 1973).
" 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting) thing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563
(1974). See note 74 supra.
76
 429 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id.
" Id., quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 1 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
76 429 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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In a separate and succinct discussion, Mr. Justice Stevens also
dissented, reasoning that an otherwise all-inclusive disability plan
which excluded pregnancy was discriminatory per se. 8° Justice Stevens
noted first that since the burden of proving a constitutional violation
of the equal protection clause was different from the burden of prov-
ing discrimination as a statutory violation, the constitutional holding in
Geduldig was not clispositive of the statutory issue presented in Gil-
ber1. 8 ' Justice Stevens then reasoned, in direct contrast to the majori-
ty's holding, that the G.E. plan was not governed by "neutral criteria,"
but rather was discriminatory "[Illy definition" since pregnancy was
placed "in a class by itself ... [and) it is the capacity to become
pregnant which primarily differentiates the female from the male." 82
Thus, Justice Stevens concluded that the plan's exclusion of preg-
nancy created a sex-based classification." Since G.E. had not advanced
a statutory affirmative defense to justify the classification, Justice Stev-
ens determined that the plan violated Title VII, and hence that the
decision of the court of appeals should have been affirmed."
It is submitted that the positions advanced in the dissents of both
Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Stevens are persuasive and
sound. Justice Stevens, of course, focused simply on the question
whether an otherwise all-inclusive disability plan which excluded
pregnancy was discriminatory per se. He concluded that it was,
employing essentially a common-sense approach to the question.
Women are threatened by the risk of pregnancy while men are not,
Justice Stevens argued, and accordingly any plan which fails to cover
only pregnancy discriminates against women." Justice Stevens thus
concluded that by excluding pregnancy alone from its coverage, the
plan created a sex-based classification which, absent a statutory affir-
mative defense, by definition contravened the provisions of section
703(a)(1) of Title VII."
The logic behind Justice Stevens' approach is straightforward
and compelling. The G.E. plan allows men to receive full compensa-
tion for all disabilities including such male-specific risks as pros-
tatectomies, vasectomies, and circumcisions. Women, however, are de-
nied the plan's coverage for the most prevalent female-specific risk—
pregnancy. Consequently, the G.E. plan, by its very provisions, creates
a double standard of coverage, keyed to sexual characteristics. To
state, as the majority did, that the plan only divides "potential re-
cipients into two groups—pregnant women and nonpregnant per-
sons"87 is not simply misleading, but rather is patently wrong. As Jus-
"Id. at 161.62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Al Id. at 160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).





" Id. at 135, quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20.
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lice Stevens noted, "[i]nsurance programs, company policies, and
employment contracts all deal with future risks rather than historic
facts. The classification is between persons who face a risk of preg-
nancy and those who do not."" Thus, since only women face the risk
of pregnancy, the inevitable conclusion is that the G.E. plan, with its
dissimilar treatment of men and women, creates a sex-based classifica-
tion in direct violation of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.
justice Brennan, instead of speaking only to the threshold ques-
tion addressed by Justice Stevens of whether the G.E. plan by its
terms is sexually discriminatory, directed his dissent more generally to
the reasoning upon which the majority had based its conclusion that
the G.E. program operated in a neutral fashion. The majority, of
course, relied on Geduldig for its determination that G.E.'s plan did
not establish a sex-based classification. As Justice Brennan pointed
out, however, "[b]eyond [the sex-based classification issue], Geduldig of-
fers little analysis helpful to decision of [Gilbert].""" Justice Brennan is
correct. Whereas Geduldig involved a constitutional challenge under
the equal protection clause, Gilbert dealt solely with an alleged Title
VII violation. Accordingly Gilbert should have been analyzed under
Title VII standards, not under equal protection standards. As the Su-
pretne Court stated in its 1976 landmark decision of Washington v.
Davis,"" "[W]e have never held that the constitutional standard for ad-
judicating claims of invidious racial discrimination is identical to the
standards applicable under Title VII, and we decline to do so to-
day."'" Thus, the Court's insistent application of Geduldig's equal pro-
tection analysis to Gilbert's Title VII allegations was misplaced. To re-
solve properly Gilbert and its issue of discrimination under Title VII,
the Court should have analyzed Title VII precedent rather than equal
protection cases.92
" 429 U.S. at 161-62 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
"Id. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
" M. at 239.
" 2
 As Justice Stevens stated in his dissent, "[q]uite clearly Congress could not have
intended to adopt this Court's analysis of sex discrimination because it was seven years
after [Title VII] was passed that the Court first intimated that the concept of sex dis-
crimination might have some relevance to equal protection analysis." 429 U.S. at 161
n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
It should also be noted, however, that even the Court's substantive equal protec-
tion analysis was persuasively rejected by Justice Brennan in dissent. See text at notes
54-64 supra. As Justice Brennan pointed out, the Geduldig mode of analysis adopted by
the Court required the determination of whether G.E.'s pregnancy classification was
used as a "'mere pretext ... designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the
members of one sex ... "' 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) quoting Geduldig,
417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20. Thus, Geduldies pretext requirement, Justice Brennan noted,
mandated a determination by the Court as to whether G.E.'s exclusion of pregnancy
from its disability benefits plan was based on "neutral, persuasive actuarial consid-
erations" or rather was a result of a systematic policy of downgrading women's role in
the labor force. 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The majority summarily dismissed the possibility of an illegal "pretext' on G.E.'s
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Prior Title VII cases have consistently held that a prima fade
violation of the Act can be established by a showing that an otherwise
facially neutral program has the effect of discriminating against a pro-
tected class of people.° 3
 While the Court majority in Gilbert acknowl-
edged this aspect of Title VII law, it nevertheless reasoned that such a
showing had not been made since the G.E. plan extended comparable
financial benefits to both men and women. Under the majority's rea-
soning therefore, "pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an addi-
tional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for
this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accru-
ing to men and women alike, which results from the facially
evenhanded inclusion of risks."'" Thus, the Court's analysis focused
only on the economic consequences of G.E.'s plan. Since the plan with
its exclusion of pregnancy was not "worth" more to men than to
women, the Court concluded that there was no discriminatory effect.
This economic analysis of the plan's effect, however, is entirely in-
appropriate in construing Title VII. Title VII's primary objective is
not merely to assure economic parity among employees, but rather "to
assure equality of employment opportunities and to eliminate those
discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered [sexually]
stratified job environments to the disadvantage of [women]."" Ac-
cordingly, G.E.'s plan and its effect must be analyzed in light of Title
VII's ultimate goal of employment equality to determine whether the
plan is in fact discriminatory.
The inconsistency of the G.E. plan with Title VII's goal becomes
evident upon analysis of that plan. G.E.'s plan insures its male
employees against all possible risks including those that are male-
specific. In contrast, G.E.'s plan affords its female employees coverage
of all risks except pregnancy. Thus the most prevalent female-specific
disability is the only risk not covered by this otherwise all-inclusive
plan. Inevitably, therefore, those female employees who wish to have
children, must do so at the risk of losing their wages for the time they
are absent from their jobs. Their male counterparts, on the other
part by distinguishing pregnancy from the other disabilities covered by the plan. This
distinction was based upon the purported "voluntariness" of pregnancy and the fact
that pregnancy was not a "disease." 429 U.S. at 136. justice Brennan, however, exposed
the fallacy of the majority's argument by detailing other conditions covered by the plan
which, at a minimum, demonstrated an inconsistent application of the supposed criteria
for coverage by the plan. See text at notes 59-61 supra. Furthermore, the plan's cover-
age of such male-specific disabilities as prostatectomies and circumcisions clearly in-
dicated a biased willingness on G.E.'s part to consider sex-based characteristics. Surely
factors such as these, especially when viewed in light of G.E.'s historic suppression of
women in the labor force, see note 56 supra, were sufficient to establish "pretext" under
Geduldig standards. Thus, even the majority's reasoning under an equal protection
analysis was inadequate.
93 Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
94 429 U.S. at 139 (emphasis in original).
95 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
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hand, are assured disability benefits when they leave work in order to
undergo such male-specific operations as prostatectomies or vasec-
tomies. The employment inequity which is bred by a system which
covers all possible risks for men, including male-specific ones, but
which omits from its coverage the most prevalent female-specific risk,
pregnancy, is both clear-cut and irrefutable. The effect of the G.E.
plan is to cover all possible risks for male employees, but not. for
female employees thus "foster[ing] [a sexually] stratified job environ-
ment to the disadvantage of [women]." It was, of course, Title VII's
objective to eliminate all such stratified systems. Consequently, under
a risk analysis, in contrast to the economic analysis employed by the
Gilbert majority it seems clear that the requisite showing of a dis-
criminatory effect has been met. Thus, G.E.'s plan should have been
held violative of Title VII. .
The majority's reluctance to resort to prior Title VII cases for
guidance in analyzing the issues presented in Gilbert was again man-
ifested when it declined to give "great deference" to an EEOC
guideline which required the inclusion of pregnancy in disability
plans." Inexplicably, the Court summarily ignored the consistent line
of Title VII cases which called for the "great deference" standard,"
and instead stated that the guideline was entitled only to "considera-
tion." The Gilbert majority justified its refusal to accord the EEOC
guideline "great deference" by noting that Congress in Title VII had
not conferred upon the EEOC the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations. Consequently, the majority reasoned, it could "accord less
weight to [the guideline] than to administrative regulations which
Congress has declared shall have the force of law, or to regulations
which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the basis for
imposition of liability."" Accordingly, the majority concluded, the
guideline was entitled only to "consideration" and under the "consid-
eration" standard, the majority determined, it fared poorly."
The "consideration" standard invoked by the majority stemmed
from a 1944 Supreme Court case dealing with administrative in-
terpretations of the Fair Labor Standards Act.'" Its invocation and
application in Gilbert contradicted not only the line of prior Title VII
cases which had called for the "great deference" standard, but also the
recent Supreme Court cases upon which the Title VII cases are based
which hold that administrative interpretations of legislation by the en-
forcing agency are entitled to "great deference." 1 D' The only previous
ve See text at notes 34-48 supra.
Albermarle Paper Co, v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J., concurring).
9" 429 U.S. at 141 (citations omitted).
"Id. at 142-45. See text at notes 34-48 supra.
'°" Skidmore v. Swill & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
1 " See, e.g., United States v, City of Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970); Udall v.
`Tallman, 380 U.S. I, 16 (1965).
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instance where the Court declined to accord "great deference" to an
EEOC guideline occurred in the 1973 case of Espinoza v. Farah Man-
ufacturing Co., Inc.'" In Espinoza, the Court held that an employer did
not violate Title VII's ban on employment discrimination based on na-
tional origin when the employer refused to hire a person who was not
a United States citizen.' 03 The Court's holding in Espinoza conflicted
with a pertinent EEOC guideline, which the Court stated "[was] no
doubt entitled to great deference."'" However, the Court further
stated that "that deference must have limits, where, as here, applica-
tion of the guideline would be inconsistent with an obvious congres-
sional intent not to reach the employment practice in question." 105
Thus, the Espinoza Court did not reject the "great deference" stan-
dard, but rejected only the application of that standard when such
application was inconsistent with the intent of Congress.'" The Gil-
bert Court, however, did not base its refusal to accord the EEOC
guideline "great deference" on an alleged inconsistency with congres-
sional intent. Rather, the Court rejected the "great deference" stan-
dard itself, stating simply that "courts properly may accord less weight
to [interpretive] guidelines than to administrative regulations which
Congress has declared shall have the force of law, or to regulations
which under the enabling statute may themselves supply the basis for
imposition of liability."'" Such reasoning, as noted, summarily ignores
consistent precedentm and consequently is difficult logically to justify.
Thus, the Gilbert Court's refusal to accord the EEOC guideline "great
deference" is an unwarranted break from clear Title VII precedent.
The final and perhaps most compelling argument against the
Court's holding in Gilbert is that of social policy. Indisputably, women's
position in the labor environment has been and continues to be an
oppressed one. And, as Justice Brennan pointed out, discrimination
does not exist in a vacuum but must take its meaning "from the de-
sired end products of the relevant legislative enactment, end products
that may demand due consideration to the uniqueness of 'dis-
advantaged' individuals." 109 As a consequence, and with proper rec-
ognition of the applicability of Justice Stevens' comment that "it is the
'2 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
'" Id. at 95-96.
wild. at 94.
"5 Id.
1°6 The Espinoza Court also pointed out that the EEOC guideline conflicted with
an earlier view taken by the agency. Id. The Court recognized in a footnote, however,
that the EEOC's earlier position had involved a different fact situation than that pre-
sented in Espinoza and had expressly reserved any decision on the particular facts even-
tually faced in Espinoza. Id. at n.7. The Espinoza Court then stated that the guideline was
inconsistent with congressional intent and it specifically based its refusal to accord the
guideline "great deference" on the guideline's inconsistency with congressional intent.
Id. at 94.
107 429 U.S. at 141.
105 See notes 97 and 101 supra.
109 429 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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capacity to become pregnant which primarily differentiates the female
from the male,""° it follows that Title VII requires the inclusion of
pregnancy in disability plans "to assure equality of employment op-
portunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices
which have fostered [sexually] stratified environments to the dis-
advantage of [women].""'
It is difficult to assess what the Supreme Court's decision in Gil-
bert portends for the future of Title VII. 12 Perhaps the most disturb-
ing element of the decision is the inference in the majority's opinion
that the constitutional analysis of the equal protection clause may be
applicable under Title VII, thus eliminating the Title VII effect stan-
dard and incorporating into Title VII law the newly enunciated intent
requirement necessary for a constitutional finding of discrimina-
don. 13 For two reasons, however, it is unlikely that such a wholesale
change in Title VII law will take place. First, it is doubtful that a
majority of the Court would agree to such a change. Clearly, Justices
Brennan, Marshall and Stevens, the three dissenters in Gilbert, have
definitively stated their support of the effect standard.'" Similarly,
both Justices Stewart and Blackmun, who specially concurred in the
judgment of the Court, indicated that they also believed in the con-
tinuing viability of the effect standard under Title VII.'" Second, in a
later Title VII case the Supreme Court clearly adopted the effect
standard in a sex discrimination case. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 16 the
Court was presented with statistical evidence which showed that
minimum height and weight requirements, imposed by statute in
Alabama for work in Alabama correctional facilities, had a disparate
effect on women. The Court held in Dothard that such a showing con-
""!d. at 162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S 792, 800 (1973).
1 " The United States Senate has already reacted to the Supreme Court's decision
in Gilbert. On September 18, 1977 the Senate by a vote of 75 to l 1 passed legislation
which amended Title VII and specifically provided that Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination includes discrimination based on pregnancy, childbirth, and
pregnancy-related disabilities. See S. 995, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CoNG. Rec. 15,059
(daily ed. Sept. 18, 1977). On September 19, 1977 S. 995 was sent to the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor where it is presently being considered,
"'See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 248 (1976).
"14 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, wrote in dissent:
Notwithstanding unexplained and inexplicable implications to the contrary
in the majority opinion, this Court and every Court or Appeals now have
firmly settled that a prima facie violation of Title VII, whether under §
703(a)(I) or § 703(a)(2), also is established by demonstrating that a facially
neutral classification has the effect of discriminating against members of a
defined class.
429 U.S. at 153-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations and fbotnotes omitted) (emphasis
in original).
Justice Stevens, citing to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-32 (1971),
wrote in dissent that "facially neutral criteria may be illegal if they have a discriminatory
effect." 429 U.S. at 161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1 " See note 50 supra..
""— U.S.	 , 97 S. Ct. 2720 (1977).
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stituted a prima facie case of discrimination.'" Thus, it seems likely
that a showing of a discriminatory effect will still suffice to establish a
prima facie violation of Title VII. However, even if the effect stan-
dard remains viable, it is clear that Title VII's goal of equalization of
employment opportunities suffered a severe setback in Gilbert.
VII. APPLICATION TO THE STATES OF TITLE VII AND OTHER
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
Amendments in 1972 extended Title VII's coverage to state and
local governmental employees who had previously been excluded
from the Act's protection.' Since remedies under Title VII include
back pay and back benefits awards,' the effect of the 1972 amend-
ments was to authorize state and local governmental employees to sue
in federal courts to recover retroactive monetary relief against the
states.' The governmental employers argued, however, that the
eleventh amendment' prohibited such awards and limited the
remedies of state and local governmental employees to prospective in-
junctive relief only. Lower courts divided on the question.'
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer6 determined that the eleventh amendment does not prohibit the
recovery of retroactive monetary awards and attorneys' fees in Title
VII suits against a state employer.' Fitzpatrick involved an action by
male employees of the state of Connecticut who alleged that certain
07 Id. at —, 97 S. Ct. at 2726-27.
' See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of' 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 2, 86
Stat. 103. The amendments changed the definition of "person" to include "govern-
ments, governmental agencies, [and] political subdivisions," id., § 2 (1), 86 Stat. 103, and
struck the specific exclusion of "a State or political subdivision thereof' from the defini-
tion of "employer." Id., § 2 (2) (b), 86 Stat. 103. A similar exclusion was struck from the
definition of "employment agency." Id., § 2 (3), 86 Stat. 103. The amendments also ex-
tended to public employees the right to sue on account of unlawful employment prac-
tices after satisfying certain procedural requirements. Id., 4 (a), 86 Stat. 104. The
amendments are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (a)-(cc), 2000e-5(a)-(g) (Stipp. V 1975).
2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
3
 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) (Supp. V 1975).
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XI. The amendment has been interpreted also to bar suit against a state by a
citizen of that state. See Edelman v. ,fordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
5 Compare Manhart v. City of Los Angeles, 13 FEP Cas. 1622, 1624 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (eleventh amendment no bar to award against a municipality), affil without discus-
sion rf the issue, 553 F.2d 581, 592, 13 FEP Cas. 1625, 1634 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
— U.S. —, 98 S. Ct. 51 (1977) with Yerrell v. Maryland Highway Ad m'n, — F. Supp.
—, 13 FEP Cas. 1746, 1750-51 (D.Md. 1976) (eleventh amendment bars award
against the state).
427 U.S. 445 (1976).
Id. at 447-48.
1134
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
provisions of the state's statutory retirement benefit plan dis-
criminated in favor of female employees. 8 The United States District
Court for the District of Connecticut 'held that the retirement system
did violate Title VIP and entered an injunction ordering the de-
fendants to administer the system without discrimination.'° Although
the employees had asked that they be awarded back benefits and at-
torneys' fees, the court denied this request," reasoning that the elev-
enth amendment prohibited the recovery of any such awards which
would have to be paid from the state treasury."
In reaching this result the district court relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Edelman v. Jordan." Edelman involved a class action
by welfare recipients against Illinois welfare officials for their failure
to process welfare applications within the time limits established by the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)." The suit re-
quested declaratory and injunctive relief, including a specific prayer
for "a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants to award to the
entire class of plaintiffs all [welfare] benefits wrongfully withheld." 15
In deciding whether the welfare recipients could recover the re-
quested back benefits, the Supreme Court in Edelman noted that Con-
gress had not specifically authorized damage suits against a state for
violation of the HEW regulations." Hence, the Court was loathe to
read such a provision into the legislation in light of the proscriptions
of the eleventh amendment." Consequently, the Court denied the
plaintiffs retroactive recovery of benefits, holding that the eleventh
amendment barred such a recovery of money which would have to be
paid from the state treasury." However, the Court did permit pro-
spective injunctive relief to be entered against the state officials since
such relief would have only an "ancillary effect" on state finances."
On the basis of Edelman the district court in Fitzpatrick permitted only
prospective injunctive relief to be entered against the defendant
state. 2 °
The employees appealed the district court's denial of monetary
relief." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
Id. at 448.
9 390 F, Supp. 278, 288, 8 FEP Gas. 877, 884 (D. Conn, 1974).
"Id. at 290, 8 FEP Gas. at 885-86.
"Id, at 288-89, 8 FEP Gas. at 884.85.
"Id. at 289, 8 FEP Cas. at 885.
13 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
54 1d. at 653-56.
"Id. at 656.
"Id. at 672.
" Id. at 673-74.
"Id. at 664-66, 678.
"Id. at 659, 668.
20 390 F. Supp. 278, 290, 8 FEP Cas. 877, 885 (D. Conn. 1974).
" 519 F.2d 559, 561, 10 FEP Cas. 956, 957 (2d Cir. 1975). The state did not ap-
peal either the finding of a violation or the entering of injunctive relief. Id, at 562, 10
FEP Gas. at 958.
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however, agreed with the district court that Edelman barred the re-
covery of the back benefits. 22
 The court reasoned that in light of the
eleventh amendment, Congress lacked authority to grant such a rem-
edy in Title VII actions against states." The court did permit the
plaintiffs to recover attorneys' fees, however, reasoning that such a re-
covery would have only an "ancillary effect" on the state treasury. As
such, the award was permissable under the Edelman rationale."
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's denial of re-
troactive damages and held that the eleventh amendment does not
prohibit private damage suits against the states to enforce the pro-
visions of Title VII. 25 Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Rehnquist rec-
ognized that the relief sought in Fitzpatrick was identical to that
sought in Edelman, viz., a damage award payable to a private party
from the state treasury. 25 However, he also noted that in Edelman
there had been no showing of specific congressional authorization of
damage suits against a state. 27 Since Title VII specifically authorized
such suits, Justice Rehnquist found that the decision in Edelman was
not dispositive of the issue in Fitzpatrick." The Court also found in-
apposite to a decision in Fitzpatrick an earlier Supreme Court case"
which had permitted damage suits against the states under a statute
passed pursuant to congressional authority under the commerce
clause. 30 The Court noted that the amendments to Title VII involved
in Fitzpatrick had not been passed under the commerce clause, but
rather had been passed pursuant to congressional authority under sec-
tion 5 of the fourteenth amendment." Since section 5 specifically au-
"Id. at 563, 10 FEP Cas. at 958.
"Id. at 569-71, 10 FEP Cas. at 963-65.
24 1d. at 571-72, 10 FEP Cas. at 965.
"427 U.S. at 447-48, 456. The decision was unanimous: seven Justices joined the
majority opinion and two, Justices Brennan and Stevens, filed separate concurrences.
' 6 Id. at 452. On appeal to the Second Circuit the employees had argued that
since the damages would be paid from a separate pension fund, the award was not ac-
tually one against the state. The court of appeals rejected this argument. 519 F.2d 559,
564-65, 10 FE? Cas. 956, 959-61 (2d Cir. 1975). The issue was not raised before the
Supreme Court. See 427 U.S. at 452 n.8.
" 427 U.S. at 452, citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672.
" 427 U.S. at 452.
" Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964) (by operating a railroad
in interstate commerce, a state waives immunity to suit under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.'§§ 51-60 (1964), a statute passed pursuant to congressional
powers to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3).
34' 427 U.S. at 452-53.
31 427 U.S. at 453 n.9, citing H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 19
(1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2137, 2154; S. REP. No. 92-415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., 10-1 I (1972). The fourteenth amendment reads in relevant part:
Section 1. All persons burn or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
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thorizes Congress to "enforce" the fourteenth amendment "by appro-
priate legislation," 32
 the Court reasoned that section 5 of the amend-
ment is necessarily a specific limitation' on the eleventh amendment
and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies. 33 Accord-
ingly, the Court determined in Fitzpatrick that the eleventh amend-
ment was no bar to the plaintiffs' recovery of either damages or attor-
neys' fees under Title VII. 34
Justice Stevens concurred in the result of Fitzpatrick, but ques-
tioned the majority's reasoning with respect to the fourteenth
amendment issue. 35 Justice Stevens did not agree that Title VII was
necessarily "appropriate legislation" to enforce the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment since he was unsure that the 1972 amend-
ments were "needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 36
 In addition, he noted that the employees in Fitzpatrick
had not proved a direct violation of the fourteenth amendment. 37
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
.. •
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. Corm. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5.
'1 See the text of the amendment at note 31 supra.
33 427 U.S. at 456. The Court relied on Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880),
where the Court examined the impact of the fourteenth amendment on state
sovereignty:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the States,
and they are to a degree restrictions of State power. It is these which Con-
gress is empowered to enforce, and to enforce against State action, how-
ever put forth, whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial.
Such enforcement is no invasion of State sovereignty. No law can he,
which the people of the States have, by the Constitution of the United
States, empowered Congress to enact
Cl)n exercising her rights, a State cannot disregard the limitations which
the Federal Constitution has applied to her power. Her rights do not reach
to that extent. Nor can she deny to the general government the right to
exercise all its granted powers, though they may interfere with the full en-
joyment of rights she would have if those powers had not been thus
granted. Indeed, every addition of power to the general government in-
volves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the
States. It is carved out of them.
(Tilie Constitution now expressly gives authority for congressional in-
terference and compulsion in the cases embraced within the Fourteenth
Amendment. It is but a limited authority, true, extending only to a single
class of cases; 'but within its limits it is complete.
Id. at 346, 347-48.
34 427 U.S. at 456.57. Because the Court concluded that the eleventh amendment
was no bar to the recovery of monetary damages against a state in Title VII actions, it
did not need to decide the issue of whether attorneys' fees generally have only an "an-
cillary effect" on state treasuries, Id. at 457.
"Id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring),
36 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
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Hence, Justice Stevens did not rely on the fourteenth amendment to
overcome Connecticut's eleventh amendment defense. Instead, he ini-
tially determined that the commerce clause provided an adequate
constitutional basis for congressional extension of Title VII coverage
to state and local governmental employees.38
 He then proceeded to
analyze the eleventh amendment issue on that basis. Justice Stevens
found that the back benefits requested by the employees would have
to be paid from the state's pension funds. 39 Accordingly, awarding
those damages against the state was permissible because the eleventh
amendment as interpreted in Edelman prohibited only payments from
a state treasury. 4 ° Justice Stevens would also have allowed the
employees in Fitzpatrick to recover attorneys' fees, reasoning that such
fees fell in the same category as other litigation costs. 41
 Thus,
although Justice Stevens questioned the majority's conclusion that
Title VII was appropriate legislation to enforce the provisions of the
fourteenth amendment, he ultimately agreed with the Court that the
eleventh amendment did not bar the plaintiffs from recovering back
benefits against the state. 42
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Fitzpatrick that the eleventh
amendment does not bar a plaintiff's recovery of monetary damages
against a state in a Title VII action is a sound one. Prior decisions of
the Court support the proposition that Title VII is appropriate legisla-
tion to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 43 Be-
cause the protections of Title VII are needed to secure the fourteenth
amendment rights of state and local governmental employees, it is
'" Id.
" Id. at 459-60 (Stevens, J., concurring). See note 26 supra.
4° 427 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, J., concurring).
41 Id.
"Id. at 458 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan also concurred in the judgment of the Court in Fitzpatrick. He
reiterated the position he took in Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 186 (1964) and
Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare of Mo. v. Dept of Pub. Health and
Welfare of Mo., 911 U.S. 279, 309 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting), that the eleventh
amendment by its terms precludes federal court suits against a state only by citizens of
another state. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 457 (Brennan, J., concurring). Since in Fitzpatrick
citizens of Connecticut were suing the state of Connecticut, Justice Brennan concluded
that the eleventh amendment did not itself bar the suit. Id. Justice Brennan instead
analyzed the case in terms of the applicability of the "nonconstitutional but ancient doc-
trine of sovereign immunity," id., and determined that the states surrendered that im-
munity when they ratified the Constitution at least insofar as the States granted Con-
gress specifically enumerated powers." Id. at 457-58 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan then noted that Congress had the power under both the commerce clause and
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution to enact the provisions of Title VII. Id.
at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring). Since Congress had thus passed the challenged legisla-
tion pursuant to powers specifically granted to it by the states, Justice Brennan de-
termined in Fitzpatrick that the state of Connecticut could not claim to be immune from
that Congressional action. Id. Accordingly, Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment
of the Court which applied the provisions of Title Vii to the state of Connecticut. Id.
43 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-50 (1966), discussed at notes 44-49
and 81-84 infra. See also authority cited in note 49 infra.
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submitted that Congress can constitutionally authorize private damage
suits against the states under the enforcement provisions of the four-
teenth amendment.
In the 1966 case of Katzenbach v. Morgan" the Supreme Court
established the framework for reviewing legislation passed pursuant to
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. Kaizenbach involved an action
by New York City voters seeking declaratory relief and an injunction
against enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. 45 The Voting
Rights Act provided that no person who had successfully completed
the sixth primary grade in an American school should be disqualified
from voting on the basis of an English literacy requirement, even if
English had not been the language of' instruction in the school. 46
 The
act had been passed pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 47
 The Supreme Court upheld the statute as a constitutional
exercise of congressional authority" and determined that the proper
inquiry in reviewing a congressional statute under section 5 of the
amendment is whether the act is "appropriate legislation to enforce
the Equal Protection Clause."49
Title VII is appropriate legislation to enforce the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Congress passed the 1972
amendments to Title VII to remedy the "failure of state and local
governmental agencies to accord equal employment opportunities."'"
Senator Jacob Javits stated during debate on a proposal to continue
exempting state employees from Title VII coverage that "Section 5 of
the 14th amendment, giving the power to Congress to enforce by ap-
propriate legislation the provisions of this article, ... makes it manda-
tory, not discretionary, in terms of the highest. morality, that we act
affirmatively on this aspect of this bill."'' Both the House and Senate
reports on the bill contain the same recognition that congressional ac-
" 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
45 Id. at 643-46. The relevant sections of the Voting Rights Act are Pub. L. No.
89-110, § 4(e), 79 Stat. 439 (current version at. 42 U.S.C. § 19731)(e) (1970) ).
" Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(e)(2), 70 Stat. 439.
47 1d. § 4(e)(1), 79 Stat. 439.
48 384 U.S. at 646.
4i' Id. at 649-50. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 141, 144, 150 (1970)
(opinion of Douglas, J.) (residency, literacy and age provisions of the Voting Rights
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 6, 84 Stat. 315 (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-bb (1970 & Supp. V 1975) ) are within congressional powers of § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment). Cf. Jones v.. Alfred H, Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439
(1968) (Congress has the power, see 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), under the enforcement.
provisions of the thirteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2, to eliminate all
racial barriers to the acquisition of real and personal property); South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (Congress has power under the enforcement pro-
visions of the fifteenth amendment, U.S.. CoNsT. amend. XV, §2, to fashion specific re-
medies for voting discrimination).
50
 118 CONG. REG, 1815 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams). See also 118 CONG. REC.
1816 (1972), reprinting U.S. Comm'a on Civil Rights, For All the People . . By All the
People—A Report on Equal Opportunity in Stale and Local Gov't Emp. (1969).
5 ' 118 CONG. REC. 1840 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Javits).
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Lion was needed to guarantee equal employment opportunities to state
workers." Under the circumstances, extension of Title VII to state
governmental workers is "appropriate" to enforce the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment. Accordingly, Congress can constitutionally
authorize private parties to bring Title VII damage suits against state
and local governmental employers.
Once it is established that Congress can constitutionally authorize
private Title VII suits against a state, it is necessary to determine the
standard of liability which courts should apply in such cases." Class
actions against private employers under Title VII require only a show-
ing of the discriminatory impact of the challenged employment prac-
tice." However, the Supreme Court recently determined that the
Title VII standard of liability is distinct from the constitutional stan-
dard applied in discrimination cases brought under the equal protec-
tion doctrine of the fifth" and fourteenth amendments." In Washing-
ton v. Davis," an employment discrimination case in which the plain-
tiffs brought a fifth amendment challenge to pre-employment tests
utilized by the District of Columbia police department," the Supreme
Court decided that constitutional challenges to discriminatory prac-
tices must meet a stringent standard of liability. That standard re-
quires a showing that the challenged practice has both a racially dis-
proportionate impact" and a racially discriminatory purpose.G° Thus,
the showing required to establish a constitutional claim of discrimina-
tion is greater than that required to establish a Title VII violation."
52 H. R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 17-19 (1971), reprinted in [1972]
U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2137, 2152-54; S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.,
9-11 (1971), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF *DIE SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC
WELFARE, 92D CONG., 21.) SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-
TUNITY A ci OF 1972, 418-20 (Comm. Print 1972).
53
 Apart from arguing that the eleventh amendment limited the employees' Title
VII remedies, the state in Fitzpatrick did not challenge the application to it of the sub-
stantive provisions of Title VII. See 427 U.S. at 456 T1. 1 1.
34 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426, 432 (1971).
" The due process clause of the fifth amendment does not specifically mention
equal protection. See U.S. CoNs.r. amend. V. The Supreme Court has, however, in-
terpreted the clause as containing an equal protection component. See Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
" U.S. CONST. amend. XI V, § 1.
" 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
33 Id. at 232-34. In Washington, black applicants for employment with the District
of Columbia police department sued under the fifth amendment, alleging, inter alia,
that a written personnel test excluded a disproportionate number of black applicants.
Id. at 232-33. In evaluating the claims the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit applied Title VII standards to determine the employment dis-
crimination claims and granted summary judgment for the applicants. 512 F.2d 956,
957-58 n.2, 10 FEP Cas. 105, 105-06 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court reversed
the circuit court's judgment, holding it impermissible to apply Tide VII standards to
constitutional claims. 426 U.S. at 238-39.
39 426 U.S. at 239.
62 1d. at 244-45.
"Id. at 246-48.
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Since the constitutional basis of applying Title VII to the states is the
fourteenth amendment," the issue remains as to whether the states
can be held liable under Title VII for practices which are not constitu-
tional violations, yet which are Title VII violations as established by
the less stringent statutory standards.
Lower courts have divided on the issue of whether Title VII
standards arc applicable in Title VII actions against state and local
governments. Thus, in Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Educa-
tion," the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio determined that the less stringent Title VII standards de-
termined the liability of a school board for alleged acts of employment
discrimination.° 4 In direct contrast, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama, in Scott v. City of Anniston," con-
cluded that plaintiffs in a Title VII action against a city must prove
that allegedly discriminatory acts violated the fourteenth amendment
standard of liability.°°
Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler involved suit against the local school
board by a woman who taught girls' physical education classes. The
woman alleged that her working conditions were inferior to those of
the men who taught physical education to the boys of the school."
The defendant. school board asked the court to rule that the board
would be liable only for intentional acts of discrimination." The court
refused so to rule, stating:
Citing Washington v. Davis, defendant contends that,
unless plaintiff proves intentional acts of discrimination, she
may not recover under Title VII. Nothing in the Washing-
ton case supports this proposition. Indeed, the holding of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. was reaffirmed in Washington:
"Congress directed the thrust. of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation.""
Accordingly, the Harrington court required the plaintiff to show only
discriminatory effect and not intentional discrimination in order to
establish the Title VII violation.
In Scott v. City of Anniston, the court did require the plaintiff in a
Title VII action against a city to show intentional discrimination."
Scott was a class action brought on behalf of past, present and future
black employees of the public works department of the city of Annis-
62 So authority cited in note 31 supra.
63 418 F. Supp. 603, 13 FEP Cas. 702 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
"Id, at 607, 13 FEP Cas. at 705.
63 430 F. Supp. 508, 14 FEP Cas. 1099 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
66
 Id. at 515, 14 FEP Cas. at 1103-04.
67 418 F. Supp. at 605-06, 13 FEP Gas. at 703-04. The woman claimed that the
facilities, equipment and office she used were inferior to those provided for the boys'
physical education instructors. /d.
"Id, at 607, 13 FEP Gas, at 705.
"Id. (emphasis in original).
26 430 F. Stipp. at 515, 14 FEP Gas. at 1103-04.
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ton, Alabama. 7 ' The named plaintiffs, former black employees, in-
troduced statistical evidence tending to show that the department dis-
criminated in promotions on the basis of race." The court held that
this evidence sufficiently established a prima facie Title VII case. 73
The defendant city, however, subsequently produced evidence show-
ing that the city affirmatively recruited blacks and that those re-
sponsible for promotions did not discriminate intentionally on the
basis of race." The court held that this evidence successfully rebutted
the plaintiffs' case," specifically ruling that the standard of liability
under which the court would judge the city was the standard of in-
tentional discrimination as established in Washington v. Davis:
[T]his court believes that the intent standard, i.e., that there
must be proof of discriminatory racial purpose as in Wash-
ington v. Davis, should be applied in civil rights litigation
brought under Title VII.... The Supreme Court held in
Fitzpatrick that the authority for the 1972 amendment ex-
tending Title VII to state and local governments was the
fourteenth amendment .... Therefore, it is simple logic
that a statute can be no broader than its Constitutional
base. Consequently, since the extension of Title VII to state
and local government rests upon the fourteenth amend-
ment, the statute cannot be any broader than the Constitu-
tional authority upon which it is based. It follows that in
Title VII cases against a state or local government the stat-
ute is to be construed in accordance with the Constitutional
test adopted by the Court in Washington; i.e., there must be
proof of discriminatory racial purpose. 76
Since the plaintiffs in Scott failed to produce specific evidence con-
tradicting the city's showing that it had not acted with discriminatory
intent, 77 the Scott court entered judgment in favor of the city."
Thus, the issue of the correct standard to apply in determining
the liability of state and local governments for alleged violations of
Title VII is not yet resolved. It is submitted that the proper resolution
of this issue is the one reached by the court in Harrington," viz., that a
court should apply Title VII standards in Title VII actions against
state and local governments. This result is reached through further
consideration of the Supreme Court's opinion in Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan. 8°
71 Id. at 510-11, 14 FEP Cas, at 1099.
"Id. at 512, 14 FEP Cas. at 1100-01.
"Id. at 516, 14 FEP Cas. at 1104.
' 4 1d. at 512-13, 14 FEP Cas. at 1101.
73 Id. at 516-17, 14 FEP Cas. at 1105.
"id. at 515, 14 FEP Cas. at 1103-04.
"Id. at 516-17, 14 FEP Cas. at 1105.
"M. at 517, 14 FEP Cas. at 1106.
" 418 F. Supp. at 607, 13 FEP Cas. at 705.
80 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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In Katzenbaeh v. Morgan, discussed above," the Supreme Court
determined that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment enlarges con-
gressional power." Thus, an action prohibited by Congress under sec-
tion 5 need not be prohibited by the amendment itself:
A construction of §5 that would require a judicial de-
termination that the enforcement of the state law precluded
by Congress violated the [Fourteenth] Amendment, as a
condition of sustaining the congressional enactment, would
depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and congres-
sional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It
would confine the legislative power in this context to the in-
significant role of abrogating only those state laws that the
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional,
or of merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by
particularizing the "majestic generalities" of §1 of the
Amendment."
Hence, the Court's inquiry need focus only on the propriety of the
enforcement legislation rather than on whether the prohibited con-
duct itself violates the amendment. 54 Since Title VII is appropriate
enforcement legislation, 85 the fact that a Title VII violation may not
be a violation of the fourteenth amendment should not constitution-
ally preclude application of the statutory standard in actions against
the states as employers. Accordingly, courts should follow the holding
of Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education" and apply Title
VII standards in Title VII actions against state and local govern-
ments."
The impact of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer on the application to state and
local governments of employment discrimination law also can be
analyzed in light of National League of Cities v. Usery, 88 a Supreme
Court decision rendered four days prior to Fitzpatrick which also con-
sidered Congress' authority to regulate the employment practices of
" See text at flows 44-49 supra.
62 384 U.S. at 648.
" Id. at 648-49 (footnote omitted).
"Id. at 649-50. Accord, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968)
(thirteenth amendment enforcement legislation); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 326-27 (1966) (fifteenth amendment enforcement legislation).
86 See text at notes 50-52 supra.
s° 418 F. Supp. at 607, 13 FEY Gas. at 705.
87 Since the Supreme Court's opinion in Washington v. Davis, district courts in
general have not distinguished Title VII actions against private parties from Title VII
actions against states in determing the evidence required to sustain a claim. See, e.g.,
Davis v. Weidner, 421 F. Supp. 594, 599, 14 FEP Gas. 544, 548 (F.D. Wis. 1976); King
v. New Hampshire Dep't of Resources and Economic Dev., 420 F. Supp. 1317, 1325-27,
13 FEP Gas. 1056, 1062-64 (D.N.H. 1976).
°° 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The case was a five to four decision. See generally Note,
Constitutional Law—Commerce Clause—The Reaffirmation of State Sovereignty as a Fundamen-
tal Tenet of Constitutional Federalism—National League of Cities v. Usery, 18 B.C. IND. &
Com. L. RE v. 736 (1977) for a more extensive treatment of National League of Cities.
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state and local governments. National League of Cities involved suit by
various state and local governmental interests seeking to enjoin the
Secretary of Labor from enforcing an extension to state and local
governments of the Fair Labor Standards Act's" minimum wage and
maximum hours provisions. 90 The Court, again writing through Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, held this extension unconstitutional." The Court
reasoned that the Constitution places limits on congressional authority
to interfere with state sovereignty, 92
 and it noted that employment de-
cisions of the states qua states are such an attribute of state
sovereignty." Accordingly, the Court held that "insofar as the chal-
lenged amendments [to the Fair Labor Standards Act] operate to di-
rectly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within the
authority granted Congress by [the commerce clause] Art. I, § 8, cl.
3."94
 The Court in a footnote expressly stated that it was making no
decision with respect to attempts by Congress to affect "integral oper-
ations of state governments" under other sections of the Constitution,
such as section 5 of the fourteenth amendment." The Court directly
addressed this question left open in National League of Cities when it
held in Fitzpatrick" that Congress could affect state employment de-
cisions under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. In Fitzpatrick
the Supreme Court decided that Congress had the authority to extend
the provisions of Title VII to state and local governments. The issue
remains as to whether Congress has similar power to extend to the
states other employment discrimination laws such as the Equal Pay Act
(EPA) 97 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)."
District courts during the course of the Survey year have had to
determine the constitutionality of those provisions of the EPA and the
ADEA which apply to the states.99 In Christensen v. lowa,"° for exam-
"° 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 206 (Supp. V 1975); id. § 207 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
°° 426 U.S. at 836-37, 839.
91 426 U.S. at 852.
9: Id. at 842, 845.
°' Id. at 845.
94 Id. at 852. Justice Stevens dissented in National League of Cities on the grounds
that the statute was constitutionally enacted under the commerce clause. Id. at 880-81
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (by implication). This position is consistent with that taken in his
concurrence in Fitzpatrick. See text at note 38 supra.
95
 426 U.S. at 852 n.17. The Court also mentioned that it was expressing no
opinion with respect to exercises of congressional authority under the spending power,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Id.
9° 427 U.S. at 456.
97 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The EPA provides generally that employers may not
discriminate in pay for comparable work on the basis of sex. Id. § 206 (d)(1) (1970).
98 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), The ADEA in general prohibits
discrimination on the basis of an individual's age with respect to the "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges" of the individual's employment. Id. at § 623 (a)( I) (1970).
99 See 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp V 1975) (extending the provisions of the EPA to the
states); id. § 203 (extending the provisions of the AREA to the states).
'°° 417 F. Supp. 423, 13 FEP Cas. 161 (N.D. Iowa 1976).
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pie, plaintiffs challenged the practice of the University of Northern
Iowa of paying female clerical help less money than was paid to male
employees for allegedly similar work."' Plaintiffs stated claims under
both the EPA, which is codified as part of the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and Title VII.'" The university moved to dismiss the EPA claim
on the grounds that the Supreme Court in National League of Cities
had struck down the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to the
states.'" The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Iowa, however, did not consider National League of Cities to be disposi-
tive. 104 It distinguished the case before it on the ground that dis-
crimination in pay is not the "fundamental employment decision" that
minimum wage or maximum hours is:,
It is difficult to say that the capacity of a state or its subdivi-
sion to direct that different pay be accorded for comparable
work, based solely on the sex of the worker, is a function
"essential to separate and independent existence" of the
state.... Likewise, the ability to exercise such discrimina-
tion is not, consistent with equal protection, an "attribute of
sovereignty." 105
Accordingly, the court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' Equal Pay
claim.'° 6
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Iowa in Usery v. Bettendorf Community School District" 7 reached an iden-
tical result in an action by the Secretary of Labor against the de-
fendant school district for alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act.'"
The court in Bettendorf cited Christensen with approval as a case which
had limited the National League of Cities decision to its facts. 10 " In addi-
tion to finding, as had the court in Christensen, that discrimination in
pay was not an attribute of sovereignty,'" the court in Bettendorf also
analogized to the Supreme Court's decision in Fitzpatrick.'" In Fitzpat-
rick the Supreme Court had upheld the application to the states of
Title VII. 12 The Bettendoif court then determined that the provisions
of Tide VII and the EPA were to be read together " 'since both stat-
utes serve the same fundamental purpose.
"I Id. at 424, 13 FEP Cas. at 162.
102 Id.
" 2 Id.
" 4 1d. at 424-25, 13 FEP Cas. at 162.
105 Id, at 425, 13 FEP Cas. at 163.
i"Id.
107 423 F. Supp. 637, 13 FEP Cas. 634
"8 Id, at 638, 13 FEP Gas. at 635.
H" Id, at 638.39, 13 FEP Cas. at 635.
11014,
1 " Id. at 639, 13 FEP Cas. at 636.
"2 427 U.S. at 456.
111
 423 F. Supp. at 639, 13 FEP Cas. at 636, quoting Shultz v. Wheaton Glass Co.,
421 F.2d 259, 266, 9 FEP Cas. 502, 507 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970).
""s Thus, since Title VII
(S.D. lowa 1976).
1143
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
was still applicable to the states, and since Title VII and the EPA were
to be read together, the court determined that the EPA was still
valid. 114
 Accordingly, it denied the school district's motion for sum-
mary judgment." 5
In a third action, the United States District Court for the District
of Utah determined that the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act' 1° as applied to the states survives the Supreme Court's decision in
National League of Cities. In Usery v. Board of Education of Salt Lake
City,'" the defendant school board moved for summary judgment in
an action by the Secretary of Labor to enforce the provisions of the
ADEA." 8 The court denied the motion," 9 distinguishing National
League of Cities on two grounds. First, the court noted that National
League of Cities established a balancing test for determining the con-
stitutionality of the application of federal standards to state practices.
Using this test the court determined that any interference with an in-
tegral governmental function through enforcement of the ADEA
would be minimal, particularly when balanced against the "significant
national interest" in nondiscriminatory employment practices."° The
second ground on which the court distinguished National League of
Cities lay in its determination that section 5 of the fourteenth amend-
ment was an adequate constitutional base for congressional passage of
the ADEA." Since the Supreme Court in Fitzpatrick recognized that
fourteenth amendment enforcement legislation could be applied to
the states, the court in Board of Education permitted the ADEA
through section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to be applied to the
states.'
It is submitted that the courts in Bettendorf, Christensen and Board
of Education are correct on two grounds in upholding the constitution-
ality of the EPA and the ADEA as applied to state and local govern-
ments. The first ground involves consideration of the Supreme
Court's decision in Fitzpatrick. In Fitzpatrick the Supreme Court de-
termined that employment discrimination stands on a different foot-
ing from minimum wage and maximum hours standards.'" The four-
'" 423 F. Supp. at 639, 13 FEP Cas. at 636. Accord, Usery v. Allegheny County
Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 154-56, 13 FEP Cas. 1188, 1193-94 (3d Cir. 1976); Usery v.
Dallas Independent School Dist., 421 F. Supp. 1 ll, 116 (N.D. Tex. 1976). Contra, Usery
v. Owensboro-Daviess County Hosp., 423 F. Supp. 843, 847 (W.D. Ky. 1976); Howard
v. Ward County, 418 F. Stapp. 494, 500-01, 14 FEP Cas. 548, 551 (D. N.D. 1976).
15 423 F, Supp. at 639, 13 FEP Cas. at 636.
'" 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), See note 98 supra.
"T 421 F. Supp. 718, 13 FEP Cas. 717 (D. Utah 1976).
'" Id, at 718, 13 FEP Cas. at 717. The Secretary of Labor alleged that the de-
fendant school board's selection process for filling administrative vacancies in the public
school system discriminated against three individuals on the basis of their age. Id.
19 Id. at 719, 13 FEP Cas. at 717,
"GU at 719.20, 13 FEP Cas. at 718-19.
12 ' Id, at 721, 13 FEP Cas. at 719-20.
"2 Id., 13 FE? Cas. at 720.
123 See 427 U.S. at 456.
1146
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
teenth amendment guarantees a citizen "equal protection" from state
practices and procedures. Section 5 of the amendment permits Con-
gress to pass appropriate legislation to enforce this provision. Whether
Congress specifically relied on the fourteenth amendment in passing
the ADEA or the EPA is inconsequential' 24 since both acts are sup-
ported by that amendment. 125 So long as there is a basis in the con-
stitution for the statute, it should be upheld.' 26 Thus, the ADEA and
the EPA can be adjudged constitutional under section 5 of the four-
teenth amendment even though Congress never specifically relied on
the amendment in passing the statutes.
The second ground on which the constitutionality of the EPA
and the ADEA can be upheld is the commerce clause. Despite the Su-
preme Court's decision in National League of Cities,'" Board rf Fiduca-
lion correctly recognized that the Supreme Court balanced the state
interest against the federal interest in striking down the legislation in-
1 " See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971) ("Our inquiry [with re-
spect to the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1970) need go only to identifying
a source of congressional power to reach the private conspiracy alleged by the corn-
plaint in this case.") (emphasis added). Cf. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802, 809 (1969) ("Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if
source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are
otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will he set aside only if' no grounds
can be conceived to justify them.")
125 ADEA: See Board of E,ducation, 421 F. Supp. at 721, 13 FEP Cas. at 720 (ADEA
is supported by the fourteenth amendment). Accord, Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F.
Supp. 914, 916, — FEP Cas. (D. N.D. 1977); Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp.
1238, 1241, l4 HP Cas. 362, 364 (E.D. Ark. 1976). Cf. H.R. REP. No. 93.913, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974) U.S. Cone CONG. & An. News 2811, 2849-50 (stress-
ing that discrimination based on age is comparable to discrimination based on race).
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam),
which held that compulsory retirement at age fifty from a state's police force does not
violate equal protection, id. at 312, 317, is not to the contrary. The Murgia Court de-
termined only that the compulsory retirement was not a direct violation of the fou•-
teenth amendment. Since the employee had stated no claim under the ADEA, see 427
U.S. at 310 n.2. the Court considered no issue with respect to' the ADEA as fourteenth
amendment enforcement legislation.
EPA: Usery v. Charlestown County School Dist., 558 F.2d 1169, 1170-71, —
EEP Cas. — (4th Cir. 1977). See also Christensen, 417 F. Supp. at 425, 13 HP
Cas. at 163 (discrimination between the sexes is not, consistent with equal protection, an
"attribute of sovereignty"). Cf. Bettendorf, 423 F. Supp. at 639, 13 FEP Cas. at 636, citing
Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 266, 9 FEY Cas. 502, 507 (3d Cir,), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (EPA and Title Vii provisions prohibiting discrimination in
pay should be construed hartnimiously).
12" See Usery v. Allegheny County Inst. Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155, 13 HP Cas.
1188, 1193.94 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, (1977) ("Nor do we attach any
significance to the fact that the legislative history of the Equal Pay Act does not
explicitly rely on the fourteenth amendment. In exercising the power of judicial review,
as distinguished from the duty of statutory interpretation, we are concerned with the
actual powers of the national government.") Cf: United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70
(1971) NOW course statutes should he construed whenever possible so as to uphold
their const it 01 ionality.")
12? See notes 88-95 supra and accompanying text.
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volved in National League of Cities. 128 Board of Education also recognized
that there is no legitimate state interest in employment discrimination
which can outweigh the national interest against such discrimina-
tion.' 29
 As Bettendorf and Christensen determined, such discrimination is
not the inherent governmental function that establishing wages and
hours generally was found to be in National League of Cities.'" Accord-
ingly, courts should continue to apply the discrimination provisions of
the Equal Pay Act and the ADEA to the states.
VIII. RIGHTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES: Chandler v. Roudebush—Brown
v. GSA
In 1972 Congress amended Title VII' and added a new section,
section 717,2 which extended Title VII's protections against employ-
ment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin 3 to federal employees and applicants for federal employment.
Section 717(b) grants to the Civil Service Commission primary author-
ity for enforcing the provisions of section 717. 4 Such authority in-
cludes the right to grant appropriate remedies for federal employ-
ment discrimination, such as reinstatement or hiring of employees
with or without back pay.5 Section 717(c) grants to federal employees
and applicants for employment the right to file in federal district
court a civil action alleging discrimination, after meeting certain juris-
dictional and procedural requirements' Section 7I7(d) in turn
'I" See 421 F. Supp. at 719, 13 FEP Cat. at 718, citing National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 852-53.
1Y9
 See 421 F. Supp. at 720, 13 FEP Cas. at 718.19.
Bettendorf, 423 F. Supp. at 638, 13 FEP Cas. at 635; Christensen, 417 F. Supp.
at 425, 13 FEP Cas. at 163.
• ' Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
2
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975).
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 717(b) also provides that the Civil Service Commission shall promulgate
rules and regulations, id., annually review and approve national and regional equal
employment opportunity plans, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975), review and
evaluate the operation of all agency equal employment opportunity programs, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975), and consult with and solicit recommendations
from interested groups and organizations. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)(3) (Supp, V 1975).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975). Any complainant must first seek relief
with the agency that has allegedly discriminated against him, proceeding pursuant to
rules and regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission. See 5 C.F.R. §
713.214 (1977). He must discuss the alleged discriminatory action within 30 days of the
date of that action with the agency Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor. 5 C.F.R.
§ 713.214(a)(1)(i) (1977). A complaint must then be filed with the agency within 15 days
of the date of the final interview with the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor. 5
C.F.R. § 713.214(a)(1)(ii) (1977). The agency is required to conduct an investigation of
the complaint, 5 C.F.R. § 713.216 (1977), and upon completion of the investigation, the
agency must provide an opportunity for adjustment of the complaint on an informal
basis. 5 C.F.R. § 713.217(a) (1977). If no such adjustment is reached, the employee may,
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specifies that those provisions of Title VII which deal with private sec-
tor civil actions shall, "as applicable," govern civil actions brought pur-
suant to section 717(c). 7
During the Survey year the Supreme Court answered two impor-
tant questions relating to federal employees' rights under Title VII. In
Chandler v. Roudebush, 8 the Court determined that section 717 gives
federal employees and applicants rot-federal employment the right to
a trial de novo of employment discrimination claims.° Then in Brown
v. GSA," delivered the same day as Chandler, the Court decided that
section 717 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of dis-
crimination in federal employment." Although both of these cases
resolved important issues under section 717, they show no consistent
line of reasoning in their approach to the scope of federal employees'
rights.
A. Chandler v. Raudebush
In Chandler, the plaintiff, Jewell Chandler, was a black employee
of the Veterans Administration." After being denied a promotion in
1972, she pursued administratively a claim of employment discrimina-
tion." Having appealed her claim through the Civil Service Cotnmis-
sion Board of Appeals and Review without achieving a satisfactory re-
sult, she filed a timely suit alleging employment discrimination against
the Veterans Administration under section 717(c) of Title VII in
United States District Court for the Central District of California."
She then initiated discovery proceedings which were challenged on
the ground that section 717(c) limits judicial action to a review of the
administrative record only." The district court adopted the ruling of
within 15 days, request a decision by the agency head. 5 C.F.R. 713.217(b) (1977). If
the employee desires, he may request a hearing before a complaints examiner prior to
the decision by the agency head. Id. Following the decision of the agency head, the
complainant has two options. First, he may, within 15 days, appeal the decision to the
Civil Service Commission, 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.23.1,.233 (1977), and, if unable to achieve a
satisfactory decision from the Civil Service Commission, he may, within 30 days of such
decision, file a civil action in a federal district' court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1970 and
Supp. V 1975). Alternatively, the complainant may decide not to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, and may within 30 days of notice of final agency action, file a civil
action in federal district court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975). It should be
noted that section 717 also provides that if after 180 days of the filing of the complaint
or appeal, the agency or Civil Service Comtnission has failed to take final action, the
complainant may file a civil action in a federal district court. 42 U.S.C, § 2000e-16(c)
(Supp. V 1975).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. V 1975).
" 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
9 Id. at 864.
i° 425 U.S. 820 (1976).
"Id at 835.
" 425 U.S. at 841.
"Id, at 841-42.
" 7 FEP Cas. 266 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
" 425 U.S. at 842.
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the District Court for the District of Columbia in Hackley v. Johnson"
that a "trial de novo is not required [under section 717(c)] in all cases"
and that a review of the administrative record will suffice if "an ab-
sence of discrimination is affirmatively established by the clear weight
of the evidence in the record ...."" Applying this threshold test, the
district court in Chandler concluded that the administrative record be-
fore it clearly established an absence of discrimination." Accordingly,
the district court held itself limited to review of the administrative re-
cord, and upon such review granted a motion for summary judgment
against Chandler." On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court as to the limited scope
of review required under section 717(c) and therefore affirmed the
judgment.2 °
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously re-
versed the circuit court, holding that section 717(c) accords "a federal
employee the same right to a trial de novo as private-sector employees
enjoy under Title VII."2 ' The Court based its opinion both on the
specific wording of section 717 and on the section's legislative history.
As an initial step, the Court undertook a careful reading of the sec-
tion,22 noting that section 717(d) states that "[t]he provisions of [sec-
tions 706(1)-(k)], as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought here-
under."23 Sections 706(f)-(k), the Court pointed out, govern private
actions brought under Title VII. 24
 The Court then noted that it had
previously held that section 706 gives private employees the right to a
trial de novo.25 "[S]yllogistically," the Court concluded, section 717
seemingly extended the same right to federal employees." However,
since the lower courts in Chandler had relied on Hackley v. Johnson to
arrive at a different analysis of section 717, the Court proceeded to
examine that case.
" 360 F. Supp. 1247, 6 FEP Cas. 79 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Hackley v.
Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 113, 11 FEP Cas. 487, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
" 360 F. Supp. at 1252, 6 FEP Cas. at 83.
" 7 FEP Cas. at 267.
"Id.
2° 515 F.2d 251, 255, 10 FEP Cas. 689, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1975).
21 425 U.S. at 864. The Court thus resolved a conflict which had developed
among the circuits. Four courts of appeals had held that § 717(c) gave federal
employees the right to a trial de novo in the district court. Abrams v. Johnson, 534 F.2d
1226, 1227, 12 FEP Cas. 1293, 1294 (6th Cir. 1976); Caro v. Schultz, 521 F.2d 1084,
1087, 11 FEP Cas. 327, 329 (7th Cir. 1975); Hackley v, Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 117,
II FEP Cas. 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Sperling v. United States, 515 F.2d 465, 481, 10
FEP Cas. 654, 667 (3d Cir. 1975). Three other courts of appeals, on the other hand,
had held that 717(c) did not give federal employees such a right. Haire v. Calloway,
526 F.2d 246, 249, 11 FEP Cas. 769, 772 (8th Cir. 1975); Chandler v. Johnson, 515
F.2d 251, 255, 10 FEP Cas. 689, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1975); Salone v. United States, 511
F.2d 902, 904, 10 FEY Gas. 1,2 (10th Cir. 1975).
2" 425 U.S. at 843-44.
25 Id. at 844, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
24 425 U.S. at 844. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(0(1) (Supp. V 1975).
25 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974).
26 425 U.S. at 846.
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The Court noted that the district court in Hackley had reasoned
that the qualification as applicable" in section 717(d) indicated that
Congress did not intend to grant federal employees all the rights en-
joyed by private sector employees, :and had thereby limited what
otherwise would be a federal employee's right to a trial de novo."
The Supreme Court, however, read the phrase "as applicable" in a
completely different manner. The Court reasoned that this language
refers to those portions of section 706 which could "have no possible
relevance to judicial proceedings involving federal employees." 28 As
an example the Court cited the provision of section 706 (f) (1) which
authorize suits and permissive intervention by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the Attorney General." The
Court noted that these provisions could not possibly be applicable to a
federal employee's civil action, 3° since under section 717(c), the ag-
grieved federal employee or applicant is the only one who can in-
stitute a civil action. The Court therefore determined that the in-
applicability to federal employment discrimination of the provisions of
section 706 related to the enforcement responsibilities of the EEOC
and the Attorney General is "[title most natural reading of the phrase
as applicable' As a result, the Court decided that the district
court in Hackley had misinterpreted this phrase. 32 Consequently, the
Court concluded that the "as applicable" language of section 717(d)
does not limit the apparent meaning of section 717 that federal
employees enjoy the same right to a trial de novo as do private
employees. 33
The Court then analyzed extensively the legislative history of the
1972 Amendments." The Court found nothing in the legislative his-
27 Id., thing 360 F. Supp. at 1252 & n.9, 6 FEP Cas. at 82 & n.9.
29 425 U.S. at 846.
29 42 U.S,C. § 2000e-5(1)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
"425 U.S. at 846-47.
3 ' Id, at 847,
32 1d. at 847-48.
33 Id. at 848.
" Id. at 848-61. The Court noted initially that two basic themes dominated the
legislative history. The first was the ineffectiveness of the individually instituted and
maintained trial de novo by private employees in enforcing Title VII. Id. at 848-49. The
second concerned federal employees and their lack of safeguards against employment
discrimination and included the congressional perception noted in Brown v. GSA that
federal employees lacked judicial remedies for such discrimination. Id. at 849 & n.9. See
text at notes 60-62 infra.
The Court followed the legislative history from the original hills reported in 1971
by the House Committee on Education and Labor and the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare to the final bill approved in 1972 by both houses of Congress. The
Court pointed out that both the original committee bills proposed to give the EEOC
power to issue cease-and-desist orders in the private sector while maintaining the pri-
vate employees' right to a trial de novo in specified instances. Id. at 850. Debate in the
committees had focused on whether the EEOC should have cease-and-desist powers
subject only to review by the federal courts of appeals on a substantial-evidence basis or
whether the EEOC should only have the power to institute trial de novo suits in federal
district courts on behalf of private employees. Id. at 850. The Court in Chandler em-
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tory to support the theory, espoused in Hachley and adopted by the
Ninth Circuit in Chandler, that federal sector civil actions would re-
phasized that with this debate as a backdrop, both committees included provisions in
their bills allowing federal employees to file civil actions in federal district courts. These
provisions, the Court noted, referred not to the sections of the bills which provided for
substantial-evidence review of EEOC cease-and-desist orders, but rather to the sections
of the bills which retained the private employees right to a trial de novo in certain in-
stances. Id. at 852-53. On this basis the Chandler Court concluded that both committees
after "a thorough and meticulous consideration of the question whether an administra-
tive agency or a court should be given primary adjudicative responsibility for particular
categories of Title VII complaints" decided that the federal employees should be
granted "the right to plenary trials in the federal district courts." Id. at 853-54.
The House committee bill was amended on the floor to allow the EEOC to in-
stitute private sector civil actions but the amendments denied the EEOC cease-and-
desist powers. This denial was based on the fear that granting primary adjudicative au-
thority over private employees' Title VII complaints to the EEOC, which was also re-
sponsible for prosecuting such complaints would bias the agency's adjudications. H.R.
1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., § 3(e) (1971). See, e.g., 117 CONG. REC. 31958-59 (1971) (re-
marks of Rep. Martin); id. at 31968, 32092 (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn); id. at 32106
(remarks of Rep. Broomfield); id. at 32107-08 (remarks of Rep. Shoup); id. at 32109-10
(remarks of Rep. Fisher). Significantly, the amendments in the House also deleted the
extension of Title VII to federal employees. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
The Senate Committee bill encountered opposition on the floor similar to that
encountered by the House Committee bill. Senator Dominick, who had dissented from
the Senate Committee bill's provision granting the EEOC cease-and-desist power, in-
troduced an amendment which would replace this aspect of the committee bill with a
provision allowing the EEOC the right to institute de novo proceedings in federal dis-
trict courts on behalf of private-sector employees. 118 CONG. REC. 591-92 (1972).
Senator Dominick argued that private-sector and federal-sector employees should be
treated equally and he noted:
[T]hat one of the first things we have to do is at least to put employees
holding their jobs, be they government or private employees, on the same
plane so that they have the same rights, so that they have the same oppor-
tunities, and so that they have the same equality within their jobs, to make
sure that they are not being discriminated against and have the enforce-
ment, investigatory procedure carried out the same way.
Id. at 594 (remarks of Sen. Dominick). Senator Dominick noted that the committee bill
already provided that federal employees were entitled to plenary adjudication of their
claims in federal district court and hence private employees should be treated similarly.
Id. at 595, 942, 943, 3389, 3809, 3967.
Senator Dominick's amendment was adopted, id. at 3979-80, and the committee
bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate. Id. at 4944. Since the House bill differed
from the Senate's amended bill in that its coverage did not extend to federal employees,
the two bills went to a conference committee which adopted the Senate bill's provision
covering federal employees. S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-681, pp. 1, 10-11, 20-21 (1972) re-
printed in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2137, 2167. This conference bill was
passed by both the House and the Senate. Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
The Court after examining this complete legislative history pointed out that the
legislative history behind the Senate bill was the most relevant to its consideration in
Chandler since it was that bill's coverage of federal employees which was adopted by the
conference committee and passed by Congress. 425 U.S. at 858. In that regard, the
Court noted, Senator Dominick's emphasis on equal rights for both federal sector and
private sector employees and his use of the federal sector de novo procedure as a
model were historically significant. Id. Hence the Court determined that the legislative
history indicated a congressional intent to accord the right to a trial de novo to both
federal sector and private sector employees. Id.
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ceive de novo consideration in some instances, but only record review
in others. 35 Rather, the Court determined that
the options which Congress 'considered were entirely
straightforward. It faced a choice between record review of
agency action based on traditional appellate standards and
trial de novo of Title VII claims. The Senate committee
selected trial de novo as the proper means for resolving the
claims of federal employees. The Senate broadened the cat-
egory of claims entitled to trial de novo to include those of
private-sector employees, and the Senate's decision to treat
private- and federal-sector employees alike in this respect
was ratified by the Congress as a:whole."
The Court focused much of its discusion of the legislative history on
this perceived desire of Congress to treat federal sector employees
and private sector employees alike." From this congressional intent,
the Court logically concluded that federal employees should have the
same right to a trial de novo as that enjoyed by private employees."
38 Id. at 861,
38 Id.
37 See note 64 supra.
38 425 U.S. at 861. The Court did note in a footnote that several statements made
in the floor debate by both Senator Williams and Senator Cranston did not support the
Court's conclusion that Congress intended to treat federal employees and private
employees equally. Senator Williams had said:
Finally, written expressly into the law is a provision enabling an aggrieved
Federal employee to file an action in U.S District Court for a review of the
administrative proceeding record after a final order by his agency or by the
Civil Service Commission, if he is dissatisfied with that decision.... There
is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same private right
of action enjoyed by individuals in the private sector, and I believe that the
committee has acted wisely in this regard.
118 CONG. REC. 4922 (1972) (emphasis added). The Court refused to give this statement
"controlling weight" even though Senator Williams had been a sponsor and floor man-
ager of the Senate Bill. The Court cited three reasons for its refusal. 425 U.S. at 858
n.36. First, the Court noted that Senator Williams' statement was self-contradictory in
that it called for "a review of the administrative proceeding record," but at the same
time stated "Where is no reason why a Federal employee should not have the same pri-
vate right of action enjoyed by individuals in the private sector .. ." Since by the pro-
visions of the pending Senate bill private employees were entitled to a trial de novo, the
Court pointed out that Senator Williams' statement was internally inconsistent. Id. Sec-
ond, the Court noted that the Senate committee had proposed the federal sector provi-
sion which was before the Senate and had clearly chosen to allow federal employees the
right to a trial de novo. See note 64 supra. As such, the Court declared that "Mlle
committee's unambiguous and unaltered treatment of federal-sector 'civil actions' is
more probative of congressional intent than the casual remark of a single Senator in the
floor debate." 425 U.S. at 858 n.36. Finally, the Court refused to give Senator Williams'
statement controlling weight because Senator Williams had himself earlier acknowl-
edged that Senator Dominick was "[t]he principal architect of .. • changes dealing with
the civil service area ...." 118 CONG. REC. 595 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams). The
Court pointed out that this statement was made immediately after Senator Dominick
had discussed the committee's decision allowing federal employees the right to bring
"civil actions" in federal district court rather than restricting them to administrative ad-
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The Court ended its discussion in Chandler by noting that the
"clear expression of congressional intent" behind section 717 over-
came both the general proposition advanced in earlier decisions by the
Court that de novo review is generally not to be presumed, 39 and also
the contention that administrative disposition of federal employment
discrimination complaints would furnish an adequate basis for record
review. 40 Though the Court recognized that "routine trials de nova in
the federal courts [could] ultimately ... defeat, rather than ... ad-
vance the basic purposes of the statutory scheme,"41 it felt that this
issue was best left for future congressional action. For the present, the
Court thought it better not to "disturb" the clear intent of Congress.'"
Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
and held that section 717(c) grants federal employees and applicants
for federal employment the right to a trial de novo of employment dis-
crimination claims.'"
It is submitted that the Court's decision in Chandler is sound, and
is clearly supported by the legislative history of the 1972 amendments
to Title VII. This legislative history, as the Chandler Court correctly
reasoned, indicates that Congress intended federal sector and private
sector employees to enjoy parallel rights in remedying employment dis-
judication of their complaints with substantial evidence review by the courts. 425 U.S. at
858 n.36; see 118 CONG. REC. 594 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Dominick). Thus, the Court
refused to give Senator Williams' statement "controlling weight." 425 U.S. at 858 n.36.
The Court also dismissed a statement made by Senator Cranston near the end of
the floor debate. As noted by the Court, Senator Cranston's remarks were reported in
the daily edition of the Congressional Record to the effect that discrimination suits
brought by federal employees would be based, as were all suits brought under Title
VII, on the agency and/or Civil Service Commission record and would not be a trial de
novo. 425 U.S. at 858 n.36, 860. The Court pointed out that approximately one year
later and ten months after the 1972 amendments had been enacted, Senator Cranston
informed the Senate that his statement had been incorrectly reported and the word
"not" was misplaced. Id. Accordingly the language was corrected, and as corrected,
read: "review would not be based on the agency and/or CSC record and would be a trial
de novo." See 118 CONG. REC. 4929 (1972) (emphasis added). Although the Court con-
ceded that the correction was not probative, it also refused to hold that the uncorrected
version was itself probative. 425 U.S. at 858 n.36, 860. In fact, the Court stated that
Senator Cranston's uncorrected statement, like that of Senator Williams, was self-
contradictory in that it equated the rights of federal sector and private sector employees
and then concluded that a federal sector suit was "not ... a trial de novo." Id., quoting
118 CONG. REC. S. 2287 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972). As the Court noted, "the private-sector
suit was to be a trial de novo." 425 U.S. at 858 n.36, 860 (emphasis in original). Hence,
Senator Cranston's uncorrected statement was contradictory and could not stand even
on its own merits. As a final point, the Court chose again to emphasize the fact that the
Senate committee had elected to equate federal sector civil actions with private sector
trials de novo and as such the committee's decision was "more probative of congres-
sional intent than a fleeting remark in the floor debate." Id. Thus, the Court refused to
give probative weight either to Senator Cranston's or Senator Williams's statement. Id.
39 Id. at 861, citing Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U.S. 607, 619
n.17 (1966).
40
 425 U.S. at 863.
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crimination.44
 As such, the Court correctly determined that federal
employees should have the same right to a trial de novo as do private
employees under Title VII.
B. Brown v. GSA
Clarence Brown was a black man employed by the General Ser-
vices Administration (GSA)." After failing to receive a promotion,
Brown filed an administrative complaint with the GSA Equal
Employment Opportunity Office alleging that racial discrimination
had affected the promotion decision." When Brown was informed by
the GSA Regional Administrator that an investigation had revealed no
evidence of racial discrimination, he. requested a hearing before a
complaints examiner of the Civil Service Commission." The examiner
also found no evidence of racial discrimination, and soon thereafter
the GSA rendered its final decision that no considerations of race had
entered the promotional process. 4 " Brown was notified of this conclu-
sion by letter and was informed that he could either carry the ad-
ministrative process further by lodging an appeal with the Board of
Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission or he could in-
itiate judicial review by filing suit in federal district court within thirty
days. 45
Forty-two days later, Brown filed suit in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York seeking review of
his discrimination claim. 5° Brown alleged that the court had jurisdic-
tion under Title VII," under general federal question jurisdiction, 52
under the Declaratory Judgment Act," and under 42 U.S.C. section
" See text and notes 34-38 supra.
45 425 U.S. at 822. Brown was classified in grade GS-7 and twice had been denied
promotion to a GS-9 position, first in December 1970 and subsequently in June 1971.
Id. Each time Brown had been one of three people recommended fur the promotion
but in both instances a white applicant was chosen. Id.
"Id. Following his first denial of promotion, Brown had filed a complaint with
the GSA Equal Employment Opportunity Office alleging racial discrimination, but had
withdrawn the complaint when informed that another GS-9 position would be available
in the near future. Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 822-23.
" Id.
'° 8 FEP Gas. 1298 (S.D,N,Y. 1973). It is clear that up to this point Brown had
properly satisfied the jurisdictional and procedural requirements set forth in the rules
and regulations promulgated by the Civil Service Commission and in the provisions of
section 717(c). See note 6 supra. He pursued his complaint within the agency and upon
final agency action elected not to appeal to the Civil Service Commission but rather to
file suit directly in federal district court pursuant to section 717(c). What Brown failed
to do, however, was to file suit within 30 days as is definitively required by section
717(c). 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975).
51
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970 and Supp. V 1975).
52 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
" 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
1)55
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
l981.54 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 55 The court reasoned that since Brown had not
filed suit within thirty clays of final agency action as required by sec-
tion 717(c), the government had not consented to suit and since the
doctrine of sovereign immunity bars recovery against the government
without such consent, Brown's claims were thereby barred." On ap-
peal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit af-
firmed the judgment of dismissal, holding that section 717 provides
"the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employee discrimination
grievances." 57 -
The Supreme Court in Brown upheld this judgment," relying
heavily on the legislative history of the 1972 amendments which ex-
tended Title Vil's coverage to federal employees and applicants for
federal employment. Noting first that nothing in section 717 itself
speaks to its intended "position in the constellation of antidiscrimina-
tion law,"59 the Court proceeded to examine the complete legislative
history to ascertain the intent of Congress. From this examination, the
Court determined that the congressional perception of the state of the
law prior to the adoption of section 717 was that "federal employees
who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy."'"
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
35
 8 FEP Cas. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
as
57 507 F.2d 1300, 1306, 8 FEP Cas. 1299, 1303 (2d Cir. 1974). The court of ap-
peals emphasized the fact that statutes such as section 717 which waive sovereign im-
munity must be strictly construed. As a result, since Brown had not met the section
717(c) requirement of filing suit within 30 days of final agency action, his suit had to be
dismissed. Id. at 1307, 8 FEP Cas. at 1304.
The court of appeals also ruled that section 717 operates retroactively and is
available to any employee whose administrative complaint was pending at the time that
section 717 became effective on March 24, 1972. Id. at 1306, 8 FEP Cas. at 1303. This
aspect of the decision was presumably not appealed to the Supreme Court since the
Court noted in a footnote that "Mlle parties have apparently acquiesced in this holding
. and we have no occasion to disturb it." 425 U.S. at 824 n.4. The court of appeals
also ruled that even if section 717 did not preempt other remedies, Brown improperly
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies and his claim would fail on that basis. 507
F.2d at 1307, 8 FEP Cas. at 1304. The court noted that even though Brown obtained a
final agency decision, he did not appeal the decision to the Board of Appeals and Re-
view of the Civil Service Commission as is provided for in 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.231-.234
(1977). See note 6 supra. Since appeal to that board might have resulted in Brown's at-
taining the relief he sought, the court of appeals concluded that Brown had "in-
excusably failed to exhaust available administrative remedies." 507 F.2d at 1308, 8 FEP
Cas. at 1305. Since the Supreme Court held that section 717 preempted all other judi-
cial remedies, it did not need to reach the issue of exhaustion of remedies. See 425 U.S.
at 835.
68 The court decided Brown by a 6-2 majority. Mr. Justice Stewart authored the
opinion. Mr. Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
59 425 U.S. at 825.
"Id. at 828. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1971); S.
REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971); 118 COG. REC. 4929 (remarks of Sen.
Cranston) (1972). Equal Employment Opportunities Enforcement Act of 1971: Hearings on
5.25I5 el al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Cominittee on Labor and Public
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The Court went on to state that this congressional perception,
whether correct or incorrect, was controlling in determining the legis-
lative intent behind the 1972 amendments." This perception in-
dicated to the Court that Congress was attempting to create "an exclu-
sive, pre-emptive administrative and judicial scheme for the redress of
Federal employment discrimination."" The Court found additional
support for this conclusion in "[t]he balance, completeness, and struc-
tural integrity of [section] 717."" The Court explained that section
'/17 both establishes a comprehensive administrative system in which
the Civil Service Commission has full authority to enforce its pro-
visions, 64 and also provides an aggrieved employee with the right to
file a civil action in federal district court." 5 These complementary ad-
ministrative and judicial powers of enforcement, the Court reasoned,
could only be seen as evidence of a congressional intention to provide
an exclusive remedy for federal employees." The Court pointed out
that if other remedies were to be left available to federal employees,
"[section] 717, with its rigorous administrative exhaustion re-
quirements and time limitations, would be driven out of currency"
simply by the use of artful pleading."
The Court in Brown concluded its discussion by invoking the
canon of construction that "a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-
empts more general remedies."" Since section 717 was such "a pre-
cisely drawn, detailed statute," while other statutes under which
Brown had filed suit were "more general remedies,""" the Court
applied this canon to the situation in Brown. This application further
supported the Court's conclusion that section 717 "provides the exclu-
sive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employ-
ment."'" Since Brown had failed to file his complaint within the
thirty-day period allowed by section 717 (c), the Court held that the
case had been properly dismissed and therefore affirmed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals."
Mr. Justice Stevens, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, dissented in
Brown, reasoning that Congress intended the 1972 amendments to
Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 296 (1971); Equal Employment Opportunity Enbrcement Proce-
dun's: Hearings on H.R. 1746 before the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee
on Education and Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 391-92 (1971).
61 425 U.S. at 828.
" Id. at 829.
" Id. at 832.
"See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. V 1975).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1975),
" 425 U.S. at 832-33.
" Id. at 833.
"Id. at 834. The Court relied on Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973);
United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495
(1959); Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952). See text at notes 95-104 infra.
"See text and notes 51-54 supra.
"425 U.S. at 835.
"Id.
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allow federal employees enjoyment of the same rights as private
employees in remedying employment discrimination claims. 72 The dis-
sent relied on the Court's statement in Chandler v. Roudebush" that the
history of the 1972 amendments indicated Congress was attempting to
accord " Ialggrieved [federal] employees or applicants ... the full
rights available in the courts as are granted to individuals in the pri-
vate sector under Title VII: "74
 Since it was well established that pri-
vate employees have a choice of remedies and are not limited exclu-
sively to Title VI1, 75
 the dissent argued that federal employees should
have parallel rights."
It is submitted that the position advanced by the dissent in Brown
is a sound one. The majority based its conclusion that section 717
provides the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment dis-
crimination on three grounds: first, the legislative history of the 1972
amendments which indicated a congressional perception that there
was no available judicial remedy for federal employment discrimina-
tion prior to 1972;" second, "[t]he balance, completeness, and struc-
tural integrity of [section] 717;" 78
 and third, the applicability of the
canon of construction that "a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-
empts more general remedies." 79
 None of these grounds, however, is
persuasive.
The first ground upon which the Brown majority based its hold-
ing was that the legislative history indicated a congressional perception
that there was no available remedy for federal employment dis-
crimination prior to 1972. This congressional perception, whether or
not accurate, led the majority to conclude that Congress intended to
create the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employees by adopting
section 717." This progression from the congressional perception of
the underlying wrong to the legislative intent with regard to the rem-
edy adopted, however, is difficult to justify logically. Simply because
Congress thought when it enacted section 717 that no other remedy
for federal employment discrimination existed, it does not follow a
fortiori that Congress intended to create an exclusive remedy. Congress
could have assured the exclusivity of the section 717 remedy simply by
writing such language into the section. It did not do so. Taken alone,
the congressional perception that no remedies existed for the resolu-
tion of federal employment discrimination grievances does not in-
dicate a congressional intent to create an exclusive remedy. In the ab-
"Id. at 836.39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" 425 U.S. 840 (1976). See text at notes 12-44 supra.
74
 425 U.S. at 841, quoting S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1971).
"See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974).
7a




"° Id. at 829.
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sence of explicit congressional intent, the proper role for the Court in
construing the statute was not to presume this intent, but rather, as
Justice Stevens noted in dissent, "simply [to] read the statute as Con-
gress wrote it."" Such a reading of section 717 would have led to the
conclusion that Congress was creating a remedy for employment griev-
ances, but not necessarily an exclusive one.
The second factor upon which the majority based its determina-
tion that section 717 was the exclusive judicial remedy for federal
employment discrimination was "the balance, completeness, and struc-
tural integrity of [section] 717." 82 This structural analysis, however,
does not justify the majority's holding in Brown. Although the system
created by section 717, with its blend of administrative and judicial
enforcement powers is an extensive one, the sections of Title VII gov-
erning private employees are comparably exlensive. 83 These sections
require numerous administrative preconditions" and, although they
do not grant administrative enforcement powers comparable to those
granted to the Civil Service Commission under section 717(b), 85 they
do call for the extensive involvement of both the EEOC and the At-
torney General."" The comprehensiveness of these sections relating to
private employees was not viewed by the Court in Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc." as an obstacle to permitting private employees to
"' Id. at 839 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"'Id. at 832.
"See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). These sections governing
private employees provide that if the state in which the alleged discrimination took
place has a state law prohibiting the challenged practice and authorizing a state agency
to grant relief, then the employee must initially file his complaint with the state. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975). If the issue is not resolved within 60 days, or within
120 days if the state law is in its first year, id., then the employee may file a charge with
the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged violation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V
1975). Absent any applicable state law, the employee must file a charge with the EEOC
within 180 days of the alleged violation. Id. Within ten clays of receiving a complaint,
the EEOC must notify the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). The
EEOC then investigates the charge. id. If the EEOC determines there is not reasonable
cause to believe the charge is true, then it must dismiss the charge and promptly notify
all parties. Id. If the investigation reveals there is reasonable cause to believe the charge
is true, then the EEOC must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice through
informal "conference, conciliation, and persuasion." ld. if a conciliation agreement is
not secured within 30 days of the filing of the charge, the EEOC, or the Attorney Gen-
eral if the charged party is a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision,
may bring a civil action against the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
IF after investigation of the charge the EEOC either finds no reasonable cause to believe
the charge or finds reasonable cause but Fails to secure a conciliation agreement or to
bring suit, then the employee must be so notified. Id. The employee may then file a
civil action in federal district court within 90 days of the receipt of such notice. Id. An
employee may also request and receive such notice of his right to sue any time after 180
days of the filing of his charge, if at the time the employee requests the notice the
EEOC has not settled the complaint to his satisfaction. Id.
"See note 83 supra.
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (Supp. V 1975).
" See note 83 supra.
87 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
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seek remedies independent of Title VII. The Johnson Court, holding
that Title VII did not preempt other private employment discrimina-
tion remedies," stated that "[d]espite Title V1I's range and its design
as a comprehensive solution for the problem of invidious discrimina-
tion in employment, the aggrieved individual clearly is not deprived
of other remedies he possesses and is not limited to Title VII in his
search for relief." 89
 The Court in Brown distinguished its holding in
Johnson on two grounds. First, the Court pointed out that Johnson had
not involved any problems of sovereign immunity, since in Johnson the
government was not a defendant, as it was in Brown. 9° Second, and
more important to the Court, was the fact that Johnson had relied on
the legislative history of Title VII as it was originally enacted in 1964.
That history, the Court stated, in direct contrast to the legislative his-
tory of the 1972 amendments, evinced a "'congressional intent to
allow an individual to pursue independently his rights under both
Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes.'"91
 Thus, the
Brown Court concluded that Johnson was distinguishable since the legis-
lative history relied on in Johnson differed markedly from the legisla-
tive history relied on in Brown. 92
It is submitted, however, that the Court's position that the legis-
lative histories of the 1964 Act and the 1972 amendments are dif-
ferent is not tenable in light of the Court's decision in Chandler. In
Chandler, the Court established conclusively that the legislative history
of the 1972 amendments indicated that Congress intended federal
employees to have available the same rights to remedy employment
discrimination as were available to private employees. 93
 As a result,
the reasoning which dictated the decision in Johnson should have gov-
erned in Brown, for, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent, "[t]here is no
evidence, either in the statute itself or in its history, that Congress in-
tended the 1972 Amendment to be construed differently from the
basic statute."94
 Thus, the Court's use of its structural analysis of sec-
tion 717 to support its determination that section 717 is the exclusive
judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination grievances was
unwarranted.
nll Id. at 459.
89 Id.
90
 425 U.S. at 833.
"' Id., quoting Johnson, 421 U.S. at 459, quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,
415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974).
92 425 U.S. at 834.
93 425 U.S. at 858. See note 34 supra.
94 /d. at 837 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It should be noted that Justice Stevens' logic
also counters the majority's contention that It would require the suspension of dis-
belief to ascribe to Congress the design to allow its careful and thorough remedial
scheme to be circumvented by artful pleading." Id. at 833. 8y allowing federal
employees and applicants for employment to pursue other remedies besides section
717, the congressional "scheme" in section 717 would be circumvented not by "artful
pleading," but rather, as in private cases, by the exercise of additional available rights.
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The final basis upon which the majority rested its holding in
Brown was the canon of construction that "a precisely drawn, detailed
statute pre-empts more general remedies." 99 In support of this princi-
ple, the majority cited one case involving a habeas corpus action" and
several cases involving attempts by injured federal employees to pro-
ceed under facially applicable tort recovery statutes." The habeas
corpus action, Preiser v. Rodriquez," involved a state prisoner who, in
challenging his loss of good-behavior-time credits, attempted to pro-
ceed under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 99 rather than under the federal
habeas corpus statute which provided a specific federal remedy but
first required exhaustion of state remedies.'" In holding that the
federal habeas corpus statute provided the exclusive means of relief,
the Preiser Court stated that:
Nile rule of exhaustion in federal habeas corpus actions is
rooted in considerations of federal-state comity... It is
difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a
stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up
with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the ad-
ministration of its prisons.... Since these internal problems
of state prisons involve issues so peculiarly within state au-
thority and expertise, the States have an important interest
in not being bypassed in the correction of these prob-
lems."'
Accordingly, the Preiser Court ruled that the federal habeas corpus
statute preempted section 1983, but it was primarily the interest in
federal-state comity upon which preemption was based in Preiser,
rather than the displacement of a general remedy by a detailed one.
In the other cited cases, the Court had held that specific com-
pensation statutes preempted more general tort recovery statutes.' 02
In those cases, however, the preemption of the more general tort re-
covery statutes by specific compensation statutes was based on the
Court's admitted recognition of an "historic truth"'" that "compensa-
95 Id. at 834.
96
 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
" 7 United States v. Deinko, 385 U.S. 149. (1966) (the compensation system in 18
U.S.C. § 4120 (1970) preempts the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671
et seq. (1970); Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959) (Federal Employees'
Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742 et seq., 5 U.S.C. § 751 et seq., (1970), preempts Admi-
ralty Act, 41 Stat, 525 et seq., 46 U.S.C. § 741 et seq. (1970); Johansen v. United States,
343 U.S. 495 (1959) (Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 742 et seq., 5
U.S.C. § 751 et seq. (1970), preempts Public VeSsels Act, 43 Stat. 1112, 46 U.S.C. § 781
et seq. (1970) ).
"" 411 U.S. 475, 476.77 (1973).
"" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
100 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
101 411 U.S. at 491-92.
102 See note 97 supra.
' 1" United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966).
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don laws are practically always thought of as substitutes for, not sup-
plements to, common-law tort actions."'" Thus in those cases, just as
in Preiser, preemption was not primarily based on the canon of con-
struction that general remedies are preempted by precisely drawn, de-
tailed statutes. Consequently, all of the cases which the Court cited in
support of its principle that a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-
empts more general remedies are distinguishable from Brown, and do
not require application of the principle in that case.
It is submitted, therefore, that a proper reading of section 717
and its legislative history supports the dissent's view that federal sector
and private sector employees were intended to enjoy parallel rights to
redress employment discrimination grievances, and that accordingly
federal employees should have a choice of remedies for such griev-
ances not limited to Title VII. Nevertheless, the Court's decision in
Brown unequivocally holds that section 717 of Title VII is the exclu-
sive remedy available to federal employees for the redress of employ-
ment discrimination.
In both Chandler and Brown the Court resolved important issues
under section 717 of Title VII concerning adjudication of federal
employment discrimination grievances. Yet, the theoretical un-
derpinnings of these decisions are seemingly at variance. In Brown,
the Court held section 717 to be the exclusive judicial remedy for
claims of discrimination in federal employment, while in Chandler it
held section 717 to entitle federal employees and applicants for fed-
eral employment to a trial de novo of such claims. Thus, although the
Court conclusively established in Chandler that Congress intended sec-
tion 717 to accord federal and private sector employees parallel rem-
edies for employment discrimination claims, the Court ignored this
intent in Brown. Consequently, in Brown the Court refused to allow
federal sector employees access to the remedies other than Title VII
which are available to private sector employees. In Chandler, however,
the Court did accord federal sector employees the same right to a trial
de novo enjoyed by private sector employees. Brown thus manifests a
restrictive view of the scope of the rights of federal employees and
applicants for employment under section 717, and Chandler an expan-
sive view.
In practice, these divergent opinions can be viewed together as a
compromise of sorts. Under this compromise, although federal
employees and applicants for federal employment may obtain judicial
review of employment discrimination claims only through section 717
of Title VII, they are assured nevertheless that they may present
those claims fully in a de novo proceeding.
1 " Id., citing Patterson v. United States, 359 U.S. 495 (1959) and Johansen v.
United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
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IX. STANDING IN TITLE VII ACTIONS:
Waters, Gray, RWDSU
Title VII permits charges of unlawful employment practices filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to be
made "by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved."' If the
EEOC does not dispose of the charge to the charging party's satisfac-
tion, the "person aggrieved" is then authorized to bring suit in federal
district court to redress the challenged employment practice. 2 Accord-
ingly, an initial question arising in any Title VII action is whether the
party suing is such a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of Title
VII. Courts generally consider this question in the context of a chal-
lenge to the plaintiff's standing. The challenge may occur whether the
plaintiff is an individual or an organization. This chapter will discuss
the issue of standing in the context of Title VII suits by both persons
and organizations.
A. Personal Standing
The standing doctrine as applied in federal courts has two di-
mensions, one constitutional and one prudential. 3 The constitutional
dimension is based upon the language of article III that federal judi-
cial power is limited to the hearing of "cases" and "controversies."'
The question of standing focuses on the party before the court and
tests whether that party has "'alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-
court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers
on his behalf."5 The plaintiff must allege "actual injury redressable by
the court."" In addition, the alleged injury must "fairly be trace-
[able] to the challenged action of the defendant."' Satisfaction of this
constitutionally mandated standing requirement of "injury in fact" is
necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court. However, a
plaintiff who has satisfied the constitutional minimum may yet lack
standing because of the further existence of prudential limitations on
the doctrine of standing.
The prudential limitations on standing encompass judicially de-
veloped rules of self-restraint. One such rule is generally applied
where the party seeking ,relief asserts a legal interest created by stat-
ute. It is phrased in terms of a "zone of interest" test: is the interest
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975). See also id. § 2000e-5(e).
Id. § 2000e•5(f)( I ), (3).
3 Warth v, Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
' U.S. Coml .. art. Ill, § 2, cl. I.
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976), quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962) (emphasis added in Warth).
"Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976).
5 Id. at 41.
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which the party is asserting "arguably within the zone of interest to be
protected or regulated by the statute ... in question [?1" 9
 Another rule
applied to determine standing generally prohibits a litigant from as-
serting the rights or legal interests of third parties. 9 For example, a
party claiming to be injured by harm done to other persons may be
precluded from litigating the rights of those third parties." However,
prudential standing rules, unlike the constitutionally required showing
of "injury in fact," can be altered by Congress." Congress does so by
conferring legal interests on persons, the invasion of which injures
them in fact.' 2 Indeed, by permitting "persons aggrieved" to sue under
Title VII, Congress has created such a legal interest in freedom from
employment discrimination which is coterminous with the injury in
fact requirement of article III. By so doing, Congress has authorized
standing as broadly as permitted by the Constitution.
Courts first recognized that Congress had broadly authorized
standing in Title VII actions in Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc." Hac-
kett involved suit by a black former employee against his former em-
ployer claiming that the employer had discriminated on the basis of
race against the employee by maintaining discriminatory job condi-
tions." The employee Hackett also claimed that he had been dis-
charged from his employment solely because of his race.' 5 Hackett
filed charges of discrimination with the EEOC and received notice of
his right to sue." After receiving this notice but before commencing
his suit, Hackett applied for and was granted a pension from his
former employer." On the basis of this pensioner status the district
court denied Hackett standing to sue for the past discrimination."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed,
holding that Hackett was a "person aggrieved" within the meaning of
Title VII.' 9
 In particular, the court noted that the language "a person
claiming to be aggrieved" in Title VII "shows a congressional inten-
$ Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S 150, 153 -
(1970).
" Wardt v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 509 (1975).
'° See id. at 509-10, in which the Court barred taxpayers claiming to be adversely
affected by the zoning policies of a neighboring municipality from asserting the con-
stitutional and statutory rights of third parties who were excluded by such policies.
" Id. at 509.
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976). See also
Warth v. Seltlitt, 422 U.S. 490, 512-13 (1975).
445 F.2d 442, 3 FEP Cas. 648 (3d Cir. 1971).
"Id. at 444, 3 FEP Cas. at 649. The conditions of which the employee com-
plained were the maintenance of separate lines of seniority and vacation schedules for
certain employees, including himself, and the existence of harrassment and intimidation
to which he was subjected. Id.
" Id. In addition to stating claims against his employer, Hackett charged his
union with acquiescing in the employer's discrimination. Id.
1 ° Id. at 444-45, 3 FEP Cas. at 649-50.
"Id. at 445, 3 FEP Cas. at 650.
" 321 F. Supp. 312, 314, 2 FE? Cas. 1076, 1078 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
" 445 F.2d at 445, 3 FEP Cas. at 650.
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tion to define standing as broadly as is permitted by Article III of the
Constitution." 20 Since Hackett had alleged the requisite "injury in
fact," the court thus recognized Hackett's standing."
The Supreme Court impliedly approved of the Hackett result in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," a suit brought under
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 23 Trafficante involved suit
by a white and a black tenant of an apartment complex, both of whom
alleged that the apartment owner discriminated against black apart-
ment applicants on the basis of race in violation of Title VIII. 24 Title
VIII permits suit by any "person aggrieved," defined as "[a]ny person
who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing prac-
tice...."13 The tenants alleged that they had been injured by the
apartment owner's discriminatory practices in that:
(I) they [the tenants] had lost the social benefits of living in
an integrated community; (2) they had missed business and
professional advantages which would have accrued if they
had lived with members of minority groups; [and] (3) they
had suffered embarassment and economic damage in social,
business, and professional activities from being "stig-
matized" as residents of a "white ghetto." 28
Both the district court 27 and the court of appeals28 denied the tenants
standing, determining that since they had not been the objects of the
alleged discrimination, they lacked standing to challenge it. The Su-
preme Court reversed." The Court initially noted that Hackett had
established the principle in Title Vii suits that standing to sue was as
broad as constitutionally permissible." The Court then stated that it
"reach[ed] the same conclusion" with respect to suits brought under
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 at least insofar as "tenants
of the same housing unit that is charged with discrimination are con-
cerned." 3 ' Accordingly, since the tenants had alleged the requisite
present injury," the Court determined that they had standing to chal-
lenge the housing discrimination. A concurring opinion specifically
recognized that the plaintiffs in Trafficante had standing only because
of the broad congressional authorization to sue present in Title VIII
2" Id. at 446, 3 FEY Cas. at 650.
21 Id. at 446, 3 FEY Cas. at 650-51.
" 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
23 Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 83 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(Stipp. V 1975)).
2-1 409 U.S. at 206-07.
23 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
29 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208.
27 322 F. Stipp. 352, 353 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (mew. op.).
28 446 F.2d 1158, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 197 1).
29 409 U.S. at 208.
"Id. at 209. See text at note 20 supra.
31 409 U.S. at 209.
32 Id. at 209-10.
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. 33 Absent the statute, the concurring
Justices stated, the plaintiffs would lack standing. 34
Trafficante exposits the Supreme Court's view on the issue of
standing under civil rights statutes authorizing suit by "persons ag-
grieved." When suing under such statutes, a party need meet only the
constitutionally required showing of "injury in fact" caused by the de-
fendant's actions. Since Title VII is such a civil rights statute authoriz-
ing suit by "persons aggrieved," 35 courts in a Title VII action need
focus only on the constitutionally required minimum showing in de-
termining issues of ".standing.
During the Survey year courts have recognized this constitutional
minimum in the context of challenges to individual plaintiffs stand-
ing. Thus, in Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East" the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that a current
employee had suffered the requisite "present injury" as a result of the
employer's allegedly discriminatory hiring practices." Gray involved
suit by a black Greyhound employee, alleging that Greyhound's hiring
practices discriminated against blacks. 39 Greyhound moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that since the employee had been
hired on his first application, he had suffered no injury from the chal-
lenged practices. Accordingly, Greyhound argued, the employee
lacked standing to sue. 4° The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia granted the motion for summary judgment. 4 ' The
court of appeals, however, reversed and held that the plaintiff did
have standing to sue. 42 The appeals court stressed that it was review-
ing a summary judgment action in which the moving party, in this
case Greyhound, "bears the burden of presenting evidence which de-
monstrates the nonexistence of any issue of material fact."'" In the
case before it the employee had specified the nature of his injury. in
deposition and affidavit:
[The employee] claimed that by improperly restricting the
number of blacks hired Greyhound's policies rendered
those blacks who were employed vulnerable to arbitrary
discipline, discriminatory treatment in assignment of routes
and equipment, and inadequate representation by the
33 Id. at 212 (White, j., concurring).
"Id. For further discussion of the theoretical difference between the majority
and the concurrence in Traffiranie, see note 73 infra.
as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1)(1) (Stipp. V 1975).
33 See, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 517, 12 FE? Cas. 451,
455 (6th Cir. 1976).
'7 545 F.2d 169, 13 FEP Gas. 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
33 Id. at 175, 13 FEP Cas. at 1405.
as
	 at 171-72, 13 FEP Cas. at 1402.
45 Id. at 173, 13 FEP Cas. at 1403-04.
10 FEP Cas. 259, 260 (D.D.C. 1975).
" 545 F.2d at 176-77, 13 FEP Cas. at 1406.
13 /d. at 174, 13 FEP Cas. at 1404-05.
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union. He also claimed that the isolation he felt as a result
of being one of the favored blacks who had slipped
through the allegedly discriminatory screening practices ad-
versely affected his mental state. 44
The court noted that this claim of injury was not controverted by
Greyhound. Accordingly, the court determined that Greyhound
would be entitled to summary judgment only if the allegations of in-
jury were insufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff." The court
then concluded that the allegations were sufficient since the plaintiff
claimed "injury in fact as a result of defendant's allegedly illegal prac-
tices."48 Since Title VII allowed suit whenever constitutionally permit-
ted and since the plaintiff had met the constitutional minimum, the
court recognized the plaintiff's standing.'"
Alternatively the court in Gray concluded that even if Congress
had not authorized standing under Title VII as broadly as constitu-
tionally permissible, the plaintiff would still have had standing. This
result obtained since in addition to having satisfied the constitutional
"injury in fact" test of standing, the plaintiff had also met the pruden-
tial "zone of interest" test: 48 since the plaintiff complained that
Greyhound's discriminatory hiring practices adversely affected his
own employment conditions, his claim was "clearly within the scope of
Title VIPs protection.""
As a final point, the court in Gray concluded that the plaintiff's
claim of psychological harm from the hiring discrimination itself satis-
fied the "zone of interest" test. The court noted that the EEOC has
consistently concluded that Title VII grants an employee a right to "a
working environment :free of racial intimidation." 5° Judicial decisions,
too, the Gray court pointed out, have recognized in Title VII "a con-
gressional purpose 'to eliminate the inconvenience, unfairness, and
humiliation of ethnic discrimination.'"51 Accordingly, the Gray court
concluded that. a claim of psychological injury from employment dis-
crimination was redressable under Title VII. 52
Another Survey year case treating the issue of the standing of' an
individual to sue under Title VII is the Ninth Circuit's decision of
Waters v. Heublein, Inc." In Waters a white woman sued her employer
"Id. at 173, 13 FEP Cas. at 1404.
'5 1d. at 175, 13 FEP Cas. at 1405.
'6 Id, at 176, 13 FE? Cas. at 1406.
" Id.
" Id. See text at note 81 supra.
49 545 F.2d at 176, 13 FEP Cas, at 1406.,
"Id., quoting EEOC Decision No. 74-84, 2 Emri., Pitnc. GUIDE (GCH) 116450
(1975).
51 545 F.2d at 176, 13 FEY Cas. at 1406, quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234,
238, 4 FEY Cas. 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1971) (opinion of Goldberg, J.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972).
" 545 F.2d at 176, 13 FEP Gas. at 1406.
" 547 F.2d 466, 13 FEP Cas. 1409 (9th Cir. 1976).
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alleging discrimination against women, blacks and Hispanics. 54 The
district court dismissed Water's claims of discrimination based on race
and national origin on the ground that she lacked standing to pursue
them. 55
 The court of appeals reversed, finding the case "logically in-
distinguishable" from Trafficante." Trafficante had permitted a white
person to sue to redress housing discrimination against blacks because
the white person claimed that the discrimination caused him to lose
"important benefits from interracial association." 57 Similarly, the cir-
cuit court in Waters reasoned, discrimination in employment would
cause white employees to suffer the loss of interracial association."
Such association, the court noted, was no less important in employ-
ment than in housing:
Indeed, in modern America, a person is as likely, and often
more likely, to know his fellow workers than the tenants
next door or down the hail. The possibilities of advanta-
geous personal, professional or business contacts are cer-
tainly as great at work as at home. The benefits of interrac-
ial harmony are as great in either locale. 59
Accordingly, the court permitted the white woman to raise the issue
of employment discrimination against blacks and Hispanics."
Both the Waters court and the Gray court applied the correct
standing test in Title VII actions. That test requires simply the con-
stitutional showing of "injury in fact" caused by the defendant's ac-
tions." Gray applied this standard, deciding properly that employee
"Id. at 467, 13 FEP Cas. at 1409.
" 8 FEP Cas. 908, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
5" 547 F.2d at 469, 13 FEP Cas. at 1411.
409 U.S. at 209-10. See text at notes 22-34 supra for discussion of Trafficante.
68
 547 F.2d at 469, 13 FEP Cas. at 1411.
5 ° Id.
"Id. at 470,.13 FEP Cas. at 1412.
But see EEOC v. Beaver Gasoline Co.,
	 F. Supp. —, 14 FEP Cas. 1343
(W.D. Pa. 1977). There, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania dismissed an action brought by the EEOC predicated on a charge of sex
discrimination filed by a male. The man had filed the charge, alleging that he had been
demoted from his position as manager of a gas station because he had hired a female
attendant. Id. at —, 14 FEP Cas. at 1344. The district court determined that because
the man had not suffered discrimination because of his sex, he was not a "person ag-
grieved" within the meaning of Title VII. id. at —, 14 FEP Cas. at 1345. The court
then determined that since no valid administrative charge had been filed, the EEOC
had no authority to bring suit. Id. at —, 14 FEP Cas. at 1347. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the action. Id. at 14 FEP Cas. at 1348.
Under the Traffieatde rationale of the Waters and Cray decisions, the court's ruling
in EEOC v. Beaver Gasoline was erroneous. Trafficante, Waters and Gray establish that
nondiscriminatees have standing to sue to redress discrimination so tong as the nondis-
critninatees have alleged injury as a result of the discrimination. Since the man who
filed the charge in EEOC v. Beaver Gasoline alleged injury to himself—viz., demotion—
because of his employer's discrimination, he had standing under the Trafficante ration-
ale to complain of the discrimination. Hence the court should have permitted the
EEOC to sue on his behalf.
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Gray had alleged injury in fact, namely, psychological harm and dis-
criminatory job treatment, caused by the defendant employer's dis-
criminatory hiring practices." These allegations sufficed to grant the
employee standing to raise in his suit the rights of the black employ-
ment applicants. Similarly the decision in Waters is correct. Although
the Waters court failed to mention the allegations of the complaint, it
appears from the district court opinion that the woman suing had
alleged psychological injury from working in an environment which
was not free from discrimination.° 3 Accordingly, under the Trafficante
rationale, the woman had standing to raise the rights of the third
party discriminatecs. Since the circuit courts64 and itnpliedly the Su-
preme Court" have recognized that Congress has created in Title VII
an employee's interest in working in a nondiscriminatory environ-
ment, courts are correct to grant standing to redress the employment
discrimination of those employees deprived of a nondiscriminatory
workplace.
B. Organizational Standing
Courts during the Survey year have also confronted challenges
to the standing of organizations to sue under Title VII. Such chal-
lenges require consideration of Warth v. Seldin," a leading Supreme
Court case discussing issues of organizational standing. Warth involved
a challenge on various constitutional grounds to the exclusionary zon-
ing practices of a New York community." Plaintiffs included an asso-
ciation of community residents claiming that exclusionary zoning de-
nied its members the benefits of living in an integrated community"
and an association of construction firms who claimed that the zoning
practices denied its members business opportunities and profits. 6" In
deciding a challenge to both associations' standing, the Supreme Court
established principles for determining such claims. The Court initially
" 545 F.2d at 173, 176, 13 FEP Cas, at 1404, 1406.
63 8 FEP Cas. 908, 909 (N.D. Cal, 1974)..
" 4 See Hackett, 445 F.2d at 446, 3 FEP Cas. at 650 (3d Cir.); Sewer v. General
Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 517, 12 FEP Cas. 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1976); Waters, 547
F.2d at 460-70, 13 FEP Cas. 1411-12 (9th Cir.) (by implication); Gray. 545 F.2d at 176,
13 FEP Cas. at 1406 (D.C. Cir.).
" See Trufficante, 409 U.S. at 209. Trafficanle's continuing validity was recognized
in the two recent Supreme Court cases on standing. See Simon v. Easter Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 n.22 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 512-14 (1975).
" 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
" Id, at 493. Plaintiffs claimed that the town's zoning ordinance excluded persons
of low and moderate income from living in the community, thereby violating both the
Plaintiffs' first, ninth and fourteenth amendment rights and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1081-83
(1970). Id.
60 Id. at 512.
" Id. at 514-15. Other plaintiffs included individuals of low and moderate in-
come who claimed to have been excluded by the zoning practices, id. at 502-03, and
taxpayers of an adjacent city alleging that their taxes were increased because the chal-
lenged community failed to provide its share of low and moderate income housing. Id.
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stated that an organization has standing to sue for injury to itself."
Moreover, the Court noted, an organization may have standing to sue
as the representative of its members even absent direct injury to it-
self." In such an instance the association must allege injury to one or
all of its members of the sort sufficient to establish a case or con-
troversy had the members themselves brought suit." Thus, the Court
would analyze the standing of the organizations' members in order to
determine the standing of the organization itself. In applying such
analysis in Warth, the Court denied standing to the organization of
community residents. The Court determined that the members lacked
standing in their own right to challenge the practices," and that con-
sequently the organization also lacked standing. 74
at 508-09. In addition, a second association of builders attempted to intervene as plain-
tiff. Id. at 497. The association's motion to intervene was denied, id. at 517, and the
complaint was dismissed as to all plaintiffs because all plaintiffs lacked standing, Id. at
518.
to Id. at 511.
"
"Id.
The Court concluded that even though the plaintiff association alleged that its
members suffered injury from living in a nonintegrated community, the Trofficante de-
cision did not operate to grant the association standing. Id. at 512. The Court dis-
tinguished Traffscante on the ground that the plaintiffs there stated a claim under the
Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 804, 82 Stat. 83 (current version at 42
U.S.0 § 3604 (Supp. V 1975)), which included a broad definition of "person aggrieved."
422 U.S. at 512-13. The plaintiffs in Worth, on the other hand, had asserted no such
statutory claim. Id. at 513. Accordingly the Court determined that the plaintiffs could
not rely on Trafficante to support their standing claim. Id. at 514.
In discussing Trafficanle, the Worth Court relied on the concurring opinion of Jus-
tices White, Blackmun and Powell, rather than the majority opinion of Justice Douglas.
Id. at 513.14. The difference between the two opinions in Trafficante lies in the signifi-
cance accorded the statute under which the plaintiffs were suing. The majority consid-
ered the statute to satisfy the prudential rules of standing which would normally bar the
plaintiffs from asserting the rights of third parties. 409 U.S. at 212. The concurring
opinion, on the other hand, considered the statute to affect the constitutional rules of
standing. Absent the statute in Trafficante, the concurring Justices would have found it
difficult to conclude that the plaintiffs had established an article III case or controversy.
hi. at 212 (White, J., concurring). In Worth the majority explained the theory of the
Trafficarne concurrence thusly: "Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the
alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the plaintiff would
have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute." Id. at 514, citing
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1975), citing Trafficante, 409 U.S. at
212 (White, J., concurring), In applying the principles of Warth and Trafficante to Title
VII cases, the theoretical difference between the majority and the concurring opinions
in Trafficante should not affect the results of the cases. This is so because Title VII con-
tains an authorization to sue by "persons aggrieved" similar to that construed in Traf-
ficante. Thus, whether the authorization is viewed as affecting prudential consid-
erations—the majority position in Trafficante— or as affecting the constitutional "injury
in fact" requirement—the concurring position in Trafficante—the result is the same, viz.,
allowing persons aggrieved to sue to redress discrimination directed at others, For a di-
scussion of the distinction between the two opinions in Trafficante and of the implication
of that distinction see Comment, Standing to Challenge Exclusionary Zoning in the Federal
Courts, 17 B.C. IND. & Cont. L. REV. 347, 370-79 (1976).
" 422 U.S. at 514.
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With respect to the organization of construction firms, the Court
initially did not challenge the standing of its individual members to
bring suit. Rather the Court determined that further inquiry into the
claim for relief was necessary in order to decide the standing issue.
The Court decided that for an organization to have standing, in addi-
tion to showing injury to its members, it must also show that neither
the nature of the claim nor the relief sought would require the par-
ticipation of its individual members in order properly to resolve the
case." Thus, the Court would permit an organization to sue for de-
claratory or injunctive relief on behalf of its members since such pro-
spective relief would benefit the organization's injured members with-
out requiring their participation." However, absent any assignment of
its individual members' claims for damages, the Court would not allow
an organization to recover damages which were due its members."
An award of retroactive relief to the organization, the Court in-
dicated, would not necessarily inure to the benefit of those organiza-
tional members who had actually been injured." Accordingly, the
Court determined that an organization would lack standing to pursue
such an award." On the basis of these principles the Court denied the
builders' association standing8 ° because of the fact that the association
was seeking damages on behalf of its members which it was not au-
thorized to collect." Moreover, the Court concluded that any injury to
the association's membership was particularized, requiring participa-
tion of the individual members in order to prove the claims. 82
 Accord-
ingly the Court held that the organization lacked standing to pursue
the members' case. 83
Courts during the Survey year have applied the constitutional
principles articulated in Warth in granting standing to unions to sue in
Title VII actions on behalf of their members. In Local 194, Retail,
Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) v. Standard Brands,
Inc." the Seventh Circuit permitted a union to sue the employer to
redress allegedly discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. Plain-
tiffs included three individuals and the union. 85




78 Id. at 515-16.
re Id.
70 1d, al 516.
"' Id. at 515.
82 1d, at 515-16.
85
 The association had also joined the other plaintiffs' prayer for prospective re-
lief. Id. at 515. The Court concluded that it also lacked standing to pursue such relief
on the ground that it had not alleged facts sufficient to establish a case or controversy
with respect to any of its members. Id. at 516. Accordingly, under the principles of or-
ganizational standing outlined above, see text at note 72 supra, the association itself
would lack standing.
84
 520 F.2d 864, 13 FEP Cas. 499 (7th Cir. 1976).
85 /d. at 865, 13 FEY Cas. at 499-500.
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dismissed the suit with respect to the union, holding that the union
lacked standing." The circuit court reversed," recognizing that the
union had alleged injury, viz, discrimination, to some of its mem-
bers.88
 Accordingly, the court applied the principles of Worth and rec-
ognized the union's standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief
on behalf of its members." In reaching this conclusion the court re-
jected the defendant's argument that because union members have
conflicting interests the union lacked standing to represent any of
them." The court noted that a union is not precluded from acting in
a collective bargaining situation simply because its members may have
conflicting interests.". Moreover, the court pointed out, although a
union has a duty to represent fairly all members without discrimina-
tion," Title VII imposes no duty of exclusive representation." Ac-
cordingly, the court granted the union standing to represent those
employees who wished to be represented."
Similarly in Thompson v. Board of Education of the Romeo Community
Schools95
 the United States District Court for the Western District of
Michigan recognized a union's standing to sue on behalf of its mem-
bers. In Thompson two teachers' unions joined the individual plaintiffs
in challenging the disability and sick leave provisions established by
various school districts in the state of Michigan." The defendants
moved to dismiss the unions for lack of standing, but the district court
denied the motion." In concluding that the unions had standing, the
court applied the principles of Warth which permit an organization to
sue on behalf of members who have themselves been injured." Ac-
cordingly, since the unions in Thompson alleged injury to some of their
members," the court held that the unions had standing.'"
The district court in Thompson did not, however, discuss the re-
quirement of Math that the unions' standing be limited to pursuit of
declaratory and injunctive relief only. Although the court would have
88
 13 FEP Cas. 497, 498 (N.D. III. 1975).
91.
 540 F.2d at 865, 13 FEP Cas. at 499.
99 1d. at 865, 13 FEP Cas. at 500.
99 Id. The court followed Worth and specifically precluded the union from seek-
ing any monetary relief on behalf of the discriminatees. Id.
95 1d. at 866, 13 FEP Cas. at 501.
91 1d.
as
	 not cited by the court, Title VII itself prohibits a union from dis-
criminating against its members. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
93
 540 F.2d at 866, 13 FEP Cas. at 501.
"Id. The court also concluded that the union need not meet the requirements of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23, concerning class action suits, in order for the
union to have standing to represent its members. 540 F.2d at 866-67, 13 FEP Cas. at
501-02.
" 71 F.R.D. 398, 12 FEP Cas. 1700 (W.D. Mich. 1976).
99 1d. at 400-01, 12 FEP Cas. at 1702.
Id, at 403-04, 12 FEP Cas. at 1704-05.
°' Id. at 403, 12 FEP Cas. at 1704.
"See id. at 400, 12 FEP Cas. at 1702.
'°° Id, at 404 & n.7, 12 FEP Cas. at 1705 & n.7.
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been more correct to state this limitation, its failure to do so does not
render the result of the case erroneous for two reasons: the nature of
the claim stated in Thompson and the posture of the case.
The claim stated in Thompson was one of continuing violation of
Title VII.'" Should the plaintiffs establish their case, relief would
therefore consist of both an injunction and a possible award of back
benefits.' 12 Thus, in Thompson the claim was amenable to the prospec-
tive relief' for which the union did have standing to sue. Accordingly,
it would have been improper for the court to have dismissed the
unions from the suit for lack of standing.' 03
Furthermore, in evaluating the court's failure in Thompson to
limit the unions' standing to pursuit of prospective relief only, it is also
important to note both the posture of the case and the effect of the
district court's decree. The court was deciding only preliminary chal-
lenges to the suit.'°4 It did not determine the relief to which the plain-
tiffs would be entitled if they prevailed on the merits. 10 ' Although the
court did not limit the unions to pursuit of prospective relief only,
neither did it permit the unions to recover damages on behalf of their
members. The issue was simply not discussed. Accordingly, since the
district court did not authorize the unions to recover relief to which
they were not entitled and since there existed a claim which the
unions had standing to assert, the district court in Thompson correctly
recognized the unions' standing. The court's failure expressly to limit
that standing did not render erroneous its result in the case.
Thompson and RWDSU are examples of the manner in which
courts determine issues of organizational standing under Title V11.'"
"'The violation was a continuing one since the disability and sick leave pro-
visions which were being challenged currently affected those teachers who were subject
to them. See id. at 402, 12 FEP Cas, at 1704.
11 ' See 42 U.S,C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp, V 1975). Cf. Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (award of baCkpay should be denied in Title VII ac-
tion on which the plaintiff prevails "only for reasons which, if applied generally, would
not frustrate the central statutory' purposes ()I' eradicating discrimination throughout
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimina-
tion"); accord, Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976) (retroactive
seniority relief).
11 ' In Worth where the Court dismissed the builders' association fOr lack 01 stand-
ing, the association lacked standing to pursue claims for •either prospective relief or
damages. 422 U.S. at 515-16.
1 " 71 F.R.D. at 401, 12 FEP Cas. at 1702.
'" The court did, however, conclude that the eleventh amendment did not bar
the plaintiffs from recovering monetary relief from the defendant school boards. Id. at
415-16, 12 FEP Cas. at 1715. For discussion of the effect of the eleventh amendment on
Title VII actions against state and local governmental units, see Annual Survey of Labor
and Employment Discrimination Law, 18 B.C. !NIL& Ccom. L. REV. 1134 (1977).
1 " Sni• also Whilhite v. South Central Bell Tel. & Tel. Co,, 426 F. Supp. 61, 64-65,
14 FEP Cas. 1270, 1272 (E,D. La. 1976) (union has standing to represent its members
in claims for injunctive relief, but may not assert its members' individual claims);
League of United Latin American Cities v. Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873, 886-87, 12
FEP Cas. 651, 660-61 (civil rights organization may sue on behalf of injured members
in a challenge to a city's hiring practices and procedures; no discussion of the organiza-
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Such standing is recognized in accordance with the principles of
Warth. Granting such standing is consistent not only with those princi-
ples, but also with the policies underlying Title VII:"[p]rivate enforce-
ment suits are an 'essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of
Title VII' and of `vindicat[ing] the important congressional policy
against discriminatory employment practices.' The effectiveness of
these suits can be increased by allowing [organizations] to place their
financial resources and expertise behind the suit."'° 7
 Accordingly,
courts are correct in recognizing organizational standing in Title VII
actions.
X. TEMPORARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER TITLE VII: EEOC v.
Pacific Press Publishing Association
Amendments to Title VII enacted in 1972' provided the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commission) with
civil enforcement tools to enable the Commission better to effectuate
Title VIPs broad remedial purpose of achieving employment equal-
ity. 2
 These amendments included sections 706(0(1) 3
 and (2) 4 under
which the EEOC is given the authority to bring a civil action for per-
manent relief and the right to seek temporary judicial relief.
Prior to the addition of these sections, the Commission's efforts
were limited solely to its conciliation authority. These efforts at con-
ciliation were largely ineffective, due in part to the voluntary nature
of the process, and in part to the employers' confidence that the ag-
grieved party would lack the initiative to institute private litigation. 5
Congress viewed the grant of civil enforcement authority to the
Commission, however, not as an alternative to the agency's prior goal
of conciliation, but as an adjunct to it. As stated in the House Report
on the proposed amendments, "[o]ne of the main advantages of grant-
ing enforcement power to a regulatory agency is that the existence of
tion's ability or inability to collect a damage award), modified on other grounds, — F.
Supp.	
—, 13 FEP Cas. 1019, 1020 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
'" RWDSU, 540 F.2d at 866, 13 FEP Cas. at 500, quoting Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974).
' Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4, 86 Stat. 104 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(Supp. V 1975) ).
2 H.R. REF'. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEwS 2144-46. The broad purposes of Title VII are to achieve employment
equality by eradicating discrimination and by providing compensation for injuries suf-
fered as a result of past discrimination. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
417-18 (1975).
42 U.S.C.	 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides in part: "If
within 30 days after a charge is filed with the Commission ... the Commission has been
unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement ... the Commission may
bring a civil action ...."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
5
 H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 11972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. News 2137, 2144.
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the sanction encourages settlement of complaints before the enforce-
ment stage is reached.° Thus Congress envisioned that civil enforce-
ment would serve as an incentive to conciliation, thereby keeping the
controversy out of the courts. This would not only prevent flooding of
already congested court dockets but also would serve to relieve the
courts of the difficult task of dealing with the complexities of
employment discrimination cases by initially leaving enforcement in
the congressionally favored forum—the EEOC. 7 Since dismissal of an
employee during the Commission's investigation and attempted con-
ciliation would be an obvious interference to this administrative pro-
cess, 8 empowering the EEOC to seek preliminary injunctive relief was
seen as a method of preserving the status quo between the parties
until the Commission had time to "bring its expertise to bear on the
controversy." Accordingly, section 706(0(2) provides in part that:
Whenever a charge is filed with the Commission and the
Commission concludes on the basis of a preliminary in-
vestigation that prompt judicial action is necessary to carry
out the purposes of this Act, the Commission may bring
an action for appropriate temporary or preliminary relief
pending final disposition of such charge."'
Section 706(0(2) thus permits the EEOC to go into court on the basis
of a preliminary investigation and request a temporary injunction
prohibiting the employer from taking any action adverse to the charg-
ing party until the Commission has completed its findings and de-
termined its course of action.
During the Survey year the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether section 706(0(2) au-
thorizes the EEOC to seek temporary relief in a district court after the
charging party has instituted a private suit. In EEOC v. Pacific Press
Publishing Association," two.employees of Pacific Press Publishing As-
sociation (Press) filed charges with the EEOC alleging sex discrimina-
tion by their employer." After requesting and receiving a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC, one of the employees filed a civil action against
Press.' 3 When Press retaliated by threatening to discharge the
employee, the EEOC brought an action under section 706(0(2) for
° Id. at II, (19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2197.
7 Id. at 8-10, [1972] U.S. Com'. Cone. & AD, NEws at 2194-96,
Hyland v. Kenner Prod. Co., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1110,108 at 7517 (S.D. Ohio
1974).
'Id.
" 42 U.S.C. [1 2000e-5(1)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
" 535 F.2d 1182, 12 FEP Cas, 1312 (9th Cir. 1976).
"Id. at 1189, 12 FEP Cas. at 1313.
"Id. The right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a § 706(f)(1) suit in
federal court by an individual. The section provides in pertinent part:
... if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge
... the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section ... or the
Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the
1175
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
temporary injunctive relief to prevent the dismissal. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California granted the re-
lief sought.' 4
The Ninth Circuit in a divided opinion reversed and held that
the district court did not have authority to issue such injunctive re-
lief." The Court reached this determination through statutory in-
terpretation of section 706(0(2). Specifically, the court found in the
statutory language the limitation that the Commission could only seek
temporary relief "pending final disposition of such charge."" Relying
on legislative history, the court determined that the phrase "final
disposition" clearly referred to completion of the Commission's ad-
ministrative process rather than to judicial resolution of the charge.' 7
Noting that the purpose of section 706(0(2)'s injunctive relief was to
aid the Commission's conciliatory efforts, the court held that the dis-
trict court's authority to issue temporary relief ended with the termi-
nation of the agency's proceedings." The circuit court then concluded
that the commencement of a private suit marked such an end of the
administrative stage since the filing of a private action "signalled the
failure of efforts at conciliation and terminated the EEOC's opportun-
ity to bring suit under [section 706(0(1)]."" Consequently, the court
person aggrieved is a party, the Commission ... shall so notify the person
aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of such notice a civil ac-
tion may be brought against the respondent named in the charge ... by
the person claiming to be aggrieved ....
42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(0(1) (Supp. V 1975).
" 12 FEP Cas. 1307, 1309 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
16 535 F.2d at 1187, 12 FEP Cas. at 1316.
"M. at 1185-86, 12 FEP Cas. at 1314.
"Id. The court cited to H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in
(19721 U.S. Coln: CONG. & An. NEWS 2163.
" 535 F.2d at 1186, 12 FEP Cas. at 1314.
"Id. The court found precedential support for its conclusion in Tuft v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 517 F.2d 1301, 10 FEP Cas. 929 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1052 (1976). In Tuft the court stated: "Before the 1972 amendments administrative
procedures ended with the termination of conciliation efforts while under the current
statute these administrative procedures end with a determination of whether to file
suit." 517 F.2d at 1309, 10 FEP Cas. at 935. It is not entirely clear whether the court
meant that procedures would terminate only upon the EEOC's determination of the
failure of conciliation or whether a determination by a private individual would also
terminate the administrative phase.
In EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hospital, 544 F.2d 664, 13 FEP Cas. 1129 (3d
Cir. 1976), the Third Circuit permitted an EEOC suit under 706(0(1) after a private
action based on the same charges had been filed. Id. at 672, 13 FEP Cas. at 1135. Since
it permitted the EEOC suit the court must have concluded that the initiation of a pri-
vate suit did not end the administrative phase for purposes of allowing a Commission
action under § 706(0(1). Thus in the Third Circuit it may be that the administrative
phase is terminated only by an EEOG decision as to whether or not to sue for the pur-
poses of § 706(0(1) relief. The authority of the EEOC to file suit after the initiation of
private litigation appears to be the basis of the dissenting opinion in Pacific Press. See
535 F.2d at 1190-91, 12 FEP Cas. at 1318 (Sneed, J., dissenting). See also notes 36-44
infra. However, since the purpose of relief under § 706(0(2) is to keep the controversy
out of the courts by aiding conciliation, and the initiation of private action necessarily
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held that once a private action was brought, the administrative phase
was ended and the justification for granting temporary injunctive re-
lief, as set forth in the legislative history, was no longer applicable.
Several factors were advanced by the circuit court in support of
its decision in Pacific Press. First, the court noted that the remedy en-
visioned by 706(0(2) is only "temporary," to fill the need for "prompt
judicial action." The court then pointed out that in Pacific Press the
claim for injunctive relief was based on charges the most recent of
which had been filed with the EEOC eight months prior to the section
706(0(2) action for temporary relief. 20 The court found that this eight
month delay by the Commission "belied" the need for speedy relief
envisioned by section 706(0(2). 2 ' Since in the court's opinion the relief
sought by the Commission was not in fact prompt, the court saw no
necessity for invoking section 706(f)(2) relief.
Second the court reasoned that if a private action did not termi-
nate the availability of temporary relief under 706(0(2), then such re-
lief could seemingly be sought indefinitely—since the administrative
phase could thus continue indefinitely—absent a determination by the
Commission as to whether to bring suit pursuant to section 706(0(1). 22
The court recognized that under its holding, termination of the ad-
ministrative phase would be cotertninus with the instigation of either a
private action or an EEOC civil action. Such a result would be benefic-
ial, the court stated, because injunctive relief under section 706(0(2)
would thereby be left in the exclusive control of the EEOC and the
charging party, and "(i)t may then become a weapon to be used
against those who are the objects of the charges."23
Finally, the court determined that a contrary holding, allowing
relief for an indefinite period of time, could not be reconciled with
the ease with which a temporary injunction could be obtained." The
court concluded that "[u]nlike the more traditional route to pre-
liminary injunctive relief, the usual requirement of irreparable injury
is relaxed because of the statutory authority granted to the EEOC to
seek judicial relief against Title VII violations." 25 In reaching this con-
clusion the court touched on the most significant point of its holding.
The proof requirements for a showing of irreparable harm are re-
places the issue before the courts, any section 706(0(1) action, whether brought by the
EEOC or the aggrieved individual should conclude the administrative phase for the
purposes of § 706(0(2) temporary relief.
20 535 F.2d at 1186, 12 FEP Cas. at 1315.
21 1d.
"Id. at 1187, 12 FEY Cas. at 1315.
"Id.
"Id. See Murray v. American Standard, Inc., 488 F.2d 529, 531, 7 FEP Cas. 787,
788 (5th Cir. 1973); Hyland v. Kenner Prod. Co., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,108 at 7517
(S.D. Ohio 1974). (These cases also distinguish the ease with which a temporary injunc-
tion can be obtained under a statutory provision providing for temporary relief.)
" 535 F.2d at 1187, 12 FE? Gas. at 1315. For a discussion of the requirements
l'or obtaining a temporary injunction under 706(0(2) see text at notes 33-38 infra.
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taxed in a suit seeking temporary relief under section 706(0(2). 2° That
relaxation stems from the fact that section 706(0(2) gives the Commis-
sion authority to seek injunctive relief upon a showing that such ac-
tion is "necessary to carry out the purpose of this Act...." 27 Courts
have interpreted this statutory language to necessitate a standard of
proof of irreparable harm lower than that required by Rule 65 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 Relief under section 706(0(2) is
seen as wholly statutory, and the traditional proof requirements for
injunctive relief, as codified in Rule 65, are therefore inapplicable. 23
Therefore when a Title VII violation is alleged by the EEOC, irrepar-
able harm is presumed from the fact of the alleged violation itself and
temporary relief is granted merely upon a prima facie showing of
Title VII discrimination. 30 Because of the ease with which a tempo-
rary injunction can issue under section 706(0(2), the Pacific Press court
felt itself compelled to limit the circumstances under which section
706(0(2) could be employed. The Pacific  Press court thus refused to
grant the EEOC section 706(0(2) temporary relief once the private
party has filed suit.
The court withheld the grant of temporary relief even though
the aggrieved party had filed with the EEOC other charges which
were not part of the party's current suit." The court recognized that
these new charges had not yet come to any "final disposition," thus
making relief under section 706(0(2) theoretically possible.32 How-
ever, the court determined that, even though injunctive relief might
technically be available, nevertheless such relief was inappropriate
since the party in the private action could amend the complaint to en-
compass the allegations subsequently filed with the EEOC. 33 Since the
court found that resolution of the private action thus could resolve all
issues, and since administrative conciliatory remedies had failed to re-
solve the initial claim, the court found "no useful purpose would be
served by invoking (section 706(0(2).]"" Accordingly, the court held
that once the private action was brought the EEOC could no longer
obtain injunctive relief under the statute despite the filing of addi-
tional charges with the Commission. 3 °
The dissenting judge agreed with the majority that injunctive re-
lief was not available upon termination of administrative pro-
34 Id. at 1187, 12 FEP Cas. 1315.
31 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(1)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
" 535 F.2d at 1187, 12 FEP Cas. at 1315. See also Murray v. American Standard,
Inc., 488 F.2d 529, 531, 7 FEP Cas. 787, 788 (5th Cir. 1973); Hyland v. Kenner Prod.
Co., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 110, 108 at 7517 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
" EEOC v. Union Bank of Arizona, 12 FEY Gas. 527, 530 (D.C. Ariz. 1976).
3° Id.
31 535 F.2d at 1186, 12 FEP Cas. at 1314.
3 ' id., 12 FEP Cas. at 1315.
"Id.
"Id.
33 Id. at 1186, 12 FEP Cas. at 1319 - 15.
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ceedings. 36 However, Judge Sneed parted company with the majority
on the issue of when such administrative proceedings were termi-
nated. The majority had found that the filing of a suit by an ag-
grieved party constituted such termination. 37 Judge Sneed, on the
other hand, would remand the case to determine whether the ad-
ministrative phase had been suspended rather than terminated, since
he reasoned that a private action might only "suspend" rather than
terminate the proceedings. 36 The Judge based this distinction between
suspension and termination on a Commission regulation which man-
dates suspension of EEOC proceedings following the issuance of a
right-to-sue letter. 36 Since under this regulation suspension continues
indefinitely until lifted or until the administrative process is otherwise
ended, the dissent concluded that suspension is not technically termi-
nation of the EEOC's phase and therefore does not necessarily fore-
close relief under section 706(0(4 4 ° Thus under the dissent's view
the Commission could still obtain injunctive relief after a showing that
the Commission had not determined whether to file suit since if the
Commission had not as yet made a decision on whether to sue, the
administrative' phase would not yet be ended. Therefore Judge Sneed
would have remanded the case to the district court to determine if the
EEOC had decided whether or not to sue. If the Commission had
made a determination, the administrative phase would have ended
and according to Judge Sneed's view, the district court would have to
dismiss the suit for temporary relief. If however the EEOC had not
yet decided whether to bring suit, Judge Sneed would consider the
EEOC proceeding merely suspended and would permit the lower
court to grant the requested relief. 4 '
39 Id. at 1187, 12 FEP Cas. at 1316 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 1188-89, 12 FEP Cas. at 1317 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
39 Id.
$9 Id. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.5.25b(d) (1976). This Regulation provides:
Issuance of notice ... shall suspend further Commission proceedings un-
less the Field Director determines that it is in the public interest to con-
tinue such proceedings, or unless, within twenty (20) days after receipt of
such notice, a party requests the Field Director, in writing, to continue to
process the case.
" 535 F.2d at . 1189, 12 FEP Cas. at 1317 (Sneed, J., dissenting).
4 ' Id. at 1190, 12 FEP Cas. at 1318 (Sneed, J., dissenting). The dissenting opin-
ion's reasoning is apparently predicated on an interpretation of section 706(f)(1) which
would permit the EEOC to bring suit after the instigation of' an action for relief by an
individual. One line of interpretation would bar the EEOC from instituting a suit for
relief under section 706(f)(1) based on the same charges as a suit by a private individual
under section 706(f)(1). There is a conflict within the circuits as to whether the EEOC
has such a right. Compare EEOC v. Continental Oil Co., — F.2d —, 14 FEP Cas.
365, 370 (10th Cir. 1977) (the EEOC limited to permissive intervention upon the filing
of a private action) with EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hospital, 544 F.2d 664, 672, 13
FEP Cas. 1129, 1135 (3d Cir. 1976) (the EEOC permitted to maintain an independent
action). Since the dissent would remand this case to determine whether the EEOC had
made a decision as to whether to sue, obviously under the dissent's interpretation the
private suit does not foreclose the EEOC from determining whether to bring its own
suit.
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It is submitted that the majority's conclusion that injunctive relief
is unavailable to the Commission once a private action has been in-
itiated is sounder than the dissent's view that the Commission may still
obtain such relief upon a showing that it has not yet determined
whether to sue. Both the dissent and the majority agree that the end
of the administrative processing of a charge constitutes a "final dispos-
ition" and terminates the EEOC's authority to seek relief under sec-
tion 706(0(2). They disagree only regarding what constitutes such a
final disposition. The dissent determined that a private suit might
merely suspend rather than terminate an EEOC proceeding and
based its conclusion on the language of a Commission regulation re-
garding suspension of proceedings. 42 However that suspension regula-
tion refers only to suspension of proceedings following the issuance of
a right-to-sue letter. Since the letter is not self-executing in that the
charging party must still decide whether to take the letter and file
charges in district court, the administrative proceedings could still be
considered suspended during the period in which the charging party
has the letter and has not yet acted upon it. It would appear to re-
quire the further action of the aggrieved party actually taking the
next step—filing suit—to end the administrative phase. Reasoning
thus, there is no inconsistency between the issuance of a right-to-sue
letter "suspending" Commission proceedings and the instigation of a
private suit ending them. The dissent in distinguishing between sus-
pension and termination fails to take into account this last logical step
of the charging party acting upon his right-to-sue letter by bringing
suit in district court, and so ignores the purpose behind the enactment
of section 706(0(2). Congress intended the section to encourage par-
ties to conciliate by giving the Commission the power to obtain injunc-
tive relief in order to maintain the status quo during conciliation.
However, to permit the EEOC to continue seeking temporary relief
after the institution of a private action would not further the congres-
sional goal of pre-court conciliation.'" Thus the majority's holding in
Pacific Press properly advances the congressional intent behind section
706(0(2), because, as the majority recognized, once suit is filed "[t]he
parties no longer look to the EEOC for relief but instead shift their
attention to the court."44 Consequently, as the majority finds, the in-
stitution of a private action should be the logical end of the EEOC's
administrative phase, and therefore the end of the availability of sec-
tion 706(0(2) relief.
Since Pacific Press holds that the commencement of a private ac-
tion marks the end of the administrative phase, and thus the end of
706(0(2)'s availability," any injunctive relief which a party desires
after the bringing of a private action must be sought as part of the
42 535 F.2d at 1188-89, 12 FEP Cas. at 1317 (Sneed,,., dissenting).
43 See text at notes 7-9 supra for a discussion of the purposes of § 706(0(2) relief.
" 535 F.2d at 1186, 12 FEY Cas. 1314.
45 Id. at 1187, 12 FEP Cas. at 1315-16.
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private suit pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rule 65 requires an affirmative showing of irreparable harm."
Thus if an action for temporary relief is brought pursuant to Rule 65
and not under the statutory provision of section 706(f)(2) irreparable
harm may not be presumed by the court.'" Moreover, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the temporary loss of recoverable income does
not usually constitute irreparable injury." Thus, the discharge of an
employee would be grounds for injunctive relief only in rare cases
since the harm stemming from a discharge is generally the loss of re-
coverable income. 49 Since a threatened discharge would not generally
meet the requirements of irreparable harm, most employees would
therefore not be able to obtain injunctive relief once they have com-
menced their private actions. However, certain jurisdictions have in-
terpreted section 706(f)(2) to permit suits for temporary relief to be
brought directly by the aggrieved individual without the assistance of
the EEOC. 5° In terms of future litigation strategy, aggrieved
46
 Rule 65 of the Fed. Rules of Civ. Pro. provides in part: "A temporary restrain-
ing order may be granted ... only if (I) it clearly appears from specific facts shown ...
that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant be-
fore the adverse party ... can be heard in opposition ...."
"See 535 F.2d at 1187, 12 FEP Cas. at 1315-16. See also Hyland v. Kenner Prod.
Co., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9 10,108 at 7517 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
" Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90 (1974); see also Pacific Press, 535 F.2d
1187, 12 FEP Cas. 1315-16; Jerome v. Viviano Food Co., 489 F.2d 965, 966, 7 FEP Cas.
145, 146 (6th Cir. 1974); Theodore v. Elmhurst College, 421 F.Supp. 355, 357-58, ,14
FEP Cas. 153, 165 (N.D. III. 1976).
49 535 F.2d at 1187, 12 FEP Cas, at 1316. In Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61
(1974) the respondent was a probationary government employee who was dismissed for
her "unwillingness to follow office procedure...." Id. at 65. Since the procedural pro-
tections afforded most probationary employees are limited, respondent sought a tempo-
rary injunction while she challenged her dismissal. Id. at 64-66. The Court held that the
district court was in error in issuing a temporary injunction since such relief requires a
showing of irreparable harm. Id. at 88. The Court held that even if the dismissal results
in the temporary loss of income, ultimately to be recovered, this does not usually consti-
tute irreparable harm. Id. at 90. The Court went further and said that even had the re-
spondent established that her reputation would he damaged as a result of her dismissal
this showing would fall far short of the type of irreparable harm which is a necessary
predicate to the issuance of a temporary injunction. Id. at 91-92. The Court found it
difficult to define in advance when attendant circumstances surrounding a discharge
would amount to irreparable harm. M. at 92 n.68.
3U
 Drew v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 69, 5 FEP Cas. 1077 (5th Cir. 1973);
Hyland v. Kenner Prod. Co., 9 Empl. Prac. Dec. 1 10,108 at 7517 (S.D. Ohio 1974).
These jurisdictions adhere to the view that since § 706(f)(2) relief is statutory, irrepara-
ble harm may be assumed on a prima facie showing of alleged Title VII violations. See
9 Empl. Prac. Dec.110,108 at 7517. See text at notes 35-38 supra. Other jurisdictions
have held that the issuance by the EEOC of a right-to-sue letter is a jurisdictional pre-
requisite to a § 706(0(2) suit by a private individual. Thus the private party would be
prevented from seeking injunctive relief under § 706(f)(2) until after the party had re-
ceived the letter. The letter is not issued until either the EEOC has dismissed the
charge or until at least 180 days have passed since the charges were filed and the EEOC
has not concluded the case to the charging party's satisfaction. See 42 U.S,C. 2000e-
5(0(1). See also Nottleson v. A.O. Smith Corp., 397 F.Supp. 928, 11 FEP Cas. 1214 (E.D.
Wis. 1974); Troy v. Shell Oil Co., 378 F.Supp, 1042, 8 FEP Cas. 1044 (E.D. Mich.
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employees and their counsel in these jurisdictions should consider
when possible the opportunity of seeking injunctive relief individually
or through the EEOC before initiating a private suit, especially since a
suit seeking temporary relief under section 706(0(2) would not bar a
private party from subsequently bringing a section 706(f)(1) action for
permanent relief." Thus by delaying the private action and theoreti-
cally the end of the administrative process until after the institution of
a section 706(f)(2) suit for temporary relief, an employee may avoid
the higher standards required for irreparable harm in traditional
temporary injunction actions, and be required only to meet the lower
standards necessary for temporary relief under section 706(1)(2) suits.
1974). Since in all likelihood, the EEOC will be too overburdened to investigate charges
and bring an action for temporary relief on behalf of the charging party, see 480 F.2d
at 74, 5 FEP Cas. at 1080, the practical effect of requiring the issuance of a right-to-sue
letter as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private action under § 706(0(2) is that no tem-
porary relief can be obtained between the time charges are filed and the issuance of a
right-to-sue letter at least 180 days later. It is unclear whether those jurisdictions which
would require a right-to-sue letter as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a § 706(1)(2) suit by
a private individual would impose the more stringent requirements for irreparable
harm. However, since the lesser standard is based on a statutory interpretation of §
706(0(2) it is unlikely that these courts would require the higher standard in suits for
temporary relief under the statute.
" EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 186, 13 FEP Cas. 472, 481 (N.D.
111. 1975). But cf. Continental Oil Co., — F.2d —, 14 FEP Cas. 365 (10th Cir. 1977)
(The court here would not permit the instigation by the EEOC, and the aggrieved party
of separate section 706(0(1) actions based on the same facts). In Rinella, after investigat-
ing charges of discrimination, the EEOC instigated an action for temporary relief under
§ 706(0(2) in federal district court. Id. at 178, 13 FEP Cas. at 474. The aggrieved party
subsequently filed an action for permanent relief under § 706 (0(1). The defendant ar-
gued that the statutory scheme precludes duplicative lawsuits based on the same facts.
Id. at 185-86, 13 FEP Cas. at 480. The court, while agreeing with this salutary principle,
noted that the injunctive suit by the Commission was based on § 706(0(2) while the pri-
vate action was based on a separate statutory provision, 706(0(0, and that thus there
were different forms of relief sought. 401 F.2d at 186, 13 FEP Cas. at 481. Accordingly
the Renella court permitted both suits to continue.
While the court in Rinella permitted the private action for permanent relief pur-
suant to § 706(0(1) to be brought subsequent to the EEOC suit for temporary relief
under § 706(0(2), this situation is distinguishable from the one presented in Pacific
Press. In Rinella the § 706(0(2) suit by the EEOC was brought prior to the private ac-
tion. To deny a private party the right then to seek permanent relief would be to deny
him the full scope of remedies provided by the statute. 401 F.Supp. at 186, 13 FEP Cas.
at 481. The Court in Rinella found nothing in the statutory framework which would
prevent the expansion of a § 706(0(2) suit into a § 706(0(1) suit for permanent relief.
Id. In Pacific Press, on the other hand, since the second action is the EEOC suit for
temporary relief, the charging party is not denied the full panoply of statutory relief
when the court denies the later EEOC action for temporary relief. The aggrieved party
might also be able to intervene in the Commission's 706(0(2) suit and expand it into a
suit for permanent relief under section 706(0(1). EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F.
Supp. 175, 186, 13 FEP Cas. 472, 481 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The court in Rinella took note
of, without answering, the question of whether the statute would permit intervention in
a § 706(0(2) suit by private parties since intervention is given as a matter of right only
to private individuals in § 706(f)(1) suits. Id. at 186, 13 FEP Cas. at 481.
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XI. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WHITES: McDonald v. Santa Fe
Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment practices
against "any individual ... because of such individual's race, color, re-
ligion, sex, or national origin."' Although no federal court of appeals
directly confronted the issue, federal district courts divided on the
question of whether Title VII encompasses suits by white persons for
discrimination on the basis of their race.' Similarly, lower federal
courts divided on the question of the applicability to employment dis-
crimination suits by whites of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 3 which grants to "[a)11
persons" in the United States "the same right ... to make and enforce
contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... . "4 During the Survey
year the Supreme Court decided McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transpor-
tation Co.,' concluding that both Title VII" and section 1981 7 extend
to employment. discrimination against members of the white race. Ac-
cordingly, white persons may now sue under either statute to redress
discrimination grievances.
McDonald involved suit by two white employees against their em-
ployer, alleging that., the employer had discriminatorily fired them."
The white employees and a black co-worker had been charged with
misappropriating sixty one-gallon cans of antifreeze from a shipment
being carried by the employer Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.
(Santa Fe). Santa Fe fired the two white employees but retained the
black worker." The white workers filed charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and after receiving
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See also id. §§ 2000e-2(b)-(d),
2000e-3.
'Compare Parks v. Brennan, 389 F. Supp. 790, 793, 10 FEP Cas. 358, 360 (N.D.
Ga. 1974) (court has jurisdiction under Title VII for claim of racial discrimination
against whites), rend on other grounds sub nom. Parks v. Dunlop 517 F.2d 785, 786, 11
FEP Cas. 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) with Mete v. United States Dept of jus-
tice, 395 F. Supp. 592, 596, 10 FEP Gas. 1000, 1002 (D.N.j. 1975) (white male is not a
member of the class protected by Title VII).
See, e.g„ Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 325, 3 FEP Gas. 900, 907 (§ 1981
extends to both blacks and whites), impliedly aff'd on rehearing, 452 F.2d 315, 327, 329-
30, 4 FEP Cas. 121, 123-24 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Hollander
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90, 94, 10 FEP Cas. 473, 475-76 (D. Conn. 1975)
(same). Contra, Balc v. United Steelworkers, 6 FEP Cas. 824, 825 (W.D. Pa. 1973), offd
without opinion, 503 F.2d 1398, 8 FEP Cas. 1006 (3d Cir. 1974) (§ 1981 does not apply to
racial discrimination against whites); Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205, 211,
6 FEP Cas. 566, 570 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (same).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
427 U.S. 273 (1976).
"Id. at 285.
Id. at 296.
8 Id. at 276. The employees also charged their union International Brotherhood
of Teamsters Local 988 with having "acquieSced and/or joined in" the employer's dis-
crimination. hi. at 284. The Court determined that the union would also be liable under
Title VII for the same reasons, see text at notes 16-26 infra, that it determined the em-
ployer would be liable. Id. at 285.
"Id. at 276.
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notice of their right to sue" brought an action against Santa Fe in
federal district court, stating claims under both Title VII and 42
U.S.C. § 1981." The United States District Court for the Southern
District of Texas dismissed the claim on the pleadings, holding that
section 1981 is inapplicable to white persons." The court also con-
cluded that since the employees had not alleged that the charges of
misappropriation were false, the fact that a black employee was re-
tained while the similarly situated white employees were fired was in-
sufficient to state a claim under Title VII.' 3 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the
district court's dismissal of both the Title VII and the section 1981
claims."
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of ap-
peals and upheld the petitioner's right to bring suit under both Title
VII and section 1981.' 5 The Court dealt with each claim separately.
With respect to the petitioners' Title VII claim, the Court unan-
imously concluded that Title VII encompasses diScrimination against
whites." The Court reached this decision through consideration of
the language, legislative history and EEOC interpretations of the stat-
ute. Title VII, the Court noted, prohibits discrimination against "any
individual" on account of race." Hence, the Court concluded that by
its terms the statute's application is not limited to members of a par-
ticular race." Moreover, the Court noted several examples of legisla-
tive history which supported its view that Title VII's protections ex-
tend to all races.' 9 For example, the Court quoted remarks made dur-
ing House floor debate on Title VII that the proposed bill "[would]
cover white men and white women and all Americans." 20 The Court
also cited statements made in an interpretive Senate memorandum
that the policies of Title VII included "the obligation not to dis-
criminate against whites."2 ' Thus, the Court concluded that the legis-
lative history was "uncontradicted" to the effect that Title VII's cover-
age extended to white persons."
In addition, the Court recognized that the EEOC's in-
terpretations of Title VII, which were entitled to "great deference" by
"Id.
" 10 FEP Cas. 1162, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
"Id.
"3 1d. at 1165.
" 513 F.2d 90, 90-91, 10 FEP Cas. 1165, 1165-66 (5th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
' 3 427 U.S. at 285, 296.
" Id. at 280. Although this part of the opinion was joined by all members of the
Court, the Court was not unanimous in its resolution of the section 1981 issue. See note
41 infra.
' 7 427 U.S. at 278, quoting 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970).
427 U.S. at 278-79.
"lid. at 280.
" Id. at 280, quoting 110 CONC. REC. 2578 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Geller).
2' McDonald, 427 U.S. at 280, quoting I 10 CoNG. REC. 7218 (1964) (memorandum
of Sen. Clark).
22 427 U.S. at 280.
1184
ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW
reviewing courts," were in accord with the legislative history." The
Court noted that the EEOC has consistently concluded that Title VII's
protections extend to whites." Accordingly, the Court held that "Title
VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this
case upon the same standards as would be applicable were they Ne-
groes and [their co-worker] white." 26
Although the Court determined that its holding in McDonald was
consistent with prior Title VII cases, it did recognize that. its previous
cases which had raised issues of racial discrimination had involved dis-
crimination against blacks." In two such cases, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co." and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 2 " the Court had dealt with
issues of burden of proof. In Griggs the Court stated that Title VII
proscribed "[d]iscriminatory preference for any [racial] group, minority
or majority."'" Thus, Griggs was consistent with the holding in
McDonald that Title V I I's protections extended to whites. 3 '
The consistency between the McDonald holding and the language
of McDonnell Douglas was not, however, so readily apparent. In
McDonnell Douglas the Court established the manner in which a plain-
tiff could prove a prima facie case in an individual Title VII action. 32
One of the requisite elements of that prima facie case was that "[a
plaintiff] belong [] to a racial minority ...." 3 However, after delineat-
ing the elements of the prima facie case, the Court then qualified its
definition by stating that "specification ... of the prima facie proof
required ... is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing
factual situations."' Accordingly, the Court in McDonald read its prior
statement requiring that plaintiff belong to a racial minority as being
merely illustrative:
(dequirement (i) [belonging to a racial minority] of this
sample pattern of proof was set out only to demonstrate
how the racial character of the discrimination could be
established in the most common sort of case, and not as•an
23 111. at 279, quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
" 427 U.S. at 279.80 & n.7.
25 Id., citing inter afia EEOC Decision No. 75-268, 10 FEP Cas. 1502, 1504 (1975)
(employer who fails to hire a white woman because of her race violates Title VII);
EEOC Decision No. 74.31, 7 FEP Cas. 1326, 1328 (1973) (the EEOC must not derogate
its "congressional mandate to eliminate all practices which operate to disadvantage the
employment opportunities of any group protected by Title VII, including Caucasians.")
" 427 U.S. at 280.
27 Id. at 279 & n.6.
2"401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
2s411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
3"401 U.S. at 431, quoted in McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279 (emphasis added in
McDonald).
3 ' See 427 U.S. at 279.
31 4 1 1 U.S. at 802.
33 Id.
3 ' /d. at n.1 3.
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indication of any substantive limitation of Title VII's pro-
hibition of racial discrimination.35
Thus, the Court concluded that its holding in McDonald that racial
discrimination against whites was within the purview of Title VII did
not conflict with its decision in McDonnell Douglas. 36.
The Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe also noted that even if the
charges of misappropriation were true, this would not serve as an
adequate defense to the employees' allegation of racial discrimina-
tion." The Court conceded that an employee's participation in steal-
ing cargo from an employer could constitute sufficient grounds for
discharge." However, in order for an employer to avoid violating
Title VII, the Court stated, any criteria for discharge had to be
applied without discrimination: "[Title VII] prohibits all racial dis-
crimination in employment, without exception for any group of par-
ticular employees and while crime or other misconduct may be a
legitimate basis for discharge, it is hardly one for racial discrimina-
tion."39 Accordingly, since the Court concluded that petitioners had
stated a valid Title VII claim, it remanded the case to the lower court
for consideration of the complaint on its merits."
Seven Justices reached the same conclusion with respect to the
section 1981 claim, namely, that section 1981 is applicable to racial
discrimination in private employment against white persons.'" The
Justices reached this conclusion through interpretation of the lan-
guage and the legislative history of the section." Although the lan-
guage of section 1981 granted rights "as [are] enjoyed by white per-
sons," the majority noted that such rights were granted to all per-
sons," including whites. 43 The Court construed the language "as is en-
joyed by white persons" as simply "emphasizing the racial character of
the rights being protected.'"44 Under the Court's construction, there-
fore, the white employees' claim against Santa Fe was cognizable
under section 1981 since the employees alleged that their rights had
been abridged because of their race.




'll Id, at 283 (emphasis in original).
"M. at 296.
4 ' Id. at 286-87. Justices White and Rehnquist dissented from the Court's conclu-
sion with respect to the § 1981 claim, 427 U.S. at 296 (White and Rehnquist, JJ., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), on the basis of their dissent in Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). In Runyon the dissenters concluded that § 1981 was in-
applicable to claims of private discrimination. 427 U.S. at 192 (White and Rehnquist, JJ,
dissenting). Accordingly, since McDonald involved a case of private discrimination, Jus-
tices White and Rehnquist would not agree that 1981 was applicable to the case. 427
U.S. at 296 (White and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"427 U.S. at 286-87.
"Id. at 287, quoting 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1970) (emphasis added in McDonald).
44 427 U.S. at 287, quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966).
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The Court found in the legislative history of section 1981
further support for the position that the statute extended to whites. 45
Section 1981 was originally codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 46
The Court noted that in the Senate where the original bill, without
the language "as is enjoyed by white citizens," was considered and
passed, both proponents and opponents of the legislation recognized
that the bill would apply equally to blacks and whites.'" After passage
in the Senate the bill went to the House and was there amended to in-
clude the descriptive phrase indicating that the rights guaranteed
would be those "as [are] enjoyed by white citizens." 48 The floor man-
ager of the bill offered the amendment, as a technical adjustment, to
"perfect" the bill, and the House accepted the amendment without
discussion or debate. 4 " The McDonald Court noted, that in subsequent
debate on the amended bill, members of the House recognized that
the legislation still covered all races.'" As the House floor manager
stated, the bill "secures to citizens of the United States equality in the
exemptions of the law.... Whatever exemptions there may be shall
apply to all citizens alike. One race shall not be more favored in this
respect than another."" The purpose of the floor manager's amend-
ment, the McDonald Court pointed out, was to satisfy the members of'
the House that the bill would not extend to discrimination against
women or minors. 52
 Rather, the amendment was enacted to em-
phasize that the bill addressed issues of racial discrimination." Thus,
the McDonald Court determined that the members of the House in
passing the bill intended it to cover all races.
The McDonald Court next analyzed the legislative history which
stemmed from the Senate's subsequent consideration of the amended
House bill. The Court noted that during Senate debate on this House
version of the bill the amendment "as is enjoyed by white citizens" was
not viewed as limiting to blacks the protection of the legislation." In-
deed, the Senate floor manager agreed that the amending language
was "superfluous,"" stating: "I do not think [the words] alter the
['k]nd as in the opinion of the [Senate Judiciary] [C]ommittee
which examined this matter, [the words] did not alter the meaning of
the bill, the Committee thought proper to recommend a concurrence
" 427 U.S. at 287.
4 " Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (amended by Act of May 31, 1870,
ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat, 144),
" 427 U.S. at 288.90.
4 " Id. at 290-91, citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1115 (1866).
ill Id .
"427 U.S. at 291.92,
" GONG. GLoisii, 39th Cong,, 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (remarks of Rep. Wilson),
quoted in McDonald, 427 U.S. at 292-93.
53 427 U.S. at 293 & 11.23.
53 Id. at 293.
54 1d. at 294.
" CLING. GI.oittl, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1413 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Trumbull),
quoted in McDonald, 427 U.S. at 295.
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...."" Consequently, as the McDonald Court noted, 57 the Senate ac-
quiesced in the House version of the bill." The bill was sent to Pres-
ident Andrew Johnson, who vetoed it, returning it to Congress for
further consideration." Both Houses subsequently overrode the veto
by the requisite margin and the bill became law." The McDonald
Court found nothing in the legislative history of these subsequent
considerations which contradicted its determination that the congres-
sional intent behind section 1981 was to provide protection from ra-
cial discrimination to all people." Thus, the Court concluded that
[ulnlikely as it might have appeared in 1866 that white citi-
zens would encounter substantial racial discrimination of
the sort proscribed under the Act, the statutory structure
and legislative history persuade us that the 39th Congress
was intent upon establishing in the federal law a broader
principle than would have been necessary simply to meet
the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed
Negro slaves. And while the statutory language has been
somewhat streamlined in reenactment and codification,
there is no indication that § 1981 is intended to provide any
less than the Congress enacted in 1866 regarding racial dis-
crimination against white persons."
Consequently, the Court permitted the white employees in McDonald,
in redressing their charge of racial discrimination, to join a claim
under section 1981 with their Title VII claim."
McDonald was applied during the Survey year in the Sixth Cir-
cuit case of Haber v. Klassen." In Haber the United States District
Court for the'Northern District of Ohio had initially determined that
a white male postal clerk could not sue tinder Title VII when a less
qualified black employee was granted a work assignment which the
white employee had desired." The Sixth Circuit in a per curiam opin-
ion reversed the district court's decision in light of McDonald." The
circuit court thus recognized that a claim of racial discrimination
against whites is cognizable under Title VII.
Not all such claims of "reverse discrimination" may, however, be
recognized under Title VII. Although in McDonald the Supreme
"Id.
"427 U.S. at 295.
5° CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1416 (1866).
59
 See id, at 1679.
6° See id. at 1809 (Senate); id. at 1861 (House).
" 1 427 U.S. at 295.
@ 2 Id. at 295-96.
"Id. at 296.
" 540 F.2d 220, 13 FEP Cas. 450 (6th Cir. 1976), rev'g per curiam 10 FEP Cas.
1446 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
65 10 FEP Cas. 1446, 1446-47 (N.D. Ohio 1975),
" 540 F.2d at 220. 13 FEP Cas. at 450 (6th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
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Court held that Title VII applies to white persons to the same extent
that it applies to minority races, 67 the Court noted that Santa Fe did
not claim that it fired the white employees pursuant to any affirmative
action program. The Court specifically emphasized that "we do not
consider here the permissibility of such a program, whether judicially
required or otherwise prompted."" Thus, McDonald expressly re-
serves decision on the validity of affirmative action programs. Accord-
ingly, although the Supreme Court in McDonald determined that
whites are covered under Title VII and section 1981, decision on af-
firmative action awaits another case.69
67 427 U.S. at 280.
68 Id. at 281 n.8.
68 The Court currently has before it a case involving a challenge to a special ad-
missions program favoring disadvantaged minority applicants to the medical school of
the University of California at Davis. That challenge is based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34,
38, 553 13.2d 1152, 1155, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 683 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. ION
(1977).
See also Hefner v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 	 Supp.__, 14 FEP Cas. 826
(E.D. La. 1977), a decision in which the district court denied relief to white employees
who claimed that they had been injured by seniority relief which had been awarded to
their black co-workers pursuant to a consent decree filed in a prior Title VII action
against the white and black workers' employer. Id, at—, 14 FEP Cas. at 826-27. The
white employees had sued under both Title VII and 1981. Id, at_, 14 FEP Cas. at
827. The court dismissed the Title VII claim on the ground that the Supreme Court in
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 771 (1976), had authorized such senior-
ity relief in Title VII actions despite the fact that such relief may adversely affect white
employees._ F. Stipp. at_, 14 FEP Gas. at 828. Accordingly, the district court re-
fused to entertain a challenge to the relief by white employees, particularly since the
employees had neglected to intervene during the pendency of the original suit. Id. The
court dismissed the § 1981 claim on the ground that the circuit court in McDonald had
determined that whites may not sue under § 1981. 1d.
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